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ABSTRACT 
Four Empirical Essays in Development Economics  
by 
KAHSAY Haftom Bayray  
Doctor of Philosophy 
This dissertation contains four empirical studies on related topics in 
development economics. The four studies are all randomized field experiments and 
all of them use original data obtained from rural households in Northern Ethiopia for 
empirical analysis. The first study examines the medium term effects of commercial 
weather index insurance. I examine a randomized controlled trial in which 
commercial weather index insurance was offered to rural households who are highly 
vulnerable to drought. The results show that weather index insurance can 
significantly improve agricultural investments, agricultural yield and also household 
finance.  
 
The second study evaluates the effects of weather index insurance on rural 
households' spending on children's education. I examine whether insured households 
can better pay for their children's education expenses due to better risk management. 
I also examine whether insured households can maintain their children's education 
expenses when they experienced rainfall shocks. The results of these two questions 
are both positive.  
 
The third study examines the level of risk aversion of individuals and of 
groups. Specifically, I examine whether risk preference among poor people with low 
level of education can be framed by interactions among peers. The results of a 
randomized field experiment show that groups not only are more risk averse than 
individuals but also that the risk preference of individuals can be largely affected by 
prior interactions in groups.  
 
The final study examines how individuals provide responses to survey 
questions of sensitive nature. I conducted a randomized field experiment to examine 
whether survey design methods and survey incentives affect how individuals provide 
responses to sensitive questions. The results show that individuals who receive high 
survey incentives will more likely provide positive responses to questions that are 
moderately sensitive in nature (but not highly sensitive). I find no evidence that the 
way survey questions are being asked affects the way individuals respond to sensitive 
questions 
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CHAPTER 1 
General Introduction 
 
This dissertation contains four empirical studies on related topics in 
development economics. The four studies are all randomized field experiments and 
all of them use original data obtained from rural households in Northern Ethiopia for 
empirical analysis. 
In the first study The Medium Term Impacts of Commercial Weather Index 
Insurance: Evidence from Rural Households in Northern Ethiopia, we analyze an 
impact evaluation of a weather index insurance program that is offered commercially 
among rural households in northern Ethiopia. There are four main reasons why it is 
important to conduct an impact evaluation study of a commercially offered weather 
index insurance program. 
The first reason is that, there is a growing literature on empirically evaluating 
the impact of weather index insurance participation among rural households in 
low-income countries (Giné and Yang, 2009; Hill and Viceisza, 2010; Dercon and 
Christaensen, 2011; Cole et al., 2013; Janzen and Carter, 2013; Karlan et al., 2014). 
However, there are still two important sets of knowledge gaps about the impact. First, 
not much is actually known about the impact of weather index insurance when the 
insurance is commercialized and is offered to rural households without subsidy. This 
is because most of the existing studies evaluate the impact of weather index 
insurance programs that are heavily subsidized (Giné and Yang, 2009; Hill and 
Angelino, 2010; Cole et al., 2013; Karlan et al., 2014). Although large subsidies on 
insurance premium can often encourage a high rate of insurance participation in 
conducting impact evaluation, subsidized insurance programs are generally not 
2 
financially sustainable and may not give us reliable estimates on the impact of the 
insurance when the insurance is instead offered commercially. Specifically, when 
rural households have to decide whether to obtain the insurance by their own means, 
the insurance participation rate may be lower and the average impact of weather 
index insurance programs may be different. 
Second, not much is known about the medium-term cumulative impact of 
weather index insurance when the insurance is offered commercially to rural 
households for a number of consecutive years. There are two specific reasons for 
why the evaluation of the medium-term impact of weather index insurance is 
important. The first reason is that in many regions, large rainfall shocks that can 
substantially affect agricultural production do not take place every year (or even 
every two years). Therefore, it is not possible to assess the full and the cumulative 
impact of the weather index insurance (i.e., impacts across good and bad agricultural 
seasons in multiple years) if the impact evaluation is conducted only over a relatively 
short period of time. However, except for a few ones (e.g., Karlan et al., 2014), most 
of the existing studies only evaluate the impact of weather index insurance over one 
or two years (Gine and Yang, 2009; Hill and Angelino, 2010; Madajewicz et al., 
2011; Cole et al., 2013; Janzen and Carter, 2013; Cai et al., 2014). 
The second reason for why the evaluation of the medium-term cumulative 
impact is important is that rural households may need a while before they can fully 
understand the design and features of weather index insurance and to complete all of 
the desired changes in their agricultural production. Rural households in many 
low-income countries typically have a low level of financial literacy (Gaurav et al., 
2011; Cole et al., 2012) and may find it not easy to easily understand the design and 
features of weather index insurance products (Cole et al., 2012; Gine et al., 2013). 
3 
Although interactive exercises and experimental games are sometimes used to 
educate rural households (Norton et al., 2014), rural households can possibly learn 
the most about weather index insurance products through their own experiences of 
having the insurance products for a longer period of time. Therefore, empirical 
studies that last for only one or two years may not capture all of the behavioral 
changes of insured households and also the full impact of the insurance. 
This study makes two main contributions to the existing empirical research 
on the impacts of weather index insurance. The first contribution of this study is to 
investigate the impact of weather index insurance when the insurance is 
commercialized and is offered to rural households without subsidy. Second, our 
study provides empirical evidence on the impact of weather index insurance when 
the insurance is offered commercially to rural households for a number of 
consecutive years (relatively longer period). To examine the medium-term impact of 
weather index insurance, we conduct a randomized controlled trial that has been 
conducted as a part of the Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA) 
project in the Tigray region of Northern Ethiopia since 2010. 
The second study Rainfall Shocks and the Effects of Weather Index Insurance 
on Household Education Expenses: Evidence from Rural Ethiopia evaluates the 
effects of weather index insurance on rural households' spending on children's 
education. Specifically, this essay examines whether insured households can better 
pay for their children's education expenses due to better risk management. It also 
reports whether insured households can maintain their children's education expenses 
when they experienced rainfall shocks.  
In developing countries, children of farming households that practice 
smallholder rain-fed agriculture are vulnerable to rainfall shocks (Jacoby & Skoufias, 
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1997; Jensen, 2000; Janzen and Carter, 2013). Households practicing smallholder 
rain-fed agriculture are usually poor and have few means to mitigate adverse impacts 
of rainfall shocks (Udry, 1994; Morduch, 1995; Dercon et al., 2005).When there are 
large rainfall shocks, many of these households faces a significant drop in 
agricultural income and are mostly forced to reduce investments on children’s 
education (Jensen, 2000; Ferreira and Schady, 2008; Dung, 2013). Some households 
may even pull their children from school and send their children to work for 
additional income (Jensen, 2000; Dung, 2013). Furthermore, as formal credit and 
insurance are usually not available in rural areas, rural households that face large 
rainfall shocks typically fail to take loans to maintain their children’s education 
(Udry, 1994; Morduch, 1995; Jensen, 2000; Giesbert and Schindler, 2012; Dung, 
2013). 
In principle, it is possible that weather index insurance participation helps 
rural households invest in their children’s education. Specifically, if weather index 
insurance can help rural households better manage rainfall risks a priori and can help 
rural households increase the level of agricultural investment and hence also their 
agricultural yield and income (Giné and Yang, 2009; Hill & Angelino, 2010; Cole et 
al., 2013; Karlan et al., 2014), rural households may have more financial resources to 
meet with the investment needs of their children’s education. Furthermore, when 
facing large rainfall shocks, insured households may also receive monetary 
compensation from the insurance policy and this compensation may help them 
overcome cash constraints that usually take place after rainfall shocks. Rural 
households with such compensation are therefore less likely to cut investment in 
their children’s education after rainfall shocks. 
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Given that weather index insurance participation may have the potential to 
promote children’s education investments among rural households, it is surprising 
that to our knowledge, there is little research evaluating the effects of weather index 
insurance on the education expenses of rural households (Chen & Jin, 2012; Janzen 
& Carter, 2013; Landmann & Frolich, 2013). While there are a few empirical studies 
evaluating the linkage between insurance participation and various educational 
outcomes, these studies often focused on school dropouts (Shah & Steinberg, 2015), 
school enrollment and school attendance (Janzen & Carter, 2013), school enrollment 
(Chen & Jin, 2012), and school attendance (Landmann & Frolich; 2013). 
This study, therefore, examines the effects of weather index insurance on the 
education expenditure of rural household. Specifically, our study evaluates whether 
households that purchased weather index insurance policies spend more on the 
education expenses of their children. We also examine whether the effects of the 
insurance on household education expenses are large enough to cover the adverse 
effects of rainfall shocks on household education expenses.  
The third essay Aggregating and Disaggregating Risk Preference: Evidence 
from a Framing Experiment among Ethiopian Farmers presents the results of a 
randomized field experiment conducted with a large number of rural farmers 
randomly selected from Northern Ethiopia. The essay examines whether risk 
preference among poor people with low level of education can be framed by 
interactions among peers.  
Economists have long been investigating the risk preference of individuals 
and also the aggregation of risk preference of individuals in small groups. The 
literature generally finds that groups are more averse to risks and uncertainties than 
individuals. In some of the literature, groups are also shown to be more risk averse 
6 
than individuals are in more risky situations and are less risk averse than individuals 
in less risky situations (Shupp & Williams 2008; Baker et al., 2008; Masclet et al., 
2009; Sutter et al., 2012). 
Despite the large body of theoretical and empirical literature, the existing 
literature on the aggregation of individual risk preference, however, contains a few 
gaps. First, the literature fails to distinguish and compare two different types of 
research designs that examine the aggregation of individual risk preference. Mainly, 
in the literature there are two-arm one-stage research studies that compare the risk 
preference of a sample of individuals side-by-side with the aggregate risk preference 
of groups that are formed by a different sample of individuals (Kocher & Sutter, 
2005; Masclet et al., 2009); there also are one-arm two-stage research studies that 
compare the risk preference of individuals with the aggregate risk preference of 
groups that are sequentially formed by the same sample of individuals (Bateman & 
Munro, 2005; Carlsson et al., 2009; He et al., 2011; Sutter et al., 2012; Amnrus et al., 
2015).
1
 While both types of research design show that small groups are more risk 
averse than individuals, to our knowledge, no literature has examined whether or not 
the results obtained from these two sets of research designs are qualitatively the same. 
In particular, except for a few ones (e.g., Shupp & Williams 2008) most of the 
literature has not pointed out, whether prior structural manifestation of individual 
risk preference has any effects on the aggregation of individual risk preferences in 
small groups. 
Second, the existing literature almost totally neglects the disaggregation of 
group risk preference back to individual risk preference (Baker et al., 2008). The 
                                                     
1
 Baker et al., 2008 exceptionally examine a one-arm three-stage research 
(individual-group-individual) and further investigate how participations in a group discussion (second 
stage) affect individual risk preference in the third stage (phase). 
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disaggregation of group risk preference has also important economic implications, 
however. Many decisions made collectively by small groups under risks and 
uncertainties have to be further managed by or executed by only individuals of the 
groups. As the literature has shown that individuals are typically less risk averse than 
groups, it is important to study whether individuals who participated in group 
decisions on risk and uncertainty tend to be more risk averse as compared to those 
who do not. In particular, whether individuals who experienced risk preference 
decisions in small groups will bring forward the aggregate risk preference of the 
group or will actually revert back to their individual level of risk preference. The 
literature, however, is basically silent on this aspect.  
Third, most empirical research on the aggregation of individual risk 
preference are conducted in experimental settings and computer labs using only 
convenience samples of university students (Kocher & Sutter, 2005; Shupp & 
Williams 2008; Baker et al., 2008; He et al., 2011) or self-selected groups of 
individuals such as married couples (Bateman & Munro, 2005; Carlsson et al., 2009; 
Sutter et al., 2012). In the first case, however, there raises questions about whether 
the findings obtained from university students can offer practical values for real 
world situations and decisions faced by individuals and groups of different 
background (Masclet et al., 2009; Man & Norton, 2015). In the second case, there 
also are concerns about how decisions made by such endogenously formed groups 
can be generalized. 
Fourth, because of research budgetary limitations the experimental scale in 
the existing studies is mostly either small scale as in the case of (Bateman & Munro 
2005; Shupp & Williams 2008; Parkinson & Baddeley, 2011) or moderate scale 
(Kocher & Sutter, 2005; Baker et al., 2008; Masclet et al., 2009; Man & Norton, 
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2015). By contrast, this research is conducted in Ethiopia with poor rural farmers and 
the lower per capita income in Ethiopia allow us to conduct a large scale field 
experiment by providing small cash amount ($3 per participant) as an incentive for 
participation in the experiment. 
This research is designed to address these several limitations of the existing 
literature and has three main goals. First, we aim to compare the two different 
aggregation methods of individual risk preference in small groups and evaluate 
whether the mechanisms on individual risk preference aggregation can have 
differential effects on the elicited group risk preference. Second, we want to 
investigate whether the experience of risk preference in small groups and knowledge 
of risk preference exercise in a small group have any effects on individual risk 
preference. Third, we want to conduct a risk preference study using a more 
methodological sampling procedure to obtain a study sample that has both a higher 
degree of external validity and also a better representation of real communities that 
regularly faces risks and uncertainties. 
In the final essay Eliciting Responses to Sensitive Questions in the Field: A 
Randomized Experiment, we present the results of a randomized field experiment 
conducted with a large number of rural households randomly selected from Northern 
Ethiopia. The essay analyzes the effects of financial incentive, and the framing of 
survey questions on the responses to survey questions of sensitive nature. 
Researchers in the social sciences often conduct research with survey data on 
topics that are considerably sensitive in nature. A large body of empirical work has 
been done on topics related to abortion (Schuman et al., 1981; Peytchev, et al., 2010), 
drugs (Timothy et al., 1989; Aquilino & Sciuto, 1990; Turner, et al., 1998), sexual 
behaviors (Turner, et al., 1998), child labors (Dumas, 2007), and domestic violence 
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(Koenig, et al., 2006; Rabel et al., 2014). One major difficulty that researchers face 
in examining the empirical patterns of these sensitive topics is about the availability 
and the reliability of data. In order to conduct an empirical study of these topics, data 
need to be collected from the field. However, as already shown in the existing 
literature, many people are not willing to take part in field surveys and to response to 
such questions. And even if people agree to participate in field survey, they may not 
necessarily tell the truth. First, some survey questions may be intrusive, socially 
undesirable or sometimes respondent perceives some level of threat of disclosure 
(Tourangeau & Yan, 2007). Second, respondents may not critically read the 
questions and rush their answer due to lack of motivation, cooperation or sense of 
obligation (Jobber & Saundrens, 1988). 
The existing literature on sensitive questions has largely been focusing on 
examining ways to reduce survey nonresponse per se. A large body of literature has 
shown that both monetary and non-monetary incentives can increase survey response 
rates.
2
 Yet, despite the growing literature on the use of incentives to improve 
response rates and response quality in broad ranges of survey modes, there are still 
some fundamental unanswered questions. 
Although field surveys are one of the major methods of how researchers 
collect data from the field, only a few empirical studies have been designed to 
examine whether and how researchers can better obtain information about sensitive 
questions from respondents (Locke et al., 1992; Aquilino, 1994; Tourangeau & Smith, 
1996; Jobe et al., 1996). While there are some empirical studies on mechanisms that 
                                                     
2
 Among the other literature, including (Goetz et al., 1984; Joseph & Peter, 1986; Jobber & Saunders, 
1988; Singer et al, 1999; Leung et al., 2004; Ryu et al., 2005; Baron et al., 2008; Wetzels et al., 2008; 
Petrolia & Bhattacharjee, 2009) examined effects of monetary incentives. (Willimack et al, 1995; 
Kalantar & Talley, 1999; Singer et al, 1999; Leung et al., 2002; Ryu et al., 2005; Haris et al., 2008) 
analyzed the effect of non-monetary incentives. 
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improve responses to sensitive questions, these studies mainly compare the 
disclosure level of sensitive questions (response to sensitive questions) among survey 
modes (Locke et al., 1992; Aquilino, 1994; Tourangeau & Smith, 1996; Jobe et al., 
1996; Brakel et al., 2008), and only a few studies evaluate the impact of promised 
incentive on responses to sensitive questions (Brakel et al., 2008). This essay, 
therefore, contributes to the growing literature by examining the effects of financial 
incentive, and the framing of survey questions on the responses to survey questions 
of sensitive nature.  
  
11 
References 
 
Aquilino, S.W. 1994. Mode effects in surveys of drug and alcohol use: A field 
experiment. American Association for Public Opinion Research, 58 (2), 
210-240 
Ambrus, A., Greiner, B. & Pathak, P.A. 2015. How individual preference are 
aggregated in groups: An Experimental study. Journal of Public Economics, 
129, 1-13. 
Baker, R.J., Laury, Laury, S.K. & Williams, A.W. 2008. Comparing small-group and 
individual behaviour in lottery choice experiments. Southern Economic 
Association, 75(2), 367-382  
Baron, J., Breunig, R., Cobb-Clark, D., Gorens, T., & Sartbayeva, A. 2008. Does the 
effect of incentive payments on survey response rates differ by income 
support history? IZA discussion paper 3473 
Brakel, V.D., Vis_Visschers, R. & Schmeets,J. 2008. An experiment with data 
collection modes and incentives in the Dutch family and fertility survey for 
young Moroccans and Turks. SAGE publications, London. 
Bateman, I. & Munro, A. 2005. An experiment on risky choice amongst households. 
The Economic Journal, 115(502), 176-189.  
Cai, H., Yuyu C., Hanming F. and Li-An Z. 2014. The effect of micro-insurance on 
economic activities: Evidence form a randomized field experiment. 
Unpublished. 
Carlsson, F., He, H., Martinsson, P., Qin, P. & Sutter, M. 2012. Household decision 
making in rural China: Using experiments to estimate the influences of 
spouses. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 84, 525-536. 
Chen, Y. & Jin. Z. G. 2012. Does health insurance coverage lead to better health and 
educational outcomes? Evidence from rural China. Journal of Health 
Economics, 31, 1-14. 
Cole, S, Giné, X. & Vickery, J. 2013. How does risk management influence 
production decisions? Evidence from a field experiment. Harvard Business 
School Working Paper, 13-080. 
Cole, S., Bastian, G.G., Vyas, S., Wendel, S., & Stein, D. 2012. The effectiveness of 
index-based micro-insurance in helping smallholders manage weather-related 
risks. London: EPPI-Centre, Social Science Research Unit, Institute of 
Education, University of London. 
Dercon, S, Hoddinott, J. and Woldehanna, T. 2005. Shocks and consumption in 15 
Ethiopian villages, 1999-2004. Journal of African Economies, 14, 559-585 
Dercon, S. & Chrisiaensen, L. 2011. Consumption risk, technology adoption and 
poverty traps: Evidence from Ethiopia. Journal of Development Economics, 
96, 159-173. 
Dumas, C. 2007. Why do parents make their children work? A test of the poverty 
hypothesis in rural areas of Burkina Faso. Oxford Economic Papers, 59, 
301-329. 
Dung, T.N. 2013. Shocks, borrowing constraints and schooling in rural Vietnam. 
Young Lives Working Paper 94 
Ferreira, F.H.G. and Schady, N. 2008. Aggregate economic shocks, child schooling 
and child health. Policy Research Working Paper 4701, Washington, DC: 
World Bank 
12 
Gaurav, S., Cole, S., & Tobacman, J. 2011. Marketing complex financial products in 
emerging markets: Evidence from rainfall insurance in India. Journal of 
Marketing Research, 48. 
Giesbert, L. & Schindler, K. 2012. Assets, shocks, and poverty trap in rural 
Mozambique. World Development, 40 (8), 1594-1609. 
Giné, X. & Yang, D. 2009. Insurance, credit, and technology adoption: Field 
experimental evidence from Malawi. Journal of Development Economics, 89, 
1-11. 
Goetz, G.E., Tyler, R.T. & Cook, F. 1984. Promised incentives in media research: A 
look at data quality, sample representativeness and response rate. Journal of 
Marketing Research, 21, 148-154. 
Harris, I.A., Khoo, O.K., Young, J. M., Solomon, M.J. & Rae, H. 2008. Lottery 
incentives did not improve response rate to a mailed survey: A randomized 
controlled trial. Journal of Clinical Epidemiology, 61, 609-610. 
He, H., Martinsson, P. & Sutter, M. 2011. Group decision making under risk: An 
experiment with student couples. Working Paper in Economics, 519, 
University of Gothenburg. 
Hill, V.A. & Angelino, V. 2010. An experiment on the impact of weather shocks and 
insurance on risky investment. International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI), IFPRI Discussion paper 00974. 
Jacoby, H. G., and Skoufias, E. 1997. Risk, financial markets, and human capital in a 
developing country. Review of Economics Studies, 64, 311-335. 
Janzen, S.A. & Carter, M. 2013. The impact of microinsurance on consumption 
smoothing and asset protection: Evidence from a drought in Kenya. Micro 
Insurance Innovative Facility Working Paper 31. 
Jensen, R. 2000. Agricultural volatility and investments in children. The American 
Economic Review, 90 (2), 399-404. 
Jobber, D., & Saunders, J. 1988. Modelling the effects of prepaid monetary 
incentives on mail-survey response. Journals of Operational Research 
Society, 39, 365-372. 
Jobe, J. B., Pratt, W. F., Tourangeau, R., Baldwin, A. K. and Rasinski, K. A. (1997) 
Effects of Interview Mode on Sensitive Questions in a Fertility Survey, in 
Survey Measurement and Process Quality (eds L. Lyberg, P. Biemer, M. 
Collins, E. De Leeuw, C. Dippo, N. Schwarz and D. Trewin), John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc., Hoboken, NJ, USA. doi:10.1002/9781118490013.ch13 
Joseph, P. & Peter, L. 1986. Monetary incentives and mail questionnaire response 
rates. Journal of Advertising, 13, 46. 
Karlan, D., Osei, R.D., Osei-Akoto, I., & Udry, C. 2014. Agricultural decisions after 
relaxing credit and risk constraints. NBER Working paper 18463. 
Kalantar, J. & Talley, N. 1999. The effects lottery incentive and lengthy of 
questionnaire on health survey response rates: A randomized study. Journal 
of Clinical Epidemiology, 11, 1117-1122. 
Kocher, M.K. & Sutter, M. 2005. The decision maker matters: Individual versus 
group behavior in experimental beauty-contest games. The Economic Journal, 
115(500), 200-223. 
Koenig, A.M., Ahmed, S., Campbell, J., Jejeebhoy, J.S., & Stephenson, R. Individual 
and contextual determinants of demostic violence in Northern India. 
American Journal of Public Health, 96, 132-138. 
Landmann, A. & Frolich, M. 2013. Can microinsurance help prevent child labor? An 
13 
impact evaluation from Pakistan. Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) 
Discussion Paper 7337. 
Leung, M.G., Ho, L., Chan, M., Johnston, M.J., & Wong, F. 2002. The effects of 
cash and lottery incentives on mailed surveys to physicians: A randomized 
trial. Journal of Clinical Epidemiology, 55, 801-807. 
Locke, S.E., Kowaloff, H., Safran, C., Slack, W.V., Cotton, D., Hoff, R., Popovsky, 
M., McGuff, J. & Page, P. Computer based interview for screening blood 
donors for risk of HIV transmission. Journal of the American Medical 
Association, 29, 1301-1305. 
Madajewicz, M, Michael N., Yesuf M., Gebrehaweria G., and Daniel O. 2011. 
Managing climate risks in smallholder agriculture in Northern Ethiopia: 
Evaluating the impacts of index insurance. Oxfam America evaluation report 
2011 
Man, A. & Norton, G.W. 2015. Social exchange, attitude towards uncertainity and 
technological adoption by Bangladeshi farmers: Experimental evidence. 
Unpublished & available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2612167  
Masclet, D., Boemont, D. L., Colombier, N., & Loheac, Y. 2009. Group and 
individual risk preferences: A lottery-choice experiment with self-employed 
and salaried workers. Journal of Economics Behaviour and Organization, 70, 
470-484. 
Morduch, J. 1995. Income smoothing and consumption smoothing. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 9, 103-114. 
Norton, M., Daniel O., Malgosia M., Eric H., Nicole P., Rahel D., Conner M., 
Tse-ling T., Mengesha G., & Conner M. 2014. Evidence of Demand for Index 
Insurance: Experimental Games and Commercial Transactions in Ethiopia. 
Journal of Development Studies 50(5), 630–648. 
Parkinson, S. & Baddeley, M. 2012. Group decision-making: An economic analysis 
of social influence and individual difference in experimental juries. The 
Journal of Socio-Economics, 41, 558-573 
Petrolia, R.D. & Bahattacharjee, S. 2009. Revisiting incentive effects: Evidence from 
a randomized sample mail survey on consumer preferences for fuel ethanol. 
Public Opinion Quarterly, 73, 537-550. 
Peytchev, A., Groves, M.R. & Peytcheva, E. 2010. Measurement error, unit 
nonresponse, and self-reports of abortion experiences. Public Opinion 
Quarterly, 74(2), 319-327 
Rabel, V.B., Cunningham, A.S. & Stephenson, R. 2014. Interview interruption and 
responses to questions about domestic violence in India, Violence against 
Women an International and Interdisciplinary Journal, doi: 
10.1177/1077801214546905 
Ryu, E., Couper, P.M. & Marans, W.R.2005. Survey incentives: Cash vs In-kind; 
Face-to-face vs mail; Response rates vs nonresponse error. International 
Journal of Public Opinion Research, 18 (1). 
Schuman, H., Ludwig, J., Presser, S. 1981. Context effects on survey responses to 
questions about abortion. American Association for Public Opinion Research, 
45 (2), 216-223. 
Shah, M. & Steinberg, B.M. 2015. Drought of opportunities: Contemporaneous and 
long-term impacts of rainfall shocks on human capital. Unpublished. 
Available at Harvard.edu. 
Shupp, S.R. & Williams, W.A. 2008. Risk preference differentials of small groups 
14 
and individuals. The Economic Journal, 118 (525), 258-283. 
Singer, E., Hoewyk, J.V., Genler, N., Raghunthan, T. & McGonagle, K. 1999. The 
effect of incentives on response rates in interviewer-mediated surveys. 
Journal of Official Statistics, 15, 217-230. 
Sutter, M., He H., & Martinsson, P. 2012. Group decision-making under risk: An 
experiment with student couples. Economics Letters, 117, 691-693 
Timothy, J., James, H. & Richard, C. 1989. Obtaining reports of sensitive behavior: 
A comparison of substance use reports from telephone and face-to-face 
interviews. Social science quarterly, 70(1), 174-183. 
Tourangeau, R. & Smith. W.T. 1996. The impact of data collection mode, question 
format, and question context. American Association for Public Opinion 
Research, 60(2), 275-304. 
Tourangeau, R., & Yan, T. 2007. Sensitive question in surveys. American Psychology 
Bulletin, 133, 859-883. 
Turner, C.F., Lindberg, L.D., Ku, L., Pleck, J.H., & Sonenstein, F.L. 1998. 
Adolescent sexual behavior, drug use, and violence: Increased reporting with 
computer survey technology. Science, 280, 867-873. 
Udry, C. 1994. Risk and insurance in a rural credit market: An empirical 
investigation in Northern Nigeria. Review of Economic Studies, 61 (3), 
495-526. 
Wetzels, W., Schmeets, H., Brakel F.V. & Feskens, R. 2008. Impact of prepaid 
incentives in face-to-face surveys: A large scale experiment with postage 
stamps. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 20 (4). 
Willimack, D., Schuman, H., Pennell, B., & Lepkowski, J. 1995. Effects of a prepaid 
nonmonetary incentive on response rates and response quality in a 
face-to-face survey. The Public Opinion Quarterly, 59(1), 78-92. 
 
  
15 
CHAPTER 2 
The Medium Term Impacts of Commercial Weather Index Insurance: Evidence 
from Rural Households in Northern Ethiopia 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Rain-fed agriculture plays a central role in the economy of many low-income 
countries where a large majority of the population lives in the rural area and most of 
the rural population conduct their farming activities with no or limited access to 
irrigation water (World Bank, 2010). In Ethiopia, for example, over 80 percent of the 
population earns their living in the agricultural sector and almost all of the rural 
population depends primarily on rain-fed agriculture (World Bank, 2012). 
While large variations in rainfall patterns are often reported to substantially 
affect agricultural production in many low-income countries, rural households in 
these countries typically have few means to adequately manage rainfall risks or to 
effectively mitigate adverse impacts that are caused by large rainfall shocks (Udry, 
1994; Dercon et al., 2005). First, rural households in low-income countries are 
generally poor and many of them have a low level of income and savings for 
consumption smoothing over agricultural seasons (Janzen and Carter, 2013). Second, 
formal credit and insurance products typically are not available in the rural area and 
it can be both physically and financially costly for rural households to obtain them in 
nearby cities or major towns (Morduch, 1995; Udry, 1994; Giesbert and Schindler, 
2012).
3
 Third, even though rural households may sometimes help each other through 
informal risk-sharing network at the community level, these risk-sharing 
arrangements typically fail to offer rural household protection from rainfall shocks 
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 In Ethiopia, for example, less than one percent of the rural households have agricultural insurance 
coverage (World Bank, 2010). 
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because rainfall shocks are, in most of the times, systematic at the community level 
(Dercon & Kirchberger, 2008; Cole et al., 2012). 
In the past few years, insurance companies are making innovations in the 
design of agricultural insurance in order to overcome major technical, economic, and 
behavioral barriers and to make agricultural insurance products, both less costly and 
also more suitable for large-scale commercialization (IFAD and WFP, 2010; Zant, 
2008; Dercon et al., 2014). Specifically, insurance companies are making use of 
reliable weather information (those that are available from official weather stations 
and/or those that are available from weather satellites) to develop a new type of 
agricultural insurance products for rural households called weather index agricultural 
insurance (henceforth, weather index insurance). Unlike traditional agricultural 
insurance, which provides protection directly on crop yield and/or crop revenue, 
weather index insurance is designed in a way that links the level of premium, the 
liability of the policy, the conditions for payouts, and the amount of compensations 
to an objective and well-designed weather index.  
With these innovations in the product design, weather index insurance may 
have improved features and cost advantages over traditional agricultural insurance 
and may encourage a higher rate of participation in agricultural insurance among 
rural households in low-income countries (Yoong et al., 2013). First, the marginal 
cost of offering weather index insurance can be substantially reduced. Specifically, 
weather index insurance does not require monitoring of the agricultural inputs ex 
ante or assessment of agricultural damages ex post at the household level or the farm 
level. Second, the design of weather index insurance would not induce moral hazard 
behaviors among insured households. Specifically, the conditions for and the amount 
of payout compensations depends only on an objective weather index and insured 
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households cannot strategically manipulate their crop protection efforts in order to 
increase the likelihood or the amount of payout compensations. Third, with possibly 
a lower level of insurance premium (in part due to the two reasons discussed right 
above), weather index insurance may be able to encourage a higher level of 
participation among rural households (including those who are relatively less 
risk-averse and those who have a smaller scale of agricultural production) and may 
be able to lessen the problem of adverse selection that typically exists in any 
insurance market. 
While there is a growing literature on empirically evaluating the impact of 
weather index insurance participation among rural households in low-income 
countries (Giné and Yang, 2009; Hill and Viceisza, 2010; Dercon and Christaensen, 
2011; Cole et al., 2013; Janzen and Carter, 2013; Karlan et al., 2014), there are still 
two important sets of knowledge gaps about its impacts.
4
 First, not much is actually 
known about the impact of weather index insurance when the insurance is 
commercialized and is offered to rural households without subsidy. This is because 
most of the existing studies evaluate the impact of weather index insurance programs 
that are heavily subsidized (Giné and Yang, 2009; Hill and Angelino, 2010; Karlan et 
al., 2014; Cole et al., 2013). Although large subsidies on insurance premium can 
often encourage a high rate of insurance participation in conducting impact 
evaluation, subsidized insurance programs are generally not financially sustainable 
and may not give us reliable estimates on the impact of the insurance when the 
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 It has been reported that the provision of weather index insurance, for example, can increase 
risk-taking in the form of the adoption of modern inputs (Cole et al., 2013; Karlan et al., 2014). 
Agricultural insurance helps farmers to redirect their farming activities towards relatively risky but 
high return activities. In addition, the provision of agricultural insurance has also been shown to 
improve specialization. Insured households switch from diversified cropping patterns towards 
specialization in few but profitable farming activities (Gine et al., 2005). Furthermore, there are 
evidences that agricultural insurance may increase risk copping ability. Since part of the weather 
shocks are shielded by the insurance company, insured households will be able to smooth their 
consumption in the incidents of drought (Gine et al., 2005; Dercon and Kirchberger, 2008). 
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insurance is instead offered commercially. Specifically, when rural households have 
to decide whether to obtain the insurance by their own means, the insurance 
participation rate may be lower and the average impact of weather index insurance 
programs (both among all households being offered the insurance and among only 
households being insured) may be different. 
Second, not much is known about the medium-term cumulative impact of 
weather index insurance when the insurance is offered commercially to rural 
households for a number of consecutive years. There are two specific reasons for 
why the evaluation of the medium-term impact of weather index insurance is 
important. The first reason is that in many regions, large rainfall shocks that can 
substantially affect agricultural production do not take place every year (or even 
every two years). Therefore, it is not possible to assess the full and the cumulative 
impact of the weather index insurance (i.e., impacts across good and bad agricultural 
seasons in multiple years) if the impact evaluation is conducted only over a relatively 
short period of time. However, except for a few ones (e.g., Karlan et al., 2014), most 
of the existing studies only evaluate the impact of weather index insurance over one 
or two years (Gine and Yang, 2009; Hill and Angelino, 2010; Madajewicz et al., 
2011; Cole et al., 2013; Janzen and Carter, 2013; Cai et al., 2014). 
The second reason for why the evaluation of the medium-term cumulative 
impact is important is that rural households may need a while before they can fully 
understand the design and features of weather index insurance and to complete all of 
the desired changes in their agricultural production. Rural households in many 
low-income countries typically have a low level of financial literacy (Gaurav et al., 
2011; Cole et al., 2012) and may find it not easy to understand the design and 
features of weather index insurance products (Cole et al., 2012; Gine et al., 2013). 
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Although interactive exercises and experimental games are sometimes used to 
educate rural households (Norton et al., 2014), rural households can possibly learn 
the most about weather index insurance products through their own experiences of 
having the insurance products for a longer period of time. Therefore, empirical 
studies that last for only one or two years may not capture all of the behavioral 
changes of insured households and also the full impact of the insurance. 
In this study, we have two overall goals. The first goal is to conduct an 
impact evaluation of a weather index insurance program that is offered commercially 
among rural households in Ethiopia who rely primarily on rain-fed agriculture. The 
second goal builds on the first one. The second goal is to evaluate the medium-term 
cumulative impact of the weather index insurance program.  
In order to achieve these two goals, we examine a randomized controlled trial 
that has been conducted as a part of the Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation 
(HARITA) project in the Tigray region of Northern Ethiopia since 2010. Specifically, 
we evaluate the impact of commercial weather index insurance offered at the village 
level. In the RCT, five rural villages were randomly selected from three 
representative drought-prone districts in Tigray for receiving the weather index 
insurance program for four consecutive years (from 2010 to 2013). Three other 
villages, one from each of the three districts, were also randomly selected as 
untreated, control villages for comparison. We have detailed survey data of about 
400 rural households in the eight sample villages (baseline data collected by 
HARITA researchers in 2010 and endline data collected by us in 2014). The data 
obtained from the two waves of the survey allow us to construct a panel dataset for 
the evaluation of the medium-term cumulative impact of commercial weather index 
insurance over a period of three years. 
20 
Our study has a few limitations, however. First, the scale of the RCT in the 
HARITA project for conducting impact evaluation is only moderate. Although the 
HARITA project was later expanded to offer commercial weather index insurance to 
over 80 rural villages in the Tigray region, due to initial budget and resource 
constraints, baseline data at the household level was only available for 400 
households that are located in eight rural villages. With a moderate scale of the RCT, 
our treatment and control sample are not perfectly balanced. As such, in our 
estimations, we control for a number of household and village characteristics in order 
to obtain reliable causal impact estimates of weather index insurance. 
Second, since no subsidy was provided to rural households for insurance 
participation, insurance participation among rural households who are offered the 
commercial weather index insurance program is fully voluntary. As such, the 
insurance participation rates in the five insurance offering villages are only moderate 
(averaged at 21.5 percent among the five villages).
5
 There are two steps that are 
attempted to obtain reliable causal impact estimates of weather index insurance. First, 
in order to obtain sufficient data of households who purchased weather index 
insurance, in the five offering villages, the HARITA project oversampled rural 
households who choose to participate in weather index insurance. Second, apart from 
obtaining an intention-to-treat (ITT) estimates of the average impact of the weather 
index insurance program in the insurance offering villages (as versus the control 
villages), we also make use of the experimental design of our study to conduct a set 
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 Commercial sales in the five villages in 2010 were 1,306 (Norton et al., 2014). Population in the 
five villages was 36,301 (DRMFSS, 2007). Besides, the five villages on average have a household 
size about 6 to a household (DRMFSS, 2007). Then, we compute the average weather index insurance 
participation rate by dividing the commercial sales in the five villages by the average number of 
households in the five villages. 
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of instrumental variable estimations and obtain treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) 
estimate of program impact.  
Third, our study focuses on the impact of commercial weather index 
insurance on selected outcomes that are most likely to be immediately affected. 
Specifically, we will only evaluate the impact of commercial weather index 
insurance on agricultural expenditure, agricultural yields, and also household finance 
only. We do not evaluate other potential welfare impact of the weather index 
insurance program (such as consumption, health, and education). Demand and 
take-up for weather index insurance are not also the main focuses of this study.
6
 We 
leave these sets of analysis to other future studies. 
The rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses our research venue 
and our research methodology. Section 3 presents the empirical results on the 
medium-term impacts of commercial weather index insurance. Section 4 discusses 
the results and concludes. 
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 However, the determinants of weather index insurance participation have been considered for the 
purpose of instrumental variable (IV) estimations. 
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2.2 Research Venue and Methodology 
 
2.2.1 Research venue 
The HARITA project is conducted in the Tigray region in the Northern part 
of Ethiopia. The Tigray region is predominately rural and about 80 percent of its 4.3 
million population lives in the rural area (CSA, 2007). The region is in severe 
poverty and the per capita income is reported to be only 232 USD (Bureau of Plan 
and Finance, 2010). Cultivable land is scarce in the region as the region is 
predominated by the complex terrains, degraded and arid lands (Ersado et al., 2004; 
Headey et al., 2014). In the rural part of Tigray, the average size of household is 4.6 
(CSA, 2007) and the average land holding of household is only about one hectare 
(Headey et al., 2014). Most of the rural households practice small-scale rain-fed 
agriculture with a limited amount of technology inputs (Ersado et al., 2004). The 
region usually rains in the period from June to September and is dry in most of the 
other months (Disaster Risk Management and Food Security Sector, 2007). The 
region has a lower level of annual rainfall (typically at between 400 and 800 
millimeters per year) and there were several droughts that substantially affected 
agricultural production in the region in the past few decades (Kumasi and 
Asenso-Okyere, 2011).  
The HARITA project is a large-scale development program that is conducted 
in collaboration between private and public organizations both within and outside of 
Ethiopia (including Oxfam America, the International Research Institute for Climate 
and Society of Columbia University, Mekelle University, Nyala Insurance Share 
Company in Ethiopia and the Relief Society of Tigray). The project aims to 
strengthen the livelihood of rural households in the drought-prone area in the Tigray 
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region through promoting better risk management among rural households and 
weather index insurance is the key component of the project (Oxfam America, 2010). 
After some initial pilots, in 2010 the project offered commercial weather index 
insurance to all rural households in five rural villages in the region. In these five 
villages, a total of 1,306 rural households voluntarily purchased weather index 
insurance.
7
  
 
 2.2.2 Sampling Methods 
The sampling of the HARITA project is composed of three major steps. In 
the first step, based on the availability of weather stations, the historical patterns of 
drought occurrences, and also the vulnerability of agriculture production on droughts, 
three districts (or Weredas) from different parts of the Tigray region were selected to 
be the sample districts of the HARITA project. Specifically, Kolla Temben in the 
Central Tigray, Raya Azebo in the Southern Tigray and Saesie Tsaedaemba in the 
Eastern Tigray were selected to be the three study districts.
8
  
The second stage of the sampling involves selecting a number of different 
village communities (or Tabyas) from the three study districts. Due to budgetary 
constraint in the early stage, the HARITA project could only conduct a baseline 
study with a total of eight different village communities in 2010. Specifically, the 
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 The HARITA project has later been expanded to offer weather index insurance in more rural 
villages in the Tigray region. Specifically, in 2014, weather index insurance was offered in 81 rural 
villages in the region and a total of 23,000 rural households have purchased weather index insurance 
(Oxfam America & WFP, 2014). The total sum insured amount has increased to nearly 2.5 million in 
2014. In the last five years, insurance companies collected on average a premium rate of 21.3 percent 
of the total insured amount. 
8
 The three districts locate in three different agro-climatic zones of the region and can broadly 
represent the selected region. Kolla Temben has a mono-modal rainfall pattern. It has a dry low land 
agro-ecology with rugged and high mountains that dominate the topography. It also has average 
latitude of 1,691 meters and has a mean slope of 7.6 percent. Raya Azebo has a bi-modal rainfall 
pattern. It has a lowland agro-ecology, a plain topography, an average altitude of 1683 meters, and a 
mean slope of 5.04 percent. Saesi Tsaedaemab has a mono-modal rainfall pattern. It is in a 
mountainous zone (with low, middle and high lands) and has an average altitude of 2,433 meters and a 
mean slope of 8.6 percent.  
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researchers of the HARITA project randomly chose one village community in each 
of the three districts as control villages that are not offered any intervention on 
weather index insurance. The research team also randomly selected a total of five 
village communities from the three study districts for receiving the weather index 
insurance intervention. In doing this step, there were three sample villages selected 
each in the district of Kolla Temben and the district of Raya Azebo. There were two 
sample villages selected in the district of Saesie Tsaedaemba. 
The last stage of the sampling was to select sample rural households from 
each of the eight sample villages. In the three control villages, the evaluation team 
proportionally and randomly selected 2.9 percent of all households in the three 
villages. Accordingly, the evaluation team respectively randomly selected 48, 26 and 
24 households for control purpose from the village of Agazi, Menj and Werebaye 
(Madajewicz et al,. 2011). That is, a total of 98 rural households were randomly 
selected from the three control villages. In the five offering villages, however, the 
selection of rural households involves further details. Since the HARITA project 
provided no subsidy to rural households for the participation of the weather index 
insurance, in the offering villages there were rural households who purchased 
weather index insurance and also households who chose not to purchase weather 
index insurance. In order to obtain a good representation of these two types of rural 
households in our study sample, the HARITA researchers conducted a stratified 
sampling method in selecting rural households from the five offering villages. First, 
from the list of households who purchased weather index insurance, the researchers 
randomly selected 15 percent of households who purchased insurance from each 
insurance villages and a total of 165 households from the five offering villages were 
proportionally selected). Second, from the list of households who chose not to 
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purchase weather index insurance, 3.5 percent of the households who decided not to 
buy insurance were proportionally selected from the five insurance treatment villages. 
Accordingly, the researchers randomly selected a total of 132 households 
proportionally from the 5 villages. Therefore, in the baseline survey in 2010, there 
were 395 households in the sample.  
Due to attrition, however, we could only follow up with 373 of the 395 rural 
households in the sample in the endline survey that is conducted by us in 2014. The 
rate of attrition was small and was at only about 5 percent over a period of four years. 
We compared the baseline characteristics of the households who dropped out in our 
endline survey with those who stayed in the endline survey and found no systematic 
patterns.
9
 Therefore, we believe that the low rate of attrition is not likely to affect 
our results. 
 
2.2.3 Weather Index Insurance Intervention 
The intervention of this RCT study was the offering of commercial weather 
index insurance to all of the rural households in the five offering villages. In each of 
the five villages, a village-specific weather index was first developed for the design 
of the weather index insurance policies. Specifically, the International Research 
Institute for Climate and Society at Columbia University used both data of past 
rainfall experiences collected from rural households through a series of interactive 
exercises and also historical rainfall estimates obtained from the African Rainfall 
Climatology (ARC) satellite to construct an objective, village-specific weather index. 
Ground-level rainfall information (whenever available) was also used to supplement 
the estimates obtained from the weather satellite. 
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 For the sake of brevity, results from the attrition analysis are not shown but are available upon 
request 
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Once the weather indexes for all the five villages were developed, 
village-specific weather index insurance policy was designed and then offered to the 
rural households. During the four years of the study period, two insurance companies 
(Nyala Insurance Share Company and Africa Insurance Company) offered the 
product through local microfinance institutions (MFIs).
10
  
Commercial weather index insurance was offered in the five offering village. 
Specifically, in each of the offering villages, households were offered weather index 
insurance for each of the agricultural seasons during the study period that pays a 
maximum liability up to 3,000 Ethiopian Birr (about 150 US dollars) with a 
minimum threshold of 800 Birr.
11
 One of the challenges for weather index insurance 
marketing is many farmers in developing countries prefer to buy a policy for smaller 
premium (Gine et al., 2010). Farmers in the HARITA project have also shown a 
similar behavior, many farmers chosen the minimum threshold to lower the premium 
cost (especially those who buy insurance on cash base). On average farmers pay a 
premium about 20 percent of the sum insured, which actually depends on the 
contract phase. The lowest premium paid by farmers is about ETB 160. Even though 
the level of liability selected by many of the farmers is small, it has significant 
economic meaning for rain-fed dependent smallholder farmers. For example, the 
lowest liability policy (ETB 800) is nearly equivalent to the mean cash loans 
received the year before the baseline survey. It can also cover mean cost of inputs, 
including cost of chemical fertilizer, cost of hybrid seeds and land preparation cost.  
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 The two insurance companies further obtained reinsurance services from the Swiss-Re Group.  
11
 Insurance policies were designed for Wheat and Teff (Mostly cultivated endemic crop). Farmers 
can buy insurance for any or both of the crops. 
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2.2.4 Data Collection 
As already mentioned above, this study makes use of two waves of household 
survey data to construct a panel dataset for the evaluation of the medium term 
impacts of commercial weather index insurance. Specifically, in July 2010, 
researchers in the HARITA project conducted the first household survey and 
collected baseline data about the rural household. Then, in February 2014, we 
conducted a follow-up survey with the same set of rural households and collected 
endline household data. In each of the two waves of the household survey, the rural 
households provided a wide range of information including basic characteristics of 
household members, health and education of household members, agricultural 
activities, household assets, and also agricultural risks and coping mechanisms. 
 
2.2.4.1 Dependent variables 
In the two waves of surveys, we obtained household level data for five 
different major expenditures on agricultural activities. Specifically, we have data on 
the expenditure on land preparation (which includes oxen rent, equipment rent and 
labor cost for land preparation), expenditure on hybrid seeds, expenditure on 
chemical fertilizers used, and expenditure on farming labor (both family labor and 
hired labor).
12
 Using these information, we also obtain an estimate of the total 
expenditure on farming at the household level (i.e., the sum of all the inputs 
mentioned above).
13
  
The behavioral change to adopt better farm technologies discussed in the 
previous paragraph is expected to improve crop yields. The hypothesis is that buyers 
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 The investment on these inputs and their return depend on the realization of good amount of 
rainfall and they are considered as risky investment activities in our study area. 
13
 We impute the cost of family labour using the average level of wages that are paid to hired 
labourers. The 2013 endline values are adjusted for inflation. 
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of WII index insurance improve their yield because of their engagement in prudent 
risk taking activities in the form of new technologies as mentioned in the previous 
paragraph. As long as insured farmers are willing to engage in prudent risk taking 
activities in the form of adoption of new technologies because of insurance 
participation, the second causal channel to understand the impact of WII is through 
its effect on household level economic outcome as measured by harvest value. We 
obtain imputed data on two measures of agricultural outcomes. First, we impute the 
total value of agricultural output. In the surveys, rural households reported the type 
and the amount of agricultural outputs they obtained from their harvest. Then, we 
imputed the value of gross output using the price report for the nearest district based 
on the Ethiopian monthly market watch produced by the WFP. The total value of 
agricultural output is then calculated as the value of gross output from various crops 
cultivated and the values are calculated based on post-harvest prices. Second, we 
calculated the amount of agricultural income net of agricultural costs (henceforth, net 
agricultural income). Specifically, we obtain a net agricultural income of the rural 
household by deducting the costs of all of the agricultural inputs (i.e., those that are 
discussed in the paragraph above) from the total imputed value of agricultural output 
as defined in this paragraph before.  
Since we are also interested in estimating whether the commercial weather 
index insurance has any impact on the finance of the rural households, we further 
make use of the data collected in the survey to construct a few variables that can 
represent some aspects of the financial situation of the rural households. Specifically, 
in the household survey, we obtain the total amount of savings (in cash) of the 
households and also the total amount of cash loans received by the households in the 
year before the baseline and endline surveys. Our intervention is expected to 
29 
positively affect loans. In our study areas, farmers mainly buy fertilizer and seeds in 
terms of loans and at the time of drought, many farmers are unable to pay their loans. 
As such, insured farmers are expected to pay back their loans and consequently get 
more loans for agricultural investments such as fertilizer and seeds in the planting 
season.
14
  
In addition, we evaluate the change of the household assets using the total 
value of livestock (including cattle, horses, sheep, goats, poultry, and other animals) 
that the households have in the baseline and endline periods. Livestock is the major 
asset for farmers in rural Ethiopia and it is also used as ex post shock coping 
mechanism. The income and risk management effects of weather index insurance 
may be translated to positively affect livestock holdings. Improvements in income 
which is a potential effect of weather index insurance should, therefore, positive 
impact on livestock asset. Weather index insurance also assists to smooth 
consumption at the time of the shocks, insured households do not need to engage in 
coping strategies, including sale of livestock in order to smooth consumption (risk 
management effect of WII). 
2.2.4.2 Treatment variables 
The RCT design of our study allows us to define two related treatment 
dummy variables to capture the weather index insurance intervention. Since the 
weather index insurance intervention was offered at the village level, we first define 
the dummy variable, Household in Insurance Offering Village to represent whether 
                                                     
14 Our expectation on the effects of the intervention on savings is mixed. In one hand, weather index 
insurance possibly increases farm income in good years. So, this income effect may increase both 
consumption and savings. On the other hand, capital is scarce for farmers in our study areas; therefore, 
farmers may prefer to invest more in agricultural production than keeping their money in safe assets 
such as savings. Moreover, since insured farmers are partly protected from higher income volatility 
due to weather shocks, insured households perhaps save less and invest more in productive but riskier 
farming activities. 
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the rural households live in one of the five insurance offering villages or not. 
Specifically, the variable equals one (1) if the rural households lived in the insurance 
offering villages and equals zero (0) if it was otherwise. 
Since the HARITA project provides no subsidy to encourage insurance 
participation, insurance participation was purely voluntary and not every of the rural 
households living in the insurance offering villages purchased the insurance. 
Therefore, we created another dummy variable, Households Participated in 
Insurance, to represent whether the rural households participated in the weather 
index insurance. Specifically, this variable equals one (1) if the rural households 
lived in one of the five insurance offering villages chose to participate in the weather 
index insurance and equals zero (0) if it was otherwise. Since weather index 
insurance was not available in the three control villages, the variable is set to zero (0) 
for all of the sample rural households in these villages. 
2.2.4.3 Control variables: Household characteristics 
Due to the moderate scale of the RCT study, the characteristics of the sample 
rural households may not be perfectly balanced between the five insurance offering 
villages and the three untreated control villages. Therefore, in our regression analysis, 
we also make use of various household information that are available in the baseline 
survey to construct a number of household characteristics as control variables. 
Specifically, we construct a dummy variable on whether the head of the household is 
a female (1=yes; 0=no), a variable on the age of household head (and also a variable 
of the square of the age of the household head), a variable on the number of years of 
education of household head received, a variable on the size of household, and also a 
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variable on the size of farmland owned by the household.
15
 We call this set of 
household variables as the baseline household characteristics. 
2.2.4.4 Control variables: Severe crop failure due to droughts 
In our endline survey, we also collected information about households’ 
rainfall experience in the four year study period (2010 to 2013). Specifically, we 
asked our study households to report their drought experience and its severity level. 
Based on the households’ report, we created a dummy variable, severity of crop 
failure, to indicate the occurrence of rainfall shock in the four year study period. 
Severity of crop failure equals one (1) if the household reported severe crop failure 
due to drought and equal to zero (0) if the household reported either no crop failure 
due to drought or only moderate crop failure due to drought.  
 
2.2.5 Statistical Approach 
We use both descriptive statistics and regression analyses to estimate the 
impact of the weather index insurance intervention on agricultural expenditure, 
agricultural yield, and also household finance. In our regression analysis, we obtain 
robust estimates of the standard errors with the use of clusters of observations at 
village level. 
The basic model of our regression analysis is village fixed effects (FE) model 
in a value added  
 
Yij
endline
 = a0 + a1*Village Insurance Offeringj + a2*Yij
baseline
 +a3*Crop_failureij 
+μj + eij.                            (1)  
 
                                                     
15
 In Tigray-Ethiopia, major land redistribution was last implemented in 1992. Therefore, the size of 
farmland does not change much in our study period. 
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Yij
baseline
 and Yij
endline 
are the baseline and the endline outcome variables of 
interest (agricultural expenditure, agricultural yield and household finance) for 
household i in village j. Our independent variable is the dummy variable Village 
Insurance Offeringj. Crop_failureij is a dummy variable used to describe the 
occurrence of rainfall shock. A set of village dummies, μj, are included in the model 
to control for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneities at the village level. We hope 
that the estimate for the parameter a1 can give us an Intention-To-Treat (ITT) 
estimate of the average impact of the weather index insurance intervention in the 
medium term.  
In order to control for potential differences in the baseline characteristics of 
the sample households between the five insurance offering villages and the three 
untreated control villages, we further include in the model a set of baseline 
household characteristics (as defined in the above section). The model which 
controls for various baseline household characteristics is as follows: 
 
 Yij
endline
 = a0 + a1*Village Insurance Offeringj + a2*Yij
baseline
 + a3*Household 
 Characteristicsij + a4*Crop_failureij + μj + eij.               (2) 
 
In the two regression models above, we target to obtain reliable estimates of 
the intention-to-treat effect of the weather index insurance intervention. However, as 
the HARITA project did not provide rural households with any subsidy for the 
weather index insurance, not all rural households that were offered the opportunities 
to purchase weather index insurance eventually chose to participate in the insurance 
(by making payment themselves). As such, the actual impact of taking-up the 
weather index insurance (not just being offered the insurance) is not estimated in the 
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above model. At the same time, the participation of weather index insurance in our 
offering villages is clearly selective (and endogenous) due to voluntary participation. 
For this reason, we conduct a set of instrumental variable (IV) estimation to obtain 
reliable Treatment-on-the-Treated (TOT) estimate of the impact of taking-up weather 
index insurance. Specifically, we make use of the random assignment of the weather 
index insurance program across the eight sample villages, as represented by the 
variable Village Insurance Offering, to instrument for the actual participation status 
of rural households, as represented by the variable, Household Purchased Insurance. 
The first stage of the IV model is as follows: 
 
Household Purchased Insuranceij = b0+ b1*Village Insurance Offeringj + 
b2*Household Characteristicsij + b3*Crop_failureij + μj + υij.       (3) 
 
Household Purchased Insuranceij is a dummy variable that equals one (1) if 
the rural household chose to participate in weather index insurance and equals zero 
(0) if otherwise.
16
 Household Characteristicsi is the same set of household 
characteristics at the baseline as already defined above. Crop_failureij is a dummy 
variable used to describe the occurrence of rainfall shock. A set of village dummies, 
μj, are also included in the model to control for unobserved time-invariant 
heterogeneities at the village level. 
After estimating the first stage of the IV model, we obtain predicted values of 
                                                     
16
 The dependent variable in our first stage IV is binary, in the first stage IV a nonlinear regression 
model such as probit model may seem appropriate. However, according to Angrist (1999) the second 
stage estimate, in the case of nonlinear first stage, may be inconsistent unless the model for the first 
stage conditional expectation function (CEF) is correct. On the contrary, the second stage estimates, in 
the case of first stage linear probability model, is consistent whether or not the first stage conditional 
expectation function (CEF) is linear. Angrist (1999), therefore, suggests the safest option is to use a 
linear probability model in the first stage. 
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the Household Purchased Insurance variable, Predicted Household Purchased 
Insurance, and use these predictions to run the second stage of the IV regression:  
 
Yij
endline
 = c0 + c1* Predicted Household Purchased Insuranceij + c2*Yij
baseline
 + 
c3*Household Characteristicsij + c4*Crop_failureij + μj + eij.        (4) 
 
We hope that the estimate for the parameter c1 in the IV model above can 
give us a reliable estimate for the Treatment-on-the-treated impact of the take-up of 
the weather index insurance intervention. 
 
2.3. Average Impacts of Weather Index Interventions 
 
2.3.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports summary statistics on key variables used in our analysis. 
Panel A presents the basic demographic characteristics. Most of the household heads 
are illiterate (on average household heads attend 1.5 years of education). The average 
size of household is 5.3 persons to a household with nearly 44 year old household 
head. Female household heads are by far less than the male household heads. On 
average, 36 percent of our sample has female household heads. In panel B we also 
present summary statistics of several agricultural assets. The households in our 
sample study area are small farm holders with little amount of savings. On average, a 
household owns about 3.5 tsimad (nearly one hectare) of land with Birr 218.4 cash 
savings. Panel C reports household expenditure on various agricultural inputs, 
including land preparations, chemical fertilizer, hybrid seeds and farming labor. 
Panel D reports value of agricultural produce and agricultural income. 
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Table 2 provides a summary of the baseline mean comparison of sample rural 
household in our treatment and control villages. The key outcome variables 
(agricultural expenditure, agricultural yield and finance—panel B to D) are not 
balanced in some of the cases across treatment and control villages. Hence, the fixed 
effect and instrumental variable statistical estimations in a value added are made to 
account for the baseline differences. 
In Appendix Table 2, we report the mean comparison of sample rural 
households in treatment and control villages at the endline in 2013. It indicates that 
weather index insurance intervention improves value of livestock, expenditure on 
land preparation, expenditure on farming labor and total expenditure on farming 
(Column 3, and row 7, 9, 12 & 13). On the other hand, the descriptive statistics show 
no statistical evidence that weather index insurance intervention improves 
expenditure on chemical fertilizer, yield and cash savings. While weather index 
insurance increases cash savings, expenditure on chemical fertilizer and yield 
(Column 3, and row 6, 10, 14 & 15), the estimates are not statistically significant. 
Surprisingly, the estimate for the expenditure on hybrid seeds is negative and 
significant at the 10% level (Appendix table 2, column 3, and row 11). It seems that, 
by the descriptive statistics, weather index insurance has positive effects on some of 
our outcome variables. However, the findings from descriptive statistics may be 
biased because of different confounding factors. 
Moreover, in order to be sure that our multivariate result is not confounded 
by compliance problem, we compared the participation status at the baseline and 
endline. Appendix table 4 documents partly the compliance of the different 
households in the offering village. As it can be seen from the table there is a 
difference in the number of compilers and non-compliers at baseline and endline 
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(Appendix table 4- Row five and six). To ensure if compliance is a problem or not 
we compared the average outcome using treatment status at baseline versus the 
average outcome using treatment status at endline.
17
 Then, our objective is to see if 
there is a significant difference between the two results. We found no significant 
difference between the two regression results. 
 
2.3.2 Multivariate Result  
Our multivariate results provide a slightly different story from the descriptive 
results described above. Specifically, when we estimate the basic model (equation 1) 
as discussed above, we find that weather index agricultural insurance (WII) 
intervention improves agricultural investment. Weather index insurance intervention 
raises total expenditure on farming by Birr 171.49 (Table 4-Column 5, row 1) and is 
significant at the 1 percent level. We also try to decompose farm investment in-to 
land preparation, chemical fertilizer, hybrid seeds and farming labor and see the 
impact. We find WII intervention has also positive and significant impact on the 
decomposed components of farm investment. Particularly, WII intervention increases 
expenditure on land preparation, expenditure on chemical fertilizer and expenditure 
on hybrid seeds, respectively by Birr 53.97 (se=22.39), Birr 67.89 (se=6.64) and Birr 
13.27 (se=1.33), and the estimated values are significant at the one percent level 
(Columns 1-3, row 1). Table 4 also shows that past rainfall shock experience 
adversely affects agricultural investment. Particularly, the occurrence of severe crop 
failure due to drought in past years significantly reduces expenditure on land 
preparation (Column 1, row 2).  
                                                     
17
 Results for the second sets of regression are not show but are available from the author upon 
request 
37 
In order to capture the observed baseline differences between treatment and 
control villages, in Table 5 we report estimates of the impact of WII intervention 
controlling for differences in baseline household characteristics (we estimate model 
(2) above). The impact on both the aggregate and disaggregate farm investment is 
large, positive and significant. Specifically, the total expenditure on farming is Birr 
482.70 (se=54.99) higher for rural households in the offering village than the farmers 
in the control villages and is significant at the one percent level (Column 5, row 1). 
Moreover, we also find that WII intervention improves the disaggregated 
components of farm investment. The expenditure on land preparation, expenditure on 
chemical fertilizer and expenditure on hybrid seeds are higher for rural households 
who are in the offering villages (Column 1-3, row 1). Overall, a comparison of Table 
4 (basic model) and Table 5 (adjusted model) shows that, after controlling for 
baseline differences in household characteristics the impact of WII became larger 
and values are significant at the one percent level.  
 
2.3.3 Instrumental Variable Estimation Results 
The application of instrumental variable (IV) estimation depends on finding 
valid instrumental variables(s). We use the random assignment of the weather index 
insurance program at the village level as an instrument for household weather index 
insurance participation in estimating the model (3) above. Annex table 3 reports the 
first stage IV result that regresses household insurance participation on village 
treatment status controlling for investment outcome variables at baseline, household 
baseline characteristics and village dummies. Overall, we find a strong and 
significant effect of village treatment status on household insurance treatment 
(Annex table 3, column 1-5, and row 1). Moreover, the requirement for a valid IV is 
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also satisfied. The first stage regression statistics (F-statistics) is large enough to 
reject the null hypothesis of weak IV (Annex table 3, columns 1-5, row 12). 
Table 6 reports the results from estimating the second stage IV regression (or 
it estimates model (4) above). The IV estimates tell us a story which is very similar 
to those discussed before. For example, total expenditure on farming (aggregate 
value) is Birr 562.74(se=139.74) higher for rural households with insurance than 
without insurance (Column 5, row 1). The value is large, positive and statistically 
significant at the one percent level. Further, to see the impact on specific agricultural 
input decisions; we also disaggregate the farm investment. It shows that WII 
intervention increases expenditure on land preparation, expenditure on chemical 
fertilizer and expenditure on farming labor. Particularly, the expenditure on land 
preparation, expenditure on chemical fertilizer and expenditure on farming labor are 
respectively Birr 117.27 (se=31.56), Birr 82.28 (se=29.07) and 358.04 (112.69) 
higher for policy holder rural households than rural households who do not buy 
insurance (Column1, column 2 & column 3, row 1) and the values are significant at 
the one percent level. The effect on expenditure on hybrid seeds is positive, but not 
statistically significant (Column 3, row 1). In fact, when we compare the results of 
the average treatment effect on the treated households with those of village level 
effects, the effects on the treated households is higher than the village level effects. 
Appendix table 1 presents IV estimates that tell us an important story on 
rainfall shocks, weather index insurance and insurance compensation. Experience of 
rainfall shock in the preceding years reduces expenditure on agricultural investment 
(Column 1-5, row 3) but the coefficients are not statistically significant except for 
expenditure on chemical fertilizer. Insurance (along with ex-ante behavioral change 
to adopt risky technologies) increases expenditure on land preparation, expenditure 
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on chemical fertilizer, expenditure on farming labor and total expenditure on farming 
respectively and the values are statistically significant (Column 1, column 2, column 
4 & column 5, row 1). Insurance compensation (ex-post shock) also help to maintain 
expenditure on chemical fertilizer and expenditure on hybrid seeds (Column 2 & 
column 3, row 2), and, the coefficients are statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level.  
 
2.3.4 Estimation on Agricultural Yield and Household Finance 
In Table 7 we present estimates from second stage IV regression results to see 
if the effects of WII intervention can go beyond agricultural investment. It shows that 
the effects are not limited to farm investment. Rural households who bought WII 
have improved the total value of agricultural output. The total value of agricultural 
output (total revenue) is Birr 748.05 (se=400.39- column 1, row 1) higher for 
households with weather index insurance than without insurance. However, the 
increase in the value of agricultural output seems not sufficiently large to generate a 
significant change in agricultural income. As it can be seen from the table the impact 
of WII intervention on agricultural income is positive, but not statistically significant 
(Column 2, row 1).  
In addition to yield and agricultural income, we also investigate the impact of 
WII on cash savings and cash loans. Here, the effect is again positive and significant. 
Cash savings and cash loans received are Birr 128.01 (se=67.27) and Birr 235.64 
(se=46.45) higher for buyers compare to rural households without WII (Columns 3& 
5, row1). Moreover, table 7 suggests that low levels of rain in the preceding years 
reduce agricultural output and farm income (Column 1 & column 2, row 2) but the 
coefficients are not statistically significant.  
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2.4. Discussion and Conclusion 
This study makes two main contributions to the existing empirical research 
on the impacts of weather index insurance. The first contribution of this study is to 
investigate the impact of weather index insurance when the insurance is 
commercialized and is offered to rural households without subsidy. Second, our 
study provides empirical evidence on the impact of weather index insurance when 
the insurance is offered commercially to rural households for a number of 
consecutive years (relatively long period). To examine the medium-term impact of 
weather index insurance, we conduct a randomized controlled trial that has been 
conducted as a part of the Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA) 
project in the Tigray region of Northern Ethiopia since 2010. 
Overall, our results are not too different from the RCT studies carried out by 
Karlan et al. (2014) in Ghana and Cole et al. (2013) in India. The main differences lie 
in the decomposed investment impact. In our case the decomposed impact is large, 
positive and significant, whereas in Cole et al. (2013) the decomposed part brought 
no impact except investment on pesticide. This should not be surprising, however. 
Our study is based on a large scale commercial sale of insurance where rural 
households will not have any motive to hide their true behavior; in their intervention 
they provided large subsidies. Our study also covers a four year period, which gives 
enough factors of production adjustment time. 
It is important to note that our results reported in the above paragraphs are not 
caused by substitution effects among the selected inputs for our impact study. We 
offer two possible justifications. First, the labor cost for both treatment and control 
households has been increased. Had there been a substitution of other inputs for labor, 
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labor cost could have declined for both or either of the cohorts. Second, studies show 
that there is an excess labor surplus in rural Ethiopia. There is no incentive for rural 
households to substitute other inputs for labor. Thus, the driving factor is the change 
in behavior that induces insured rural households to be engaged in higher risk and 
higher return production activities.  
Our results are also consistent with the story that rainfall shock experience 
reduces agricultural investment (past rainfall shock experience deteriorates savings 
and also it is a barrier to the adoption of agricultural technologies like chemical 
fertilizer), weather index insurance (along with ex-ante technology adoption 
behavioral change) helps better management of agricultural investment and insurance 
compensation (ex-post) also help to maintain farmers’ investment on risky 
agricultural inputs such as chemical fertilizer.  
In general, our results provide the following three sets of conclusions. The 
first one is that carefully designed and implemented weather index insurance can 
indeed improve agricultural investment, yield and finance. Second, weather index 
insurance should be promoted given its strong potential effect, lower cost, lower 
moral hazard and simple to implement. Third, from a development points of view our 
result suggests that variability of weather coupled with incomplete insurance markets 
may hinder agricultural development in developing countries. As such, an 
introduction of innovative weather index insurance in developing countries may play 
a significant role in boosting investments, savings and economic growth.   
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1 
Summary statistics of sample rural households in the Tigray Region in Northern Ethiopia in 2010 (N=395) 
 Mean S.D. Min Max 
A. Demographic characteristics     
Female household head (1=Yes; 0=No) 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Age of household head (in years) 43.89 13.94 18.00 80.00 
Years of education of household head 1.52 2.57 0.00 10.00 
Size of household 5.34 2.24 1.00 12.00 
B. Household finance     
Size of farmland (in tsimad) 3.53 2.96 0.00 23.00 
Cash savings (in Birr) 218.39 1,228.00 0.00 15,000.00 
Value of livestock (in Birr) 6,163.94 9,057.74 0.00 67,545.00 
Total Cash loans received the year before (in 
Birr) 
1100.92 2526.76 0.00 31957.00 
C. Agricultural costs     
Expenditure on land preparation (in Birr) 484.92 813.41 0.00 9,200.00 
Expenditure on chemical fertilizer (in Birr) 194.38 322.87 0.00 2,677.00 
Expenditure on hybrid seeds (in Birr) 44.53 96.14 0.00 654.00 
Expenditure on farming labor (in Birr) 1,625.98 2,163.03 0.00 16,100 
Total Expenditure on farming (in Birr) 2,349.81 2,918.72 0.00 22,009 
D. Agricultural yield     
Total value of agricultural produce (in Birr) 5,827.05 29,487.48 0.00 441,020.00 
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Imputed agricultural income (in Birr) 3,473.53 29,649.22 -20,938.40 439,559.00 
 
Data source: Data for the 2010 survey is provided by the Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA) program. 
Note: Size of farmland is measured in tsimad and 1 tsimad equals 0.25 hectare.  
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Table 2 
Mean comparison of sample rural households in offering and control villages in the Tigray Region in Northern Ethiopia in 2010 
 Offering 
village 
(N=297) 
Control 
village 
(N=98) 
Difference 
(1) – (2) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Demographic characteristics    
Female household head (1=Yes; 0=No) 0.383 0.275 0.108* (0.054) 
Age of household head (in years) 42.76 47.29 -4.53*** (1.71) 
Years of education of household head 1.60 1.25 0.35 (0.273) 
Size of household 5.27 5.51 -0.23 (0.289) 
Household finance    
Size of farmland (in tsimad) 3.389 2.42 1.47*** (0.250) 
Cash savings (in Birr) 224.29 200.50 23.78 (167.59) 
Value of livestock (in Birr) 6,421.78 5,382.51 1,039.27 (874.5) 
Cash loans received the year before (in Birr) 1,176.95 870.48 306.46 (250.3) 
Agricultural costs    
Expenditure on land preparation (in Birr) 524.27 365.65 158.62* (69.09) 
Expenditure on chemical fertilizer (in Birr) 213.19 137.34 75.84** (36.19) 
Expenditure on hybrid seeds (in Birr) 39.74 59.02 -19.27* (11.42) 
Expenditure on farming labor (in Birr) 1,790.00 1,129 661*** (193.58) 
Total Expenditure on farming (in Birr) 2,567.30 1,690.80 876.5*** (265.02) 
Agricultural yield    
Total value of agricultural produce (in Birr) 6,542.52 3,666.01 2,876.50 (2269.6) 
Imputed value of agricultural income (in Birr) 3,969.60 1,975.20 1,994.40 (2286.2) 
Data source: Data for the 2010 survey is provided by the Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA) program. 
Note: Size of farmland is measured in tsimad and 1 tsimad is 0.25 hectare. Standard errors reported in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
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Table 3 
The participation of weather index insurance among rural households in 2010 
 
Dependent variable: Household purchased insurance (1=Yes; 0=No) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Household in insurance offering village (1=Yes; 0=No) 0.556** 
(0.11) 
0.530** 
(0.11) 
0.573*** 
(0.09) 
Female household head (1=Yes; 0=No) 
 
0.132 0.0686 
  
(0.10) (0.10) 
Age of household head (in years) 
 
-0.012 -0.006 
  
(0.01) (0.01) 
Years of education of household head 
 
0.028* 0.033* 
  
(0.01) (0.01) 
Size of household 
 
0.016* 0.028** 
  
(0.01) (0.01) 
Size of farmland (in tsimad) 
  
-0.015 
   
(0.01) 
Total cash savings (in Birr) 
  
-0.000 
   
(0.00) 
Total value of livestock (in Birr) 
  
-0.000* 
   
(0.00) 
Total cash loans received last year (in Birr) 
  
-0.000 
   
(0.00) 
Observation (N) 395 395 395 
Adjusted R-Square 0.235 0.265 0.309 
Data source: Data for the 2010 survey is provided by the Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA) program. 
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Note: Size of farmland is measured in tsimad and 1 tsimad is 0.25 hectare. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the village level are 
reported in parentheses. 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively. 
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Table 4 
Intended-to-treat (ITT) estimates of the impact of weather index insurance on agricultural expenditure over a period of four years (in Birr) 
 
(1) 
Expenditure on land 
preparation  
(2) 
Expenditure on 
chemical 
fertilizer  
(3) 
Expenditure on 
hybrid 
seeds  
(4) 
Expenditure on 
farming 
labor  
(5) 
Total 
Expenditure on 
farming  
      
Household in insurance offering village 
(1=Yes; 0=No) 
53.97***(22.39) 67.89***(6.64) 13.27***(1.33) 41.32(81.05) 171.49***(18.14) 
Reported number of severe rainfall shocks 
household faced in the last four years 
-67.84** (27.24) -16.06(16.40) 9.62 (7.03) -77.68 (133.55) -133.06) 
Expenditure on land preparation in 2010 0.07*** (0.010) 
    
Expenditure on chemical fertilizer in 2010 
 
0.11***(0.030) 
   
Expenditure on hybrid seeds in 2010 
  
0.08*(0.040) 
  
Expenditure on farming labor in 2010 
  
 0.12***(0.020) 
 
Total Expenditure on farming in 2010 
   
 0.13***(0.020) 
Village dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations (N) 373 372 372 373 371 
Adjusted R-square 0.17 0.30 0.14 0.18 0.21 
Data source: Data for the 2010 survey is provided by the Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA) program. Data for the 2013 
survey is collected by the author. 
Note: Size of farmland is measured in tsimad and 1 tsimad is 0.25 hectare. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the village level are 
reported in parentheses. 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively. 
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Table 5 
Adjusted intended-to-treat (ITT) estimates of the impact of weather index insurance on agricultural expenditure over a period of four years (in 
Birr) 
 
(1) 
Expenditure on land 
preparation  
(2) 
Expenditure on 
chemical 
fertilizer  
(3) 
Expenditure on 
hybrid 
seeds  
(4) 
Expenditure on 
farming 
labor  
(5) 
Total Expenditure 
on 
farming  
Household in insurance offering village (1=Yes; 
0=No) 
72.58**(21.89) 94.84***(14.33) 16.86***(1.53) 181.31*(96.89) 482.70***(54.99) 
Reported number of severe rainfall shocks 
household faced in the last four years 
-53.65*(28.09) -7.61(21.40) 11.03(6.70) -21.53(137.03) -58.59(193.03) 
Expenditure on land preparation in 2010 0.04***(0.01)     
Expenditure on chemical fertilizer in 2010  0.07*(0.03)    
Expenditure on hybrid seeds in 2010   0.05(0.04)   
Expenditure on farming labor in 2010    0.06***(0.01)  
Total Expenditure on farming in 2010     0.06***(0.01) 
Female household head (1=Yes; 0=No) -74.02**(23.62) -42.39***(11.50) -7.11(4.98) -222.45*(116.29) -327.42**(136.04) 
Age of household head (in years) 9.19(6.27) 0.35(4.06) 0.84(1.61) 38.19(22.44) 48.58(32.91) 
Years of education of household head 8.07(5.67) 10.36**(3.62) 1.87*(0.87) 48.35**(15.54) 68.84**(23.18) 
Size of household 13.71**(5.07) 10.72**(3.11) 1.54(1.25) 112.97***(13.29) 136.11***(15.29) 
Size of farmland 3.80(4.46) 5.77*(2.60) 0.26(0.68) 12.50(17.40) 21.37(23.55) 
Village dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations (N) 373 372 372 373 371 
Adjusted R-square 0.30 0.43 0.18 0.36 0.39 
Data source: Data for the 2010 survey is provided by the Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA) program. Data for the 2013 
survey is collected by the author. 
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Note: Size of farmland is measured in tsimad and 1 tsimad is 0.25 hectare. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the village level are 
reported in parentheses. 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively.  
53 
Table 6 
Treatment-on-the-treated (TOT)/Instrumental variable (IV) estimates of the impact of weather index insurance on agricultural expenditure over a 
period of four year (in Birr) 
 
(1) 
Expenditure on 
land 
preparation  
(2) 
Expenditure on 
chemical 
fertilizer  
(3) 
Expenditure on 
hybrid 
seeds  
(4) 
Expenditure on 
farming 
labor  
(5) 
Total Expenditure 
on 
farming  
      
Household purchased insurance (1=Yes; 0=No) 117.27***(31.56) 82.28***(29.07) 2.40(17.03) 358.04***(112.69) 562.74***(139.74) 
Reported number of severe rainfall shocks 
household faced in the last four years 
-52.14**(22.55) -34.49(22.92) 3.86(7.97) -30.43(101.42) -103.42(147.66) 
Expenditure on land preparation in 2010 0.04***(0.01)     
Expenditure on chemical fertilizer in 2010  0.09***(0.03)    
Expenditure on hybrid seeds in 2010   0.07*(0.04)   
Expenditure on farming labor in 2010    0.06***(0.01)  
Total Expenditure on farming in 2010     0.07***(0.01) 
Household characteristics 
Village dummies 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Observations (N) 373 372 372 373 371 
Adjusted R-square 0.23 0.38 0.11 0.29 0.31 
Data source: Data for the 2010 survey is provided by the Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA) program. Data for the 2013 
survey is collected by the author. 
Note: The dummy variable “Household purchased insurance” is instrumented by a village insurance treatment dummy variable. Household 
characteristics includes female household head (1=yes; 0=no), age of household head, years of education of household head, size of household 
and size of farmland. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the village level are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively.  
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Table 7 
Treatment-on-the-treated (TOT)/Instrumental variable (IV) estimates of the impact of weather index insurance on agricultural outcome and 
household finance over a period of four year (in Birr) 
 
(1) 
Total value of 
agricultural 
produce 
(2) 
Imputed farm 
income 
 
(3) 
Total cash 
savings 
 
(4) 
Total value of 
livestock 
 
(5) 
Total cash 
loans received 
the year before 
Household purchased insurance (1=Yes; 
0=No) 
748.05*(400.39) 102.54(365.79) 128.01*(67.27) 108.77*(58.69) 235.64***(46.45) 
Reported number of severe rainfall shocks 
household faced in the last four years 
-382.49(266.21) -236.12(302.09) -183.38(130.34) 81.68(186.39) 5.57(92.47) 
Total value of agricultural produce in 2010 0.0003(0.001)     
Imputed agricultural income in 2010  -0.001(0.001)    
Total cash savings in 2010   0.09(0.07)   
Total value of livestock in 2010    0.02***(0.01)  
Total cash loans received in 2010     0.02(0.01) 
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Village dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observation (N) 367 365 373 373 373 
Adjusted R-square 0.14 0.10 0.05 0.10 0.10 
Data source: Data for the 2010 survey is provided by the Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA) program. Data for the 2013 
survey is collected by the author. 
Note: The dummy variable “Household purchased insurance” is instrumented by a village insurance treatment dummy variable. Household 
characteristics includes female household head (1=yes; 0=no), age of household head, years of education of household head, size of household 
and size of farmland. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the village level are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively. 
  
55 
Appendix 
Appendix Table 1 
Treatment-on-the-treated (TOT)/Instrumental variable (IV) estimates of the impact of weather index insurance on agricultural expenditure over a 
period of four year (in Birr) 
 
(1) 
Expenditure on 
land 
preparation  
(2) 
Expenditure on 
chemical 
fertilizer  
(3) 
Expenditure on 
hybrid 
seeds  
(4) 
Expenditure on 
farming 
labor  
(5) 
Total Expenditure 
on 
farming  
      
Household purchased insurance (1=Yes; 0=No) 127.01***(34.79) 
68.12**(27.01) -6.31(19.10) 354.74***(137.47
) 
543.88***(166.11
) 
Household purchased insurance * Rainfall 
shock 
-83.05(97.15) 133.13*(77.41) 75.22*(40.63) 29.60(483.29) 165.66(636.37) 
Reported number of severe rainfall shocks 
household faced in the last four years 
-23.73(28.10) -80.43**(31.55) -21.73(15.20) -40.62(183.24) -160.76(240.54) 
Expenditure on land preparation in 2010 0.04***(0.01)     
Expenditure on chemical fertilizer in 2010  0.08***(0.03)    
Expenditure on hybrid seeds in 2010   0.07**(0.03)   
Expenditure on farming labor in 2010    0.06***(0.01)  
Total Expenditure on farming in 2010     0.07***(0.01) 
Household characteristics 
Village dummies 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Observations (N) 373 372 372 373 371 
Adjusted R-square 0.23 0.35 . 0.29 0.31 
Data source: Data for the 2010 survey is provided by the Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA) program. Data for the 2013 
survey is collected by the author. 
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Note: The dummy variable “Household purchased insurance” is instrumented by a village insurance treatment dummy variable. Household 
characteristics includes female household head (1=yes; 0=no), age of household head, age of household head square, years of education of 
household head, size of household and size of farmland. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the village level are reported in 
parentheses. 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively.  
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Appendix Table 2 
Mean comparison of sample rural households in offering and control villages in the Tigray Region in Northern Ethiopia in 2013 
 Offering 
village 
(N=297) 
Control 
village 
N=(98) 
Difference 
(1) – (2) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Demographic characteristics    
Female household head (1=Yes; 0=No) 0.325 0.387 -0.062 (0.024) 
Age of household head (in years) 46.40 50.50 -4.10** (1.67) 
Years of education of household head 1.47 1.07 0.39 (0.305) 
Size of household 5.38 5.13 0.245 (0.238) 
Household finance    
Size of farmland (in tsimad) 3.37 2.47 0.91** (0.359) 
Cash savings (in Birr) 146.6 68.50 78.10 (81.69) 
Value of livestock (in Birr) 379.30 170.20 209.10** (95.5) 
Cash loans received the year before (in Birr) 293.30 220.00 73.00 (48.05) 
Agricultural costs    
Expenditure on land preparation (in Birr) 177.50 112.70 64.80*** (22.4) 
Expenditure on chemical fertilizer (in Birr) 174.20 156.60 17.60 (17.76) 
Expenditure on hybrid seeds (in Birr) 17.54 26.40 -8.86* (5.02) 
Expenditure on farming labor (in Birr) 985.48 793.23 192.24* (102.84) 
Total Expenditure on farming (in Birr) 1,359.00 1,098.00 260.00*(129.7) 
Agricultural yield    
Total value of agricultural produce (in Birr) 1,155.00 948.00 207.00 (210) 
Imputed value of agricultural income (in Birr) (197.00) (148.00) (49.00) (201) 
Observations (N) 280 93 187 
Data source: Data for the 2013 survey is collected by the author. 
Note: Size of farmland is measured in tsimad and 1 tsimad is 0.25 hectare. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate 
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significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively. 
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Appendix Table 3 
First-stage estimation of the treatment-on-the-treated (TOT)/Instrumental variable (IV) estimates of the impact of weather index insurance on 
agricultural expenditure over a period of four year (in Birr) 
 
Household purchased insurance (1=Yes; 0=No) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Household in insurance offering village 
(1=Yes; 0=No) 
0.743*** 
(0.064) 
0.774*** 
(0.067) 
0.743*** 
(0.064) 
0.749*** 
(0.065) 
0.750*** 
(0.066) 
Expenditure on land preparation in 2010 Yes     
Expenditure on chemical fertilizer in 2010  Yes    
Expenditure on hybrid seeds in 2010   Yes   
Expenditure on farming labor in 2010    Yes  
Total Expenditure on farming in 2010     Yes 
Household characteristics 
Village dummies 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Observations (N) 373 372 372 373 371 
Adjusted R-square 0.441 0.44 0.441 0.441 0.439 
First stage regression statistics:      
F-statistics 161.9 (p=0.000) 130.76 (p=0.000) 161.3 (p=0.000) 165.8 (p=0.000) 166.2 (p=0.000) 
Durbin-WU-Hausman test of endogenity 
Chi-square 
11.54 (p=0.0007) 6.16 (p=0.013) 0.014 (p=0.90) 11.87 (p=0.001) 14.34 (p=0.0002) 
Ho: Variable exogenous      
Data source: Data for the 2010 survey is provided by the Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA) program. Data for the 2013 
survey is collected by the author. 
Note: Household characteristics includes female household head (1=yes; 0=no), age of household head, age of household head square, years of 
education of household head, size of household and size of farmland. Size of farmland is measured in tsimad and 1 tsimad is 0.25 hectare. Robust 
standard errors adjusted are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively. 
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Appendix Table 4 
Sample frame summaries and observational counts 
 Count at 2010 Count at 2013 Difference 
 (1) (2) (2) – (1) 
All sample households 395 373 22 
A. Households in offering villages  297 280 17 
- Insured households  165 188 23 
- Uninsured households 132 92 40 
B. Households in control villages 98 93 5 
Difference between treatment and 
control villages (A-B) 
199 187 12 
Data source: Data for the 2010 survey is provided by the Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA) program. Data for the 2013 
survey is collected by the author. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Rainfall Shocks and the Effects of Weather Index Insurance on Household 
Education Expenses: Evidence from Rural Ethiopia 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Economic and rainfall shocks have huge negative impacts to the 
accumulation of human capital among children in developing countries (Jensen, 2000; 
Escobal, 2005; Edmonds, 2006; Janvry et al., 2006; Duryea et al., 2007; Guarcello et 
al., 2007; Ferreira and Schady, 2008; Ferreira and Schady, 2009; Dung, 2013). For 
example, in Brazil, labor market shocks that trigger loss of the father’s income have 
caused school dropouts (Duryea, 1998; Neri et al., 2000; Skoufias & Parker, 2002; 
Duryea et al., 2007). In Mexico recession has also caused drops in school attendance 
(Jacoby and Skoufias, 1997; Binder, 1999) while rainfall shocks adversely affected 
farm income and increased school dropouts and drops in school enrollment in India 
and Ivory Coast (Jacoby & Skoufias, 1997; Jensen, 2000). Similarly, adverse 
agricultural conditions have been shown to have caused reductions in education 
expenses and investments (Jensen, 2000). In the long run, rainfall shocks have also 
been shown to significantly affect human capital formation (Alderman et al., 2004). 
While adverse rainfall, in general, pushes down the average child wage rate 
that reduces the opportunity cost of schooling leading to improve child schooling 
(Jensen, 2000); households, on the other hand, desperately look to any kind of means 
which likely to cause high marginal utility of child income leading to negative child 
schooling (Ferreira and Schady, 2008). Therefore, the extent in which shocks affect 
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child education depends on the strength of the two effects operating in the opposite 
direction (Ferreira and Schady, 2008). 
In developing countries, children of farming households that practice 
smallholder rain-fed agriculture are particularly vulnerable to rainfall shocks (Jacoby 
& Skoufias, 1997; Jensen, 2000; Janzen and Carter, 2013). Households practicing 
smallholder rain-fed agriculture are usually poor and have few means to mitigate 
adverse impacts of rainfall shocks (Udry, 1994; Morduch, 1995; Dercon et al., 2005). 
There are several studies that attempt to test the hypothesis of perfect consumption 
smoothing in developing countries (Deaton, 1992; Townsend, 1994; Grimard, 1997; 
Jacoby and Skoufias, 1997; Fafchamps et al., 1998; Kazianga and Udry, 2006; 
Dercon, 2007; Janzen and Carter, 2013). Most of the studies find minute evidence of 
consumption smoothing and reject the hypothesis of perfect consumption smoothing.  
 When there are large rainfall shocks, many of these households faces a 
significant drop in agricultural income and are mostly forced to reduce investments 
on children’s education (Jensen, 2000; Ferreira and Schady, 2008; Dung, 2013). 
Some households may even pull their children from school and send their children to 
work for additional income (Jensen, 2000; Dung, 2013). Furthermore, as formal 
credit and insurance are usually not available in rural areas, rural households that 
face large rainfall shocks typically fail to take loans to maintain their children’s 
education (Udry, 1994; Morduch, 1995; Jensen, 2000; Giesbert and Schindler, 2012; 
Dung, 2013). 
Over the last decade, researchers, multilateral institutions and insurance 
companies have worked on innovations in index insurance as a means to facilitate 
resilience against weather shocks in lower income countries (Chantarat et al., 2007; 
Zant, 2008; Collier et al., 2009; Miranda & Farrin, 2012; Dercon et al., 2014). 
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Specifically, researchers, multilateral institutions and insurance companies have 
made considerable efforts to develop a new type of agricultural insurance known as 
weather index insurance for households in low income countries (Zant, 2008; Collier 
et al., 2009; Dercon et al., 2014). Unlike traditional agricultural insurance, which 
guaranties policyholders for verifiable production loses arising from weather shocks, 
weather index insurance indemnifies insured household based on the realization of a 
weather index such as rainfall deficit measured over a specified period of time in a 
particular area (Chantarat et al., 2007; Collier et al., 2009; Miranda & Farrin, 2012; 
Karlan et al., 2014; Karlan et al., 2014).
18
 
Weather index insurance pilots have shown that WII has a potential to 
provide several welfare enhancing benefits in lower income countries (Collier et al., 
2009; Karlan et al., 2014). For example, it has been shown that weather index 
insurance participation help rural households invest more in their farm and help 
households obtain a higher agricultural yield (Giné and Yang, 2009; Dercon and 
Christaensen, 2011; Cole et al., 2013; Janzen and Carter, 2013; Karlan et al., 2014). 
It has been also shown that compensations from insurance companies during adverse 
weather shocks may help insured households smoothing their streams of payments 
specially the payment for the capital investment required for their agricultural 
production (Collier et al., 2009; Janzen & Carter, 2013; Karlan et al., 2014). 
In principle, it is possible that weather index insurance participation also 
helps rural households invest in their children’s education. Specifically, if weather 
index insurance can help rural households better manage rainfall risks a priori and 
                                                     
18
 Weather index insurance (WII) has several advantages over the traditional crop insurance. First, 
weather index insurance does not require farm level input and output inspections which substantially 
reduce overhead costs. Second, because WII is based on the realization of observed rainfall that 
cannot be influenced by the policyholder or the insurer, it eliminates the moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems (Chantarat et al., 2007; Miranda & Farrin, 2012; Karlan et al., 2014). With these 
costs and designing advantages WII has been gaining popularity in many lower income countries 
(Chantarat et al., 2007; Yoong et al., 2013). 
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can help rural households increase the level of agricultural investment and hence also 
their agricultural yield and income (Giné and Yang, 2009; Hill & Angelino, 2010; 
Cole et al., 2013; Karlan et al., 2014), rural households may have more financial 
resources to meet with the investment needs of their children’s education. 
Furthermore, when facing large rainfall shocks, insured households may also receive 
monetary compensation from the insurance policy and this compensation may help 
them overcome cash constraints that usually take place after rainfall shocks. Rural 
households with such compensation are therefore less likely to reduce investment in 
their children’s education after rainfall shocks. 
Given that weather index insurance participation may have the potential to 
promote children’s education investments among rural households, it is surprising 
that to our knowledge, there is little research evaluating the effects of weather index 
insurance on the education expenses of rural households (Chen & Jin, 2012; Janzen 
& Carter, 2013; Landmann & Frolich; 2013). While there are a few empirical studies 
evaluating the linkage between insurance participation and various educational 
outcomes, these studies often focused on school dropouts (Shah & Steinberg, 2015), 
school enrollment and school attendance (Janzen & Carter, 2013), school enrollment 
(Chen & Jin, 2012), and school attendance (Landmann & Frolich; 2013). 
In this paper, our main goal is to examine the effects of weather index 
insurance on the education expenses of rural household. Specifically, our study 
evaluates whether households that purchased weather index insurance policies spend 
more on the education expenses of their children. We also examine whether the 
effects of the insurance on household education expenses are large enough to cover 
the adverse effects of rainfall shocks on household education expenses. 
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In order to achieve the goals, this study evaluates a randomized control trial 
(RCT) that has been conducted by HARITA research group on a sample of 8 villages 
and 400 households in Northern Ethiopia in 2010.
19
 In the RCT, eight villages were 
selected from three drought prone districts. Five of the eight villages were randomly 
assigned for weather index insurance intervention and households in these villages 
were offered weather index insurance. To obtain district representative control 
villages, one village was randomly selected from each of the three districts for 
control purpose. Households in the three villages were not offered weather index 
insurance. We obtained detailed baseline survey data of about 400 rural households 
in 2010 and conducted a follow-up survey with the households again in 2014. We 
mainly use the endline data to examine the effects of commercial weather index 
insurance on education expenses (more details in part 2-sampling method).  
Our study has, however, a few limitations. First, due to the limitation of our 
survey dataset, we can only conduct a study of the effects of weather index insurance 
on household education expenses. We do not have detailed records of the education 
of each of the children of our sample households, and therefore, we cannot evaluate 
the effects of the insurance on school enrollment, school attendance, or other aspects 
of educational performance. We also only have one wave of survey data on 
household education expenses and hence we cannot employ panel data estimation 
techniques in our regression analysis. 
Second, while there was randomized allocations of weather index insurance 
at the village level (i.e., some villages randomized to receive the insurance 
                                                     
19
 The HARITA project was funded by Oxfam America and was implemented by a collaboration of 
private and public organizations both located in Ethiopia and also from outside the country, including 
the International Research Institute for Climate and Society (IRI) of Columbia University, Mekelle 
University, the Nyala Insurance Share Company, the Africa Insurance Company and also the Relief 
Society of Tigray. More information about the HARITA project can be found in (Chen et al., 2010; 
Norton et al., 2014). 
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intervention and some villages randomized not to receive the insurance intervention), 
households in our treatment villages obtain no financial subsidy for their 
participation in weather index insurance initiatives and hence buying insurance is 
voluntary in nature. Given this background, households in treatment villages decided 
by themselves whether to purchase insurance with their own resources or not and 
there is likely self-selection among sample households into the insurance program. In 
order to deal with the selection issue and to obtain more reliable estimates of the 
effects of weather index insurance on household education expenses, we conduct our 
empirical analysis using the instrumental variable estimation technique (more details 
in part 2-statistical approach). 
The rest of this paper is as follows: Section 2 describes our research venue 
and the research methodology, which include the sampling method, weather index 
insurance intervention, data collection, and the statistical approach. Section 3 
presents the results of the effects of weather index insurance on household education 
expenses. Section 4 discusses the results and concludes.  
 
3.2 Research Methodology 
 
3.2.1 Research Venue 
The region of Tigray is located in the northern Ethiopia and is about the same 
size as Denmark. Similar to other parts of Ethiopia, the region is predominately rural 
and nearly 80 percent of its 4.3 million population live in the rural area (World Bank, 
2012). Most of the region’s population is severely poor and the per capita income of 
the region is only 230 US dollars (Bureau of Plan and Finance, 2010). Cultivatable 
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land is scarce as the region has mostly complex terrains, arid and degraded lands 
(Ersado et al., 2004; Headey et al., 2014).  
In the rural part of Tigray, the average size of a household is about five and 
the average size of landholding per household is only about one hectare (CSA, 2007; 
Headey et al., 2014). Most of the rural households in the region practice low-yield 
smallholder rain-fed agriculture with limited technology inputs and virtually no 
irrigation water (Ersado et al., 2004). The rain season in the region is a mere 
four-month period from June to September, and is mostly dry in other months. The 
level of annual rainfall is low, typically amounting to between 400 and 800 
millimeters of rain in a year. Accordingly, negative rainfall shocks are a major threat 
to agriculture in the region and severe droughts had occurred multiple times in the 
past decades (Kumasi and Asenso-Okyere, 2011). Specifically, droughts have 
happened during our study period. In the 2011/2012 agricultural season large part of 
Tigray experienced a drought, which left 0.4 million people in need for urgent 
humanitarian assistance (Sandison, 2012). Despite regular droughts having 
substantially affected the agricultural production and livelihood of the people in the 
region until the introduction of the HARITA project few rural households in the 
region had any kind of agricultural insurance. 
The HARITA project is a large-scale development project that has been 
conducted in the rural part of Tigray since 2010.
20
 The project is aimed at 
strengthening the livelihood of the rural population and to promote better 
                                                     
20
 The HARITA project was funded by Oxfam America and was implemented by a collaboration of 
private and public organizations both located in Ethiopia and also from outside the country, including 
the International Research Institute for Climate and Society (IRI) of Columbia University, Mekelle 
University, the Nyala Insurance Share Company, the Africa Insurance Company and also the Relief 
Society of Tigray. More information about the HARITA project can be found in (Chen et al., 2010; 
Norton et al., 2014). 
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management of agricultural risk among households that depend on rain-fed 
agriculture.
21
 Weather index insurance is a key component of the HARITA project.  
Over the four-year period of this study the HARITA project has gradually 
expanded to providing commercial weather index insurance to more rural households 
in different villages of the region. Specifically, in 2014 weather index insurance was 
offered in 81 rural villages and a total of 23,000 rural households purchased weather 
index insurance through the HARITA project (Oxfam America & WFP, 2014). 
However, despite the large-scale insurance participation in the region, baseline 
household data was only collected from 400 rural households in the eight villages. 
Therefore, in this study the evaluation of the commercial weather index insurance 
program can only be conducted with a moderate size of sample. 
 
3.2.2 Sampling Method 
The sampling of the randomized control trial (RCT) part of the HARITA 
project is composed of three main steps. In the first step, the research group in the 
HARITA project selected three drought-prone districts (or Weredas) from the Tigray 
region to be the study districts. In order to assess the drought vulnerability risk of the 
districts, district-level information such as the availability of weather stations, the 
historical patterns of drought occurrences and also the drought vulnerability of 
agricultural production were considered. A list of drought-prone districts was then 
compiled and the project selected from the list one district from three different 
agro-climatic zones of the region. Specifically, the project selected the district of 
                                                     
21
 The HARITA combines risk reduction (improved resource management), risk transfer(weather 
index insurance) and credit facilities (prudent risk taking) to strengthen the livelihood of poor farmers 
(Oxfam America, 2010) 
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Kolla Temben in the Central Tigray, the district of Raya Azebo in the Southern 
Tigray and the district of Saesie Tsaedaemba in the Eastern Tigray.
22
 
The second randomization step was to select treatment and control villages 
(or Tabyas) from the three sample districts. A total of eight drought-prone villages 
from the three sample districts were randomly selected using procedures similar to 
those in the selection of drought-prone districts (as mentioned above). In this step, 
three drought-prone villages were selected from the district of Kolla Temben, three 
villages were selected from the district of Raya Azebo, and two villages were 
selected from the district of Saesie Tsaedaemba. Furthermore, one village in each of 
the three districts (three villages in total) was randomly assigned to be the control 
villages. The other five villages were assigned to receive the weather index insurance 
program and are the treatment villages of the study. 
The third step was the selection of sample households from the eight villages 
for the study. Although weather index insurance was offered to all rural households 
in the five treatment villages, due to resource considerations, in 2010 the HARITA 
project did not collect baseline survey data with all households in these villages. 
Instead, the HARITA project only conducted surveys with about 400 households 
randomly selected from the villages.  
 In the eight sample villages there were three different types of rural 
households: (1) households in the three control villages that were not offered weather 
index insurance; (2) households in the five treatment villages that were offered 
weather index insurance and chose to purchase the insurance; and (3) households in 
                                                     
22
 Kolla Temben has a mono-modal rainfall pattern. It has a dry lowland agro-ecology with mainly 
rugged and high mountains. The district has an average latitude of about 1,700 meters and a mean 
slope of about 7.5 percent. Raya Azebo has a bi-modal rainfall pattern. It has a lowland agro-ecology 
and a relatively plain topography. The district has an average latitude of about 1,700 meters and a 
mean slope of about 5 percent. Saesi Tsaedaemab has a mono-modal rainfall pattern and is in a 
mountainous zone (with low, middle and high lands). It has an average altitude of about 2,400 meters 
and a mean slope of about 8.5 percent 
 71 
treatment villages that were also offered weather index insurance but chose not to 
purchase the insurance. In order to conduct the program evaluation in a cost-effective 
way, the project used a stratified sampling method in selecting rural households 
(Madajewicz et al., 2011). First, in the three control villages, the project randomly 
chose about three percent of the households to be part of the household sample 
(henceforth, control households). In this first step, the project randomly selected a 
total of 98 rural households from the three control villages. Then, from the lists of 
households that purchased weather index insurance in the five treatment villages, the 
project randomly selected about 15 percent of households. In this second step, a total 
of 165 households were selected (henceforth, insured households). Third, from the 
lists of households that chose not to purchase weather index insurance in the five 
treatment villages, the project randomly selected about four percent of the 
households. In this third step, a total of 132 households that did not purchase 
insurance were selected (henceforth, declined households). Following these three 
steps, the sample included a total of 395 households (98 + 165 + 132) at the baseline. 
There was, however, an attrition in the sample. In our endline survey 
conducted in 2014, we could only follow up on 373 of the 395 sample households. 
However, considering that the endline survey was conducted almost four years after 
the baseline survey, the rate of attrition (at only about five percent) is low. We also 
compare the baseline characteristics of the households of whom we could reach at 
the endline with those of whom we could not reach. We find no systematic patterns 
in their baseline household characteristics and, therefore, believe that attrition would 
not affect the results of this study (results of the attrition analysis not reported for the 
sake of brevity). 
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3.2.3 Weather Index Insurance Intervention 
The intervention of this study was the offering of commercial weather index 
insurance to rural households in the five treatment villages. The first step of the 
intervention was to develop an objective weather index for each of the treatment 
villages. In this step, the International Research Institute for Climate and Society at 
Columbia University (IRI) first collected historical rainfall estimates from the 
African Rainfall Climatology (ARC) satellite and, whenever available, also 
ground-level rainfall information. Using these two sets of rainfall information, the 
IRI then developed a village-specific weather index for each of the five treatment 
villages.
23
 In order to ensure that the weather indexes were well calibrated, in each 
of the five villages several rural households (usually the more senior and more 
educated members of the communities) were invited to an interactive index 
validation exercise during which they compared their past rainfall experience against 
the indexes. 
After the weather indexes were validated, village-specific weather index 
insurance policies were developed and priced by local insurance companies.
24
 Since 
the insurance was offered on a commercial basis, the insurance companies expected 
to be able to cover their operational costs and to make a reasonable profit on average 
(i.e., over the years of different rainfall levels). Insurance was offered to the rural 
households in the five treatment villages through a local microfinance institution, the 
                                                     
23
 More specifically, for each village community index insurance was designed for two major types of 
staple crops (wheat and teff) and rural households could buy insurance for only one or both of the 
crops. The index insurance is (Trigger and exit). A trigger is a minimum rainfall required for an 
insured crop for a given phase. No payout occurs for rainfall amount above the trigger level. Payout 
starts for each deficit rainfall below trigger up to the exit point. The maximum payout will be paid if 
the rainfall total is below the exit level in a given phase (Norton et al., 2014) 
24
 Two local insurance companies (Nyala Insurance Share Company and Africa Insurance Company) 
were responsible for the pricing of the insurance at different stage of the project. The two insurance 
companies both further obtained reinsurance services from the SwissRe Group to reduce their level of 
risk exposure. 
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Dedebit Credit and Saving Institute (DeCSI), which operates in most of the rural 
parts of the Tigray region. DeCSI was responsible for completing the contractual 
agreement with rural households on behalf of the insurance companies. It was also 
responsible for collecting insurance premiums and, if there were large rainfall shocks, 
settling payout claims. 
The HARITA project offered weather index insurance on a commercial basis 
to all rural households in five treatment villages of the sample for four consecutive 
years from 2010 to 2013. Rural households could purchase different amounts of 
insurance and the most that one household could purchase had a maximum liability 
(i.e., the amount of the full payout during severe droughts) of 3,000 Ethiopian Birr 
per year (or at about 150 US dollars). However, as common in other insurance 
programs (Gine et al., 2010), most of the rural households in our study chose to 
purchase a basic amount of insurance, which had a maximum liability of 800 Birr per 
year (about 40 US dollars).
25
 On average insurance premium was around 20 percent 
of the amount of the maximum liability and most insured households contributed 
around 160 Birr a year.
26
 
 
3.2.4 Data Collection 
This study makes use of two waves of household survey data for the 
evaluation of medium-term effects of the commercial weather index insurance 
program. Specifically, in July 2010 the HARITA project conducted a field survey 
                                                     
25
 The full liability of the basic policy (at 800 Birr) was already about the average amount of total 
cash loans households typically get in a year. The amount was also more than enough to cover the 
average cost of several major agricultural investments including, the cost of land preparation, the cost 
of hybrid seeds and the cost of chemical fertilizers. 
26
 In the HARITA project, there are two ways households could pay for the insurance premium. First, 
households could purchase the insurance in cash. Second, if households were poor and if they were 
part of the social safety net program (Productive Safety Net Program, or PSNP); households could 
contribute to insurance premium by making cash-equivalent labor contributions to local public 
projects. 
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and collected baseline data from 400 rural households in the eight sample villages. In 
February 2014 we (i.e., the author of this study) conducted a follow-up survey with 
the rural households and collected endline survey data. In these two waves of surveys, 
we obtained a wide range of information about the rural households. The information 
included basic household characteristics, agricultural investments and production 
outcomes of the households, incomes and assets of the households, and also the labor 
supply of household members.  
We only have data on household education expenses in the second wave and 
no other child level education data such as school enrollment, school attendance, 
school dropouts and other aspects of educational performance. Therefore, we cannot 
examine the effect of weather index insurance on school enrollment, school 
attendance and school dropouts.  
We are able to study the effects of weather index insurance on school 
expenses by merging the baseline and endline data. Moreover, in the endline survey 
we collected education expenses data, including payments for stationery, payment 
for books and uniforms, tuition fees (mainly school registration fees). Unfortunately, 
data for the educational outcome variables was not included in the first wave of 
household survey (baseline survey), thus, we are not able to construct a panel dataset 
for the evaluation of the impacts. As a result, this study mainly makes use of data 
from the endline survey. We also use the baseline data in dealing with the effects of 
baseline differences.  
 
3.2.4.1 Dependent variables: Household education expenses 
In our survey, we obtained three household-level measures of household 
education expenses. The first education expenses variable is general education 
 75 
expenses which include the expenses on uniform, books, and other educational 
supplies. The second education expenses variable is the total amount of tuition fees 
that households paid. The third education expenses variable is total education 
expenses which is the sum of the other two variables above.  
 
3.2.4.2 Treatment variables: Household insurance status  
The design of our research study allows us to define two sets of treatment 
dummy variables to represent the status of households in the weather index insurance 
program. Since the insurance program was offered at the village level, we first 
defined a dummy variable, Household in treatment village to represent whether the 
households live in a treatment village and whether they were offered the weather 
index insurance program. Specifically, the variable equals one (1) if rural households 
lived in one of the five treatment villages and equals zero (0) if otherwise (i.e., 
households living in one of the three control villages). 
Since the HARITA project provided no subsidy for insurance participation, 
not every household in the five treatment villages purchased the insurance. Therefore, 
we create another treatment dummy variable, Household purchased insurance, to 
represent whether the rural households participated in the insurance project. 
Specifically, this variable equals one (1) if rural households in the five treatment 
villages purchased weather index insurance and equals zero (0) if households in the 
treatment villages did not purchase the insurance. The variable is also set to zero (0) 
for all sample households in the control villages. 
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3.2.4.3 Control variables: Severe crop failure due to drought 
We asked the sample households to report their rainfall experience in the 
four-year study period (2010 to 2013) in our endline survey. Specifically, in our 
endline survey, we asked households, whether they had experienced crop failure due 
to drought and the severity level of crop failure. Using this information, we construct 
a binary variable to measure the extent of crop failure household experienced due to 
drought. Specifically, we construct the variable severe crop failure due to drought, 
which the crop failure dummy takes equals one (1) if the household experienced 
severe crop failure due to drought and equals zero (0) if the household did not 
experience severe crop failure due to drought (either experienced no crop failure due 
to drought or experienced only moderate crop failure due to drought). 
 
3.2.4.4 Control variables: Household and child characteristics 
We make use of baseline household information in the survey to construct a 
number of household characteristics to be used as control variables in our estimations. 
Specifically, the list of household variables includes the gender of the household 
head (1=female; 0=male), the age of the household head, the number of years of 
education of the household head received, the size of household, the size of farmland 
the household owned, total value of agricultural production and also imputed 
agricultural income. We call this set of household variables baseline household 
characteristics. 
In our endline survey, we also collected information about the number of 
children in a household, their different age groups, including the number of children 
in the household attending middle school and the number of children in the 
household attending high school. The numbers of children in a household in different 
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age groups are introduced to account the effect of intra-household resource allocation 
on child education expenses.  
 
3.2.5 Statistical Approach 
We use different regression analysis techniques to obtain reliable estimates of 
the effects of weather index insurance on household education expenses and tuition. 
In our regression analysis, we use robust estimates of the standard errors with the use 
of clusters of observations at village level. 
 
3.2.5.1 Estimating intended-to-treat (ITT) effects of the weather index insurance 
program 
We estimate an ordinary least square (OLS) model to estimate the effects of weather 
index insurance participation on household education expenses. Our OLS model is as 
below: 
 
Householdeducationexpensesij
endline
 = a0 + a1*household_in_insurance_villageij 
+ a2*Household characteristicsij + a3*Children_characteristicsij + a4*Crop failureij 
+ Villagej + eij.                                    (1) 
 
In other words, the base group for comparison is the control villages. Household 
characteristicsij is the list of baseline household characteristics defined above. 
Children education characteristicsij is a dummy variable for child education 
characteristics as defined above. Crop failureij is a dummy variable used to account 
the occurrence of rainfall shock. Villagej is a set of village dummy variables used to 
capture village heterogeneities. The estimate for the parameter a1 is the average 
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village level effects of the provision of weather index insurance. Our objective is to 
test whether this coefficient is positive and statistically different from zero. 
 
3.2.5.2 Instrumental variable estimation for the treatment-on-the-treated effects of 
the weather index insurance program  
Since the HARITA project did not provide subsidies to rural households for 
insurance participation, in the treatment villages insurance participation was 
voluntary. As such, there can be a selection bias in insurance participation and the 
effect of participating in the insurance may not be correctly estimated in the above 
models (see Appendix Table 1 for the determinants of insurance participation at the 
baseline). In order to address this endogeneity concern, we conduct a set of 
instrumental variable (IV) estimation to obtain a more reliable estimate of the 
program effects. Specifically, we make use of the random assignment of the 
insurance program across the eight sample villages to obtain a 
Treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) effect of the program. Using the Household in 
treatment village variable to instrument for the endogenous Household Purchased 
Insurance variable, the first stage of the IV model can be written as follow: 
 
Household Purchased Insuranceij = b0+ b1*Household in treatment villageij + 
b2*Baselinehouseholdcharacteristicsij + a3*Children_characteristicsij + 
a4*Crop failureij + Villagej + eij.              (2) 
 
We obtain from the first stage of the IV model the predicted values of the 
Household purchased insurance variable, namely, Predicted household purchased 
insurance. We then use this set of predictions as the independent variable of the 
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second stage of the IV estimation:  
 
 
Householdeducationexpensesij
endline
  = c0 + c1* Predicted household purchased 
insuranceij+c2*Baselinehouseholdcharacteristicsij+ 
c3*Children_characteristicsij + c4*Crop failureij  + Villagej + eij.    (3) 
 
We hope that the estimate for the parameter c1 in the IV model above can 
give us a more reliable estimate for the Treatment-on-the-treated effect of the 
participation in the weather index insurance program. 
 
3.3. Average Impact of the Weather index insurance Interventions 
 
3.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Rainfall shocks are key sources of uncertainty for farmers in our study area. 
As Table 3 shows, almost all of the farmers reported experiencing rainfall shocks in 
the study years (2010-2013). Specifically, 61 percent of the households living in our 
study villages reported that the first rainfall shock they encountered in the last 4 
years was severe. The other 39 percent of the farmers reported that they were 
exposed to rainfall shock, but the rainfall shock was not severe (Table 3, Column 1 
row 1). Moreover, nearly 70% of the households in our study villages reported crop 
failure due to drought, which is the most commonly occurring adverse climate shock 
(Table 2, Column 2 row 1). 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the variables used in this study. 
Most of the household heads are illiterate (on average household heads attend 1.5 
years of education). The households in our study area are poor small farm holders. 
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The average farmer in our sample owns 3.5 tsimad of land (nearly 1 hectare) and also 
an average household owns livestock value of six thousand Birr. The households in 
our study spend a small amount of money on child school expenditure. In Panel B we 
present summary statistics of the three types of child school expenses per semester- 
general education expenses, tuition fees and total education expenses. The 
households in our sample on average spend Birr 140.36, Birr 22.61 and Birr 162.97 
respectively, for general education, tuition fees and total education expenses per 
semester. Table 5 compares child school expenses by treatment, on average the child 
school expenses for those who purchased weather index insurance is more than the 
one for households that did not purchase weather index insurance as indicated by the 
two sample robust t test. General education expenses, tuition fees and total education 
expenses are higher for buyers of weather index insurance than the households who 
do not buy insurance (Column 1-3, row 1). 
 
3.3.2 Multivariate Results 
Our multivariate results provide a similar story as the descriptive results 
described above. Specifically, when we estimated the basic model (equation 1), we 
found that weather index insurance intervention improves general education 
expenses. Table 6 shows that, on average there is a significant difference in general 
education expenses between households in treatment and comparison villages. 
Weather index insurance intervention improves general education expenses by ETB 
56.10 (Column 3, row 1) and is statistically significant at the one percent level. Our 
multivariate results also show that rainfall shocks adversely affect household 
expenses on general education. The incident of rainfall shock reduces general 
 81 
education expenses by ETB 7.94 (Column 3, row 2), but it is not statistically 
significant.  
 
3.3.3 Instrumental variable estimations 
The application of instrumental variable (IV) estimation depends on finding a 
strong instrument. We use the random assignment of the weather index insurance 
program at the village level as an instrument for household weather index insurance 
participation in estimating the model (3) above. Our instrumental variable (IV) 
estimate shows a similar story as the descriptive and the fixed effect results discussed 
in table 5 and table 6 above. Among households with school-aged children, insured 
households in the treatment villages invest more in child schooling expenses in 
general. Particularly, table 9 shows the estimates from IV regression result. Column 
2-4 and row 2 of the table shows that weather index insurance has a positive and 
significant effect on the three outcome variables. As can be seen in table 9, for 
example, general education expenses is Birr 52.20 higher for the households with 
weather index insurance than without insurance and is statistically significant at the 
five percent level. Column 3 and row 2 of the same table also shows that tuition fees 
is Birr 28.47 (se=3.85) higher for households with weather index insurance than 
without insurance and the values are significant at the one percent level. Tuition fee 
is a mandatory fee households need to pay as long as the child stays in the school. 
Tuition fees in rural Ethiopia are also mostly fixed in all government schools. In such 
cases, weather index insurance should have insignificantly affect tuition fees. We 
assume households in our study area may have considered for the voluntary school 
contribution and other fees which are common in rural Ethiopia as part of tuition fees. 
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In such cases, households are more likely to cut the non-tuition fees component at the 
time of rainfall shock.  
Further, to see the impact on the total education expenses, we aggregated the 
total sum of general school expenses and tuition fees together in table 9. It shows that 
WII intervention increases aggregate school expenses. Particularly, aggregate school 
expenses is ETB 80.67(se=23.75) higher for insured households than for those 
without insurance (Column 4, row 2) and is statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level. Moreover, as table 9 shows, rainfall shocks adversely affect household 
expenditure on education. Rainfall shock reduces total education expenses by ETB 
10.06(se=11.25-column 4, row 3) but the coefficient is not statistically significant.  
Finally, appendix 3 tells us a story regarding educational investment respond 
when both buyers and non-buyers experienced rainfall shock. In this table, we 
introduce an interaction variable between household purchased insurance and 
rainfall shock. As can be seen in appendix table 3, weather index insurance 
compensation (ex post shock) helps buyers to maintain their educational investment 
(Column 1, column 2 & column 3, row 2). However, our study lacks enough 
statistical power to identify this channel.   
 
3.4. Conclusion and Discussion 
 
As noted in the introduction, micro and macro level uninsured shocks and 
adverse events negatively affect child education outcomes. The impacts of these 
shocks are severe for children of farming households that practice smallholder 
rain-fed agriculture, because households practicing smallholder rain-fed agriculture 
are usually poor and have few means to mitigate adverse impacts of rainfall shocks 
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(Udry, 1994; Morduch, 1995; Dercon et al., 2005). They have low income and 
savings, they barely have access to formal credit and insurance mechanisms and their 
informal social networks are not effective because of the systemic nature of weather 
shocks. 
In principle, it is possible that weather index insurance participation helps 
rural households to invest in their children’s education. Specifically, if weather index 
insurance can help rural households better manage rainfall risks a priori and can help 
rural households increase the level of agricultural investment and hence also their 
agricultural yield and income (Giné and Yang, 2009; Hill & Angelino, 2010; Cole et 
al., 2013; Karlan et al., 2014), rural households may have more financial resources to 
meet with the investment needs of their children’s education. Furthermore, when 
facing large rainfall shocks, insured households may also receive monetary 
compensation from the insurance policy and this compensation may help them 
overcome cash constraints that usually take place after rainfall shocks. Rural 
households with such compensation are therefore less likely to cut investment in 
their children’s education after rainfall shocks. 
In this study, we evaluate the impact of weather index insurance on child 
education expenses based on evidence from rural households in Northern Ethiopia. 
To examine the impacts, we conduct a randomized control trial (RCT) that has been 
conducted by HARITA research group on a sample of 8 villages and 400 households 
in Northern Ethiopia in 2010. The results indicate that WII is relevant in determining 
household school expenses because insured households are effectively protected 
from the rainfall shock, which often induces them to reduce educational expenses. In 
addition, education expenditure is higher for rural households with WII than those 
without the insurance. These results are statistically significant. 
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Further, we also find that rainfall shocks have negative effects on household 
education expenses. Rainfall shock (proxied in our analysis by the severity of crop 
failure due to rainfall shock) shows negative effects on household education 
expenses.  
These results are consistent with theoretical notion on the role of WII in 
reducing the impacts of rainfall shocks on education expenses. It was shown that 
weather index insurance affects education expenses in two ways: WII helps 
households earn higher income due its effect on farm investment, yield and 
agricultural income (Cole et al., 2013; Karlan et al., 2014), in turn, increasing 
expenses including investment on education. Second, as noted in the literature, WII 
is one of the risk coping strategies that help households to smooth consumption 
during adverse shocks. Therefore, insurance policy holders are less likely to cut 
school expenses compared to non-buyers.  
  Even though our study may not have enough statistical power to identify 
some of the theoretical channels regarding rainfall shocks, weather index insurance 
and compensation from insurance policy, but overall our results are consistent with 
the story that rainfall shock experience reduces education expenses, weather index 
insurance helps better management of educational investment and insurance 
compensation also help to maintain education investment.  
Finally, having shown that the introduction of weather index insurance can 
play a role in reducing the impacts of rainfall shocks on education expenses and 
given the importance of such investment for human capital formation, this implies 
that policies aimed at insuring rural households against rainfall shocks may lead to an 
improvement in households’ educational investment.   
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1 
Summary statistics of sample rural households in the Tigray Region in Northern Ethiopia (N=373) 
 Mean S.D. Min Max 
A. Household characteristics     
Female household head (1=Yes; 0=No)  0.35   0.48   0.00     1.00  
Age of household head (in years)  43.92   14.02   18.00   80.00  
Years of education of household head  1.54   2.58   0.00    10.00  
Size of household  5.33   2.24   1.00   12.00  
B. Children count in primary, middle & high school 
age 
    
Number of children in primary school age 0.96 0.87 0.00 3.00 
Number of children in middle school age 0.27 0.45 0.00 2.00 
Number of children in high school age 0.61 0.75 0.00 3.00 
C. Household asset     
Size of farmland (in tsimad)  3.49   2.93   0.00    22.50  
Value of livestock (in 1,000 Birr) 6.19 9.15 0.00 67.55 
D. Agricultural yield     
Total value of agricultural produce (in 1,000 Birr) 5.06 25.44 0.00 441.02 
Imputed agricultural income (in 1,000 Birr) 3.67 25.55 -10.45 440.15 
E. Children education expenses     
General education expenses (in Birr) 140.4 218.1 0.0 1,950.0 
Tuition fees (in Birr) 22.6 53.2 0.0 700.0 
Total children education expenses (in Birr) 163.0 241.7 0.0 1,970.0 
Data source: Data for Panel A, Panel C and Panel D are obtained from Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA) program 2010 
baseline survey. Data for Panel B & E is obtained from the 2013 endline survey by the author. 
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Note: Size of farmland is measured in tsimad and 1 tsimad equals 0.25 hectare.  
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Table 2 
Self-reports of major shocks among sample households in Rural Tigray in 2010 (N=373) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Percent of 
households 
who reported 
the specified 
shock is main 
problem 
Percent of 
households 
who 
reported the 
problem is 
minor 
Percent of 
households 
who 
reported the 
problem is 
moderate 
Percent of 
households 
who 
reported the 
problem is 
serious 
Percent of 
households 
who reported 
the problem 
is severe 
Crop failure due to drought 70.1 2.5 5.1 14.7 48.8 
Crop failure due to pests 41.5 9.8 12.2 11.1 8.4 
Unusual temperatures 28.6 7.1 14.4 5.8 1.2 
Flood disaster 46.1 5.3 10.4 16.7 13.7 
Hailstorms 28.6 12.4 7.8 5.3 3.0 
Illness in the family 33.9 11.9 5.1 9.4 7.6 
Death in the family 23.3 12.2 2.0 4.1 5.1 
Loss of a job 19.2 8.7 4.1 4.3 2.0 
Changes in market prices 24.3 5.8 10.9 5.3 2.3 
Data source: Data for the 2010 baseline survey is obtained from Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA) program. 
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Table 3 
Reported severity level of the worst rainfall shocks households faced in the last 4 years  
(2010-2013), (N=373) 
 
(1) (2) 
 
Percentage of 
households who 
reported the shock 
was severe 
Percentage of 
households who 
reported the shock 
was not severe 
Severity of the first rainfall shock 
(1=Severe; 0=Not severe) 
61.13 38.87 
Severity of the second rainfall shock 
(1=Severe; 0=Not severe) 
25.74 74.26 
Data source: 2013 endline survey by the author. 
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Table 4 
Mean Comparison of sample rural households in offering & control villages in the Tigray Region in Northern Ethiopia  
 Offering 
village 
(N=280) 
Control 
village 
(N=93) 
Difference 
(1) – (2) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
A. Household characteristics    
Female household head (1=Yes; 0=No) 0.37 0.27 0.09*(0.057) 
Age of household head (in years) 42.6 47.7 -5.1**(1.65) 
Years of education of household head 1.6 1.3 0.3(0.308) 
Size of household 5.2 5.4 -0.2(0.267) 
Number of children in primary school age 1 0.83 0.17* (0.104) 
Number of children in middle school age 0.26 0.29 -0.02 (0.054) 
Number of children in high school age 0.62 0.54 0.07 (0.090) 
B. Household asset    
Size of farmland (in tsimad) 3.8 2.4 1.4***(0.342) 
Value of livestock (in 1,000 Birr) 6.56 5.05 1.51 (1.09) 
C. Agricultural yield    
Total value of agricultural produce (in 1,000 
Birr) 
5.48 3.77 1.71 (3.04) 
Imputed agricultural income (in 1,000 Birr) 3.93 2.86 1.07 (3.06) 
Data source: Except for the data for the number of children in primary, middle and high school age school; the other data is obtained from 2010 
survey provided by the Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA) program. Data for the number of children primary, middle and 
high school age is obtained from the 2013 endline survey by the author. 
Note: Size of farmland is measured in tsimad and 1 tsimad is 0.25 hectare. Standard errors reported in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
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Table 5 
Mean comparison by WII treatment status for the sample of rural households in Northern Ethiopia in 2013 
 
Outcome variables 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 General education 
expenses 
Tuition fees Total education 
expenses 
Household purchased insurance 
(1=Yes; 0=No) 
47.78** 
(22.40) 
10.89** 
(5.45) 
58.67** 
(24.79) 
Data source: Author’s survey. 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level. 
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Table 6 
OLS estimates of the effects of weather index insurance on general education expenses 
 (1) 
General 
education 
expenses 
(2) 
General 
education 
expenses 
(3) 
General 
education 
expenses 
Household in treatment village (1=Yes; 0=No) 54.95
**
 87.53
***
 56.10
***
 
 (18.81) (9.83) (11.78) 
Reported number of severe rainfall shocks household 
faced in the last four years 
-18.99 
(16.67) 
-7.52 
(13.52) 
-7.94 
(15.24) 
Female household head (1=Yes; 0=No)  72.05
*
 69.71
**
 
  (34.47) (22.79) 
Age of household head (in years)  0.82
*
 0.56 
  (0.36) (0.32) 
Years of education of household head  9.16
**
 9.71
***
 
  (2.85) (2.74) 
Size of household  31.44
***
 13.00
**
 
  (5.83) (4.43) 
Size of farmland (in tsimad)  -1.76 -1.98 
  (3.91) (3.95) 
Total value of livestock (in 1,000 Birr)  -1.26 -1.85 
  (2.32) (1.66) 
Total value of agricultural produce (in 1,000 Birr)  17.45
*
 16.32 
  (8.42) (8.82) 
Imputed agricultural income (in 1,000 Birr)  -17.75
*
 -16.51
*
 
  (8.28) (8.67) 
Number of children in primary school age    29.02
***
 
   (7.06) 
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Number of children in middle school age    18.62 
   (32.18) 
Number of children in high school age   80.05
**
 
   (29.54) 
Village dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations (N) 373 372 372 
Adjusted R-square 0.03 0.17 0.23 
Data source: Data for household characteristics, household asset and agricultural yield are obtained from Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for 
Adaptation (HARITA) program 2010 baseline survey the 2010 baseline survey. Data for the number of children primary, middle and high school 
age, and general education expenses is obtained from the 2013 endline survey by the author. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the 
village level are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level. 
 
 
  
 96 
Table 7 
OLS estimates of the effects of weather index insurance on tuition expenses 
 (1) 
Tuition 
expenses 
(2) 
Tuition 
expenses 
(3) 
Tuition 
expenses 
Household in treatment village (1=Yes; 0=No) -9.74 8.40
*
 2.89 
 (6.14) (3.73) (5.29) 
Reported number of severe rainfall shocks 
household faced in the last four years 
2.61 
(5.44) 
4.41 
(5.51) 
4.27 
(5.82) 
Female household head (1=Yes; 0=No)  5.11 4.55 
  (7.17) (5.02) 
Age of household head (in years)  0.09 0.00 
  (0.15) (0.14) 
Years of education of household head  1.63 1.74 
  (1.17) (1.09) 
Size of household  3.98
**
 0.11 
  (1.33) (1.27) 
Size of farmland (in tsimad)  -0.52 -0.59 
  (0.54) (0.46) 
Total value of livestock (in 1,000 Birr)  -0.21 -0.32
**
 
  (0.14) (0.11) 
Total value of agricultural produce (in 1,000 Birr)  2.23
*
 1.99
*
 
  (1.13) (0.97) 
Imputed agricultural income (in 1,000 Birr)  -2.28
*
 -2.02
*
 
  (1.14) (0.98) 
Number of children in primary school age    4.10 
   (4.19) 
Number of children in middle school age    9.65 
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   (7.13) 
Number of children in high school age   16.44
*
 
   (7.99) 
Village dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations (N) 373 372 372 
Adjusted R-square 0.03 0.08 0.12 
Data source: Data for household characteristics, household asset and agricultural yield are obtained from Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for 
Adaptation (HARITA) program 2010 baseline survey the 2010 baseline survey. Data for the number of children primary, middle and high school 
age, and tuition expenses is obtained from the 2013 endline survey by the author. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the village 
level are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level. 
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Table 8 
OLS estimates of the effects of weather index insurance on total education expenses 
 (1) 
Total 
education 
expenses 
(2) 
Total 
education 
expenses 
(3) 
Total 
education 
expenses 
Household in treatment village (1=Yes; 0=No) 45.20
*
 95.93
***
 58.99
***
 
 (21.70) (10.69) (13.40) 
Reported number of severe rainfall shocks 
household faced in the last four years 
-16.38 
(19.24) 
-3.11 
(15.83) 
-3.67 
(17.40) 
Female household head (1=Yes; 0=No)  77.16
*
 74.26
***
 
  (35.42) (21.20) 
Age of household head (in years)  0.91
*
 0.57 
  (0.40) (0.32) 
Years of education of household head  10.80
**
 11.45
**
 
  (3.60) (3.29) 
Size of household  35.42
***
 13.11
**
 
  (6.94) (5.10) 
Size of farmland (in tsimad)  -2.29 -2.57 
  (4.02) (4.04) 
Total value of livestock (in 1,000 Birr)  -1.47 -2.17 
  (2.34) (1.60) 
Total value of agricultural produce (in 1,000 Birr)  19.69
**
 18.31
*
 
  (8.23) (8.61) 
Imputed agricultural income (in 1,000 Birr)  -20.03
**
 -18.53
*
 
  (8.09) (8.45) 
Number of children in primary school age    33.12
***
 
   (8.93) 
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Number of children in middle school age    28.27 
   (28.93) 
Number of children in high school age   96.50
**
 
   (35.93) 
Village dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations (N) 373 372 372 
Adjusted R-square 0.03 0.18 0.25 
Data source: Data for household characteristics, household asset and agricultural yield are obtained from Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for 
Adaptation (HARITA) program 2010 baseline survey the 2010 baseline survey. Data for the number of children primary, middle and high school 
age, and total education expenses is obtained from the 2013 endline survey by the author. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the 
village level are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level. 
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Table 9 
IV estimates of the effects of weather index insurance on general education, tuition & total education expenses 
 (1) 
Household 
Purchased 
insurance 
(1=Yes;0=
No) 
(2) 
General 
education 
expenses 
(3) 
Tuition 
expenses 
(4) 
Total 
education 
expenses 
Household in treatment village (1=Yes; 
0=No) 
0.83
***
 
(0.03) 
   
Household purchase insurance (1=Yes; 
0=No) 
 52.20
**
 
(26.48) 
28.47
***
 
(3.85) 
80.67
***
 
(23.75) 
Reported number of severe rainfall shocks 
household faced in the last four years 
0.09
**
 
(0.04) 
-10.85 
(10.42) 
0.79 
(3.67) 
-10.06 
(11.25) 
Female household head (1=Yes; 0=No) 0.08 67.00
***
 2.37 69.37
***
 
 (0.05) (19.26) (3.93) (16.83) 
Age of household head (in years) -0.00 0.71
**
 0.08 0.80
**
 
 (0.00) (0.33) (0.14) (0.33) 
Years of education of household head 0.01 9.54
***
 1.55 11.09
***
 
 (0.01) (2.35) (1.10) (2.97) 
Size of household 0.02 11.24
***
 -0.41 10.84
**
 
 (0.01) (4.00) (1.06) (4.34) 
Size of farmland (in tsimad) 0.00 -2.17 -0.62 -2.79 
 (0.00) (3.41) (0.49) (3.45) 
Total value of livestock (in 1,000 Birr) -0.01
**
 -1.39 -0.04 -1.43 
 (0.00) (1.55) (0.13) (1.56) 
Total value of agricultural produce (in 
1,000 Birr) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
16.81
**
 
(7.99) 
2.17
**
 
(1.03) 
18.98
**
 
(7.83) 
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Imputed agricultural income (in 1,000 
Birr) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-17.05
**
 
(7.84) 
-2.21
**
 
(1.04) 
-19.26
**
 
(7.67) 
Number of children in primary school age  0.03
**
 27.89
***
 3.34 31.23
***
 
 (0.01) (6.58) (3.59) (7.94) 
Number of children in middle school age  0.04 15.99 8.81 24.80 
 (0.05) (27.89) (6.65) (24.21) 
Number of children in high school age -0.02 83.23
***
 16.70
**
 99.92
***
 
 (0.03) (24.84) (6.64) (29.93) 
Village dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations (N) 372 372 372 372 
Adjusted R-square 0.51 0.23 0.10 0.25 
Data source: Data for household characteristics, household asset and agricultural yield are obtained from Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for 
Adaptation (HARITA) program 2010 baseline survey the 2010 baseline survey. Data for the number of children primary, middle and high school 
age, general education, tuition and total education expenses is obtained from the 2013 endline survey by the author. Robust standard errors 
adjusted for clustering at the village level are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level. 
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Appendix 
Appendix Table 1 
OLS regression: The participation of weather index insurance among rural households in 2010 
 Dependent variable: Household purchased 
insurance (1=Yes; 0=No) 
(1)                 (2)                                
Household in insurance offering village 
(1=Yes; 0=No) 
0.644***(0.091) 0.695***(0.066) 
Female household head (1=Yes; 0=No) 0.148*(0.067) 0.079 (0.062) 
Age of household head (in years) -0.002**(0.001) -0.002 (0.001) 
Years of education of household head 0.008 (0.007) 0.013 (0.008) 
Size of household 0.012* (0.006) 0.030**(0.009) 
Size of farmland (in tsimad)  -0.011 (0.008) 
Value of livestock (in 1,000 Birr)  -0.012***(0.003) 
Total value of agricultural produce (in 1,000 
Birr) 
 -0.009* (0.004) 
Imputed agricultural income (in 1,000 Birr)  0.010* (0.004) 
Data source: Data for the 2010 survey is provided by the Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA) program. 
Note: Size of farmland is measured in tsimad and 1 tsimad is 0.25 hectare. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the village level are 
reported in parentheses. 
***, **, * indicate significance atsum the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively. 
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Appendix Table 2 
OLS estimates of the effects of weather index insurance on general education, tuition & total education expenses 
 (1) 
General 
education 
expenses 
(2) 
Tuition 
expenses 
(3) 
Total 
education 
expenses 
Household in treatment village (1=Yes; 0=No) 56.10
***
 2.89 58.99
***
 
 (11.78) (5.29) (13.40) 
Reported number of severe rainfall shocks 
household faced in the last four years 
-7.94 
(15.24) 
4.27 
(5.82) 
-3.67 
(17.40) 
Female household head (1=Yes; 0=No) 69.71
**
 4.55 74.26
***
 
 (22.79) (5.02) (21.20) 
Age of household head (in years) 0.56 0.00 0.57 
 (0.32) (0.14) (0.32) 
Years of education of household head 9.71
***
 1.74 11.45
**
 
 (2.74) (1.09) (3.29) 
Size of household 13.00
**
 0.11 13.11
**
 
 (4.43) (1.27) (5.10) 
Size of farmland (in tsimad) -1.98 -0.59 -2.57 
 (3.95) (0.46) (4.04) 
Total value of livestock (in 1,000 Birr) -1.85 -0.32
**
 -2.17 
 (1.66) (0.11) (1.60) 
Total value of agricultural produce (in 1,000 Birr) 16.32 1.99
*
 18.31
*
 
 (8.82) (0.97) (8.61) 
Imputed agricultural income (in 1,000 Birr) -16.51
*
 -2.02
*
 -18.53
*
 
 (8.67) (0.98) (8.45) 
Number of children in primary school age  29.02
***
 4.10 33.12
***
 
 (7.06) (4.19) (8.93) 
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Number of children in middle school age  18.62 9.65 28.27 
 (32.18) (7.13) (28.93) 
Number of children in high school age 80.05
**
 16.44
*
 96.50
**
 
 (29.54) (7.99) (35.93) 
Village dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations (N) 372 372 372 
Adjusted R-square 0.23 0.12 0.25 
Data source: Data for household characteristics, household asset and agricultural yield are obtained from Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for 
Adaptation (HARITA) program 2010 baseline survey the 2010 baseline survey. Data for the number of children primary, middle and high school 
age, general education, tuition and total education expenses is obtained from the 2013 endline survey by the author. Robust standard errors 
adjusted for clustering at the village level are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level. 
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Appendix Table 3  
IV estimates of the effects of weather index insurance on general education, tuition & total education expenses 
 (1) 
General 
education 
expenses 
(2) 
Tuition 
expenses 
(3) 
Total 
education 
expenses 
Household purchase insurance (1=Yes; 0=No) 30.74 21.07
***
 51.81 
 (47.21) (3.46) (45.02) 
Household purchased insurance * Rainfall shock 35.23 12.15
*
 47.38 
 (44.95) (7.18) (46.05) 
Reported number of severe rainfall shocks 
household faced in the last four years 
-26.36 
(19.26) 
-4.56
***
 
(1.76) 
-30.92
*
 
(18.53) 
Female household head (1=Yes; 0=No) 65.50
***
 1.86 67.36
***
 
 (20.05) (3.99) (17.88) 
Age of household head (in years) 0.66
*
 0.06 0.72
**
 
 (0.37) (0.13) (0.36) 
Years of education of household head 9.55
***
 1.55 11.11
***
 
 (2.44) (1.07) (3.02) 
Size of household 10.97
**
 -0.50 10.47
**
 
 (4.28) (1.16) (4.78) 
Size of farmland (in tsimad) -2.25 -0.65 -2.91 
 (3.40) (0.46) (3.42) 
Total value of livestock (in 1,000 Birr) -1.03 0.09 -0.94 
 (1.72) (0.17) (1.80) 
Total value of agricultural produce (in 1,000 Birr) 16.37
*
 2.02
**
 18.39
**
 
 (8.39) (1.00) (8.28) 
Imputed agricultural income (in 1,000 Birr) -16.62
**
 -2.06
**
 -18.67
**
 
 (8.23) (1.00) (8.11) 
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Number of children in primary school age  26.88
***
 2.99 29.87
***
 
 (5.77) (3.35) (6.99) 
Number of children in middle school age  15.23 8.55 23.79 
 (28.18) (6.42) (24.55) 
Number of children in high school age 82.97
***
 16.61
**
 99.57
***
 
 (24.58) (6.70) (29.69) 
Village dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations (N) 372 372 372 
Adjusted R-square 0.23 0.09 0.24 
Data source: Data for household characteristics, household asset and agricultural yield are obtained from Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for 
Adaptation (HARITA) program 2010 baseline survey the 2010 baseline survey. Data for the number of children primary, middle and high school 
age, general education, tuition and total education expenses is obtained from the 2013 endline survey by the author. Robust standard errors 
adjusted for clustering at the village level are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Aggregating and disaggregating risk preference: Evidence from a framing 
experiment among Ethiopian farmers  
 
4.1 Introduction 
Economists have long been investigating the risk preference of individuals 
and also the aggregation of risk preference of individuals in small groups.
27
 The 
literature generally finds that groups are more averse to risks and uncertainties than 
individuals. In some of the literature, groups are also shown to be more risk averse 
than individuals are in more risky situations and are less risk averse than individuals 
in less risky situations (Shupp & Williams 2008; Baker et al., 2008; Masclet et al., 
2009; Sutter et al., 2012).  
Despite the large body of theoretical and empirical literature, the existing 
literature on the aggregation of individual risk preference, however, contains a few 
gaps. First, the literature fails to distinguish and compare two different types of 
research designs that examine the aggregation of individual risk preference. 
Specifically, in the literature there are two-arm one-stage research studies that 
compare the risk preference of a sample of individuals side-by-side with the 
aggregate risk preference of groups that are formed by a different sample of 
individuals (Kocher & Sutter, 2005; Masclet et al., 2009); there also are one-arm 
two-stage research studies that compare the risk preference of individuals with the 
                                                     
27
 The main issues considered in the first groups of literature are assessing and measuring the risk 
preference of individuals using different risk preference eliciting methods (Becker et al., 1964; 
Binswanger, 1980; Harrison, 1986; Holt & Laury, 2002; Harbaugh et al., 2007; Harrison et al., 2007; 
Eckel & Grossman, 2008; Charness et al., 2012; Noelck & Musshoff, 2013) and the second group of 
the literature (Bateman & Munro 2005; Kocher & Sutter, 2005; Shupp & Williams 2008; Masclet et 
al., 2009; Baker et al., 2008; Masclet et al., 2009; Carlsson et al., 2009; He et al., 2011; Sutter et al., 
2012; Ambrus et al., 2015) examine individual and a small member groups decision making behavior 
under risk and uncertainty.   
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aggregate risk preference of groups that are sequentially formed by the same sample 
of individuals (Bateman & Munro, 2005; Carlsson et al., 2009; He et al., 2011; Sutter 
et al., 2012; Amnrus et al., 2015).
28
 While both types of research design show that 
small groups are more risk averse than individuals, to our knowledge, no literature 
has examined whether or not the results obtained from these two sets of research 
designs are qualitatively the same. In particular, except for a few ones (e.g., Shupp & 
Williams 2008) most of the literature has not pointed out whether prior structural 
manifestation of individual risk preference has any effects on the aggregation of 
individual risk preferences in small groups. 
Second, the existing literature almost totally neglects the disaggregation of 
group risk preference back to individual risk preference (Baker et al., 2008). The 
disaggregation of group risk preference has also important economic implications, 
however. Many decisions made collectively by small groups under risks and 
uncertainties have to be further managed by or executed by only individuals of the 
groups. As the literature has shown that individuals are typically less risk averse than 
groups, so it is important to study whether individuals who participated in group 
decisions on risk and uncertainty tend to be more risk averse as compared to those 
who do not. In particular, whether individuals who experienced risk preference 
decisions in small groups will bring forward the aggregate risk preference of the 
group or will actually revert back to their individual level of risk preference. The 
literature, however, is basically silent on this aspect. Specifically, it is unclear if prior 
communication, knowledge, and decision-making on aggregate risk preference in 
small groups will affect individual risk preference. 
                                                     
28
 Baker et al., 2008 exceptionally examine a one-arm three-stage research 
(individual-group-individual) and further investigate how participations in a group discussion (second 
stage) affect individual risk preference in the third stage (phase). 
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Third, most empirical research on the aggregation of individual risk 
preference are conducted in experimental settings and computer labs using only 
convenience samples of university students (Kocher & Sutter, 2005; Shupp & 
Williams 2008; Baker et al., 2008; He et al., 2011) or self-selected groups of 
individuals such as married couples (Bateman & Munro, 2005; Carlsson et al., 2009; 
Sutter et al., 2012). In the first case, however, there raises questions about whether 
the findings obtained from university students can offer practical values for real 
world situations and decisions faced by individuals and groups of different 
background (Masclet et al., 2009; Man & Norton, 2015). In the second case, there 
also are concerns about how decisions made by such endogenously formed groups 
can be generalized. 
Fourth, because of research budgetary limitations the experimental scale in 
the existing studies is mostly either small scale as in the case of (Bateman & Munro 
2005; Shupp & Williams 2008; Parkinson & Baddeley, 2011) or moderate scale 
(Kocher & Sutter, 2005; Baker et al., 2008; Masclet et al., 2009; Man & Norton, 
2015).
29
 By contrast, this research is conducted in Ethiopia with poor rural farmers 
and the lower per capita income in Ethiopia allow us to conduct a large scale field 
experiment by providing small cash amount ($3 per participant) as an incentive for 
participation in the experiment. 
This study is designed to address these several limitations of the existing 
literature and has three main goals. First, we aim to compare the two different 
aggregation methods of individual risk preference in small groups and evaluate 
whether the mechanisms on individual risk preference aggregation can have 
                                                     
29
 The RCT scale classification is relative. In our search for related studies 52 and 204 respectively, 
are the smallest and the largest sample sizes and we set a sample size of 100 and below as small scale 
and a sample size between 100 and 204 as medium scale. To our knowledge, no related study has 
examined using a sample size of greater than 204. 
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differential effects on the elicited group risk preference. Specifically, we want to 
examine whether results obtained from two-arm one-stage research design are 
qualitatively the same as those that are obtained from one-arm two-stage research 
design. 
Second, we want to investigate the disaggregation of group risk preference 
back to individual risk preference. Specifically, we want to examine whether the 
experience of risk preference exercise in small groups and knowledge of prior group 
risk preference exercise has any effects on individual risk preference. 
Third, we want to conduct a risk preference study using a more 
methodological sampling procedure to obtain a study sample that has both a higher 
degree of external validity and also a better representation of real communities that 
regularly faces risks and uncertainties. 
In order to achieve these goals, we conduct a randomized field experiment 
that comprises two experimental arms and two experimental phases. Specifically, our 
experiment contains a Risk Preference Individual to Group Arm in which 
participants have to take part in a series of risk preference elicitation exercise 
individually in the first phase before taking part in a similar series of risk preference 
elicitation exercise collectively as a group in the second phase. Our experiment also 
contains a Risk Preference Group to Individual Arm in which participants have to 
first take part in a series of risk preference elicitation exercise collectively as a group 
in the first phase before taking part in a similar series of risk preference elicitation 
exercise individually in the second phase. 
The above experimental setting can help us achieve our goals. First, by 
comparing the group risk preference of the Individual to Group Arm with the group 
risk preference of Group to Individual Arm, we can evaluate whether the 
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mechanisms on individual risk preference aggregation can have differential effects 
on the elicited group risk preference. Second, by comparing the individual risk 
preference of the Individual to Group arm with the individual risk preference of the 
Group to Individual arm, we can show how the experience of risk preference 
exercise in small groups and prior knowledge of group risk preference can affect 
individual risk preference. 
We also conduct our randomized field experiment with a large number of 
rural farmers randomly selected from Northern Ethiopia. We conduct our study in the 
rural part of a poor developing country because the societal structures of most 
developing countries in Africa revolve around small groups and clusters. Many 
important decisions on farming practices, technological adoption, agricultural 
production and environmental protection are commonly done in groups. In particular, 
rural farmers undertake economic, political and environmental decisions in groups, 
suggesting that group decision-making plays an important role in developing 
countries. 
Our study has a few limitations, however. First, unlike the other studies 
(Shupp & Williams 2008; Baker et al., 2008; Masclet et al., 2009; Sutter et al., 2012) 
that have used cash rewards in their risk preference experiment, due to resource 
limitations, in our lottery exercises we conducted a hypothetical lottery game instead 
of lotteries with real payoffs. However, to minimize potential hypothetical bias, 
participants were given a consent form to sign. The consent form states the purpose 
of the study, its implications for real life, willingness to participate (free to withdraw 
at any time) and once anyone decided to participate he/she has to tell the truth.  
Second, we only conduct a randomized field experiment and do not have the 
capacity and facilities to conduct lab-in-the-field experiment. However, to get 
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reliable information from the field experiment, we hired well trained enumerators 
who can explain and elaborate the hypothetical lottery games to our subjects clearly. 
We also provided the enumerators detailed experimental instructions that can help 
them to smoothly conduct the field experiment (More details in Appendix 1, 2 & 3).  
The rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses our research 
methodology, which includes our sampling methods, experimental arms and phases, 
data collection and statistical approaches. Section 3 presents the empirical results. 
Section 4 discusses the results and concludes. 
 
4.2. Research Methodology 
 
4.2.1 Sampling method 
We conduct our risk preference randomized field experiment in the Tigray 
Region of Northern Ethiopia. The Tigray Region is predominately rural, poor and the 
per capita income of the region is only US$230 (Tigray Bureau of Plan & Finance, 
2010). Farmers in the region typically practices low-yield smallholder rain-fed 
agriculture with limited technology inputs and no irrigation water (Ersado et al., 
2004). Negative rainfall shocks are a major threat to agriculture in the region and 
severe droughts had occurred multiple times in the past decades (Kumasi and 
Asenso-Okyere, 2011). 
We conduct our field experiment with a total of 571 farmers that are 
randomly selected from the Tigray Region. The sampling method comprises four 
main steps. First, we selected four drought-prone districts (or Weredas) from 
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different parts of the region to be our study districts.
30
 Then, we randomly selected 
eight different administrative villages (or Tabyas) in each of the four sample districts 
to obtain a sample of 32 villages. Third, in each of the 32 administrative villages we 
randomly chose two sub-village clusters (or Kushets which are essentially natural 
villages) to obtain a total of 64 sub-village clusters. In the last step, we randomly 
selected nine poor farmers in each of the 64 sub-village clusters to be the farmer 
sample of our study. In doing these steps, we targeted to obtain a total of 576 sample 
farmers.
31
 However, our final sample contains only 571 farmers because five of the 
farmers could not show up due to health problems. 
 
4.2.2 Experimental design and research hypothesis  
We randomly allocate farmers in our sample into the two experimental arms 
of our study. In order to obtain a balanced sample of farmers between our two 
experimental arms, we allocate farmers to the two experimental arms using a within 
cluster randomization procedure. Specifically, within each of the 64 sub-village 
clusters, we first randomly put the nine farmers into three groups of three farmers. 
We then randomly assign one of the three farmer groups to the Individual to Group 
Arm and also one other group to the Group to Individual Arm. There still remain two 
groups of three farmers in each of the 32 sample villages (one group of three farmers 
                                                     
30
 The current study shares the same sampling frame with an ongoing randomized control experiment 
on weather index insurance and agricultural input coupons. Therefore, our four sample districts are all 
drought-prone districts and in order to assess the drought vulnerability risk of the districts, 
district-level information such as the availability of weather stations, the historical patterns of drought 
occurrences and also the drought vulnerability of agricultural production were considered. In this step, 
we selected the districts of Ganta-Afeshum and Gulo-Maheda in the Eastern Tigray, and the districts 
of Enderta and Hintalo-Wajirat in the Southern Tigray. However, the experimental interventions of the 
other studies were designed to be orthogonal to those in this study. Specifically, the fieldwork of this 
current study was completed before the introduction of interventions on weather index insurance and 
agricultural input coupons.  
31
 Farmers in our sample are poor and are all members of Productive Safety Net program (PSNP) 
which targeted to help chronically food insecure rural households (WFP, 2012). 
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per each of the two sub-village clusters in a village). We then randomly allocate 
these two remaining groups of the villages to the two experimental arms. 
The two experimental arms of this study are named the Risk Preference 
Individual to Group Arm and the Risk Preference Group to Individual Arm 
(henceforth, Individual to Group Arm and Group to Individual Arm). Farmers in 
both of the experimental arms have to go through two phases of risk preference 
elicitation exercise. Specifically, farmers assigned to the Individual to Group Arms 
have to take part in the Individual Risk Preference Exercises first and then the Group 
Risk Preference Exercise. Farmers assigned to the Group to Individual Arms instead 
have to first take part in the Group Risk Preference Exercise and then the Individual 
Risk Preference Exercise.  
4.2.2.1 Individual Risk Preference Exercise 
The Individual Risk Preference Exercise (henceforth, Individual Exercise) 
contains nine hypothetical lotteries that farmers are asked to take part in individually. 
We asked each individual farmer to tell us the maximum amount of cash that the 
farmer is willing to pay for participating in a lottery that would hypothetically give 
the farmers a chance to win 100 birr in cash (about US$4.5 or about 5 days of causal 
labor wages). In the nine hypothetical lotteries, there are some chances to win 100 
birr in cash and the nine games carry different chances of winning. The nine 
hypothetical lotteries carries different chances of winning and the win percentages of 
the lotteries range from 10% to 90%. In order to ensure that farmers are able to take 
part in the individual exercise without interference from each other, we conduct the 
individual exercise with individual farmers at a distance of others to prohibit 
communication among farmers. 
4.2.2.2 Group Risk Preference Exercise 
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The Group Risk Preference Exercise (henceforth, Group Exercise) has a 
similar design to the Individual Exercise. Farmers were put into three-member 
groups to participate in the group risk preference exercise. In the exercise, we asked 
the group to make one decision for each of the nine lotteries on the maximum 
amount of cash that the group is willing to pay in order to play the lottery. Farmers 
were allowed to make group decision after free discussion and the discussion may 
involve different forms of communications such as sharing, debate, and persuasion. 
No specific guidelines were provided to the farmers. The hypothetical lotteries in the 
group exercise were almost identical to those in the individual exercise. We asked 
the farmer group to tell us the maximum amount of cash that the farmer is willing to 
pay for participating in a lottery that would hypothetically give the farmers a chance 
to win 300 birr in cash (about US$13.5 or about 15 days of causal labor wages). The 
cash outcome of the hypothetical lotteries is to be divided and shared equally within 
the group. Among the nine hypothetical lotteries, there are some chances to win 300 
birr in cash and the nine games carry different chances of winning. The nine 
hypothetical lotteries carries different chances of winning and the win percentages of 
the lotteries range from 10% to 90%. Farmers in the group were allowed to 
communicate with each other, but not with anyone outside of the groups.  
Appendix 1 presents the instructions of our risk preference experiment we 
provided for our enumerators. Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 present the experimental 
instruments used in the individual risk preference exercise and the group risk 
preference exercise respectively. 
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4.2.2.3 Experimental propositions 
Figure 4 summarizes the overall experimental design. Our experimental 
design allows us to undertake five different comparisons on the aggregation and 
disaggregation of risk preference. 
First, by comparing the individual risk preference of the Individual to Group 
Arm with the group risk preference of the Group to Individual Arm (i.e., Phase One 
of the two arms), we can obtain an estimate of the pure risk preference differential 
(or across-subject differential).  
Second, by comparing the individual risk preference of the Individual to 
Group Arm with the group risk preference of the same arm (i.e., Phase One and 
Phase Two of the Individual to Group Arm), we can obtain an estimate of the 
aggregation effects of risk preference within subjects. 
Third, by comparing the group risk preference of the Group to Individual 
Arm with the individual risk preference of the same arm (i.e., Phase One and Phase 
Two of the Group to Individual Arm), we can obtain an estimate of the 
disaggregation effects of risk preference within subjects. 
Fourth, by comparing the group risk preference of the Individual to Group 
Arm with the group risk preference of the Group to Individual arm (i.e., Phase Two 
of the Individual to Group Arm and Phase One of the Group to Individual Arm), we 
can obtain an estimate of the individual risk preference exercise on group risk 
preference. 
Fifth and finally, by comparing the individual risk preference of the 
Individual to Group Arm with the individual risk preference of the Group to 
Individual arm (i.e., Phase One of the Individual to Group Arm and Phase Two of the 
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Group to Individual Arm), we can obtain an estimate of the group risk preference 
exercise on individual risk preference. 
 
4.2.3 Data Collection  
In November 2015, our research team visited each study villages and 
households and conducted a baseline survey. The survey collected information on 
socioeconomic data, including farmer demographic characteristics, wealth and assets 
(including size of farmland, livestock and productive assets), numeracy score, risk 
aversion and community trust score. Six months later in April 2016, we invited the 
farmers to participate in our risk preference experiment. Since the farmers in the 
April intervention are exactly the same as the farmers interviewed in November, we 
matched the experimental information with that of the information collected in the 
main survey and create a full set of information. Consequently, we make use of a set 
of household characteristics and other control variables from the baseline survey. 
4.2.3.1 Dependent variables: Certainty Equivalent Ratio (CER) 
Following Shupp & Williams (2008), we use the Certainty Equivalent Ratio 
(CER) as our measure of risk preference to be our dependent variable. CER is 
defined as the ratio of a farmer’s willingness to pay (WTP) to play a lottery to the 
lottery’s expected value. CER = 1 indicates risk neutrality, CER less than one (1) 
implies risk-averse and CER greater than one (1) corresponds to risk loving 
preference over a specific lottery (Kachelmeier & Shehata, 1992; Shupp & Williams, 
2008).
32 
We choose CER because our study farmers have low literacy levels (on 
                                                     
32
 We also run second sets of regressions using the coefficient of risk aversion (r). The coefficient of 
risk aversion is defined as:𝑟 =  𝑙𝑛𝐶𝐸𝑅 (𝑙𝑛𝑃 + 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝐸𝑅)⁄  , where P is the lottery probability of winning. 
r=0 implies risk neutrality, r>0 implies risk aversion and r<0 implies risk loving. Results for the 
second sets of regression are not shown but are available upon request.  
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average a farmer in our study attended 2.8 years of education) and the willingness to 
pay experiment to measure risk preference is easier to understand than the Holt and 
Laury (2002) risk task that requires knowledge of expected payoffs and variance. 
4.2.3.2 Treatment variables 
In order to examine the different experimental propositions stated above, we 
construct three different treatment variables to measure different aspects of our 
experimental design for analysis. 
First, in order to indicate the experimental arm that the farmers belong to, we 
defined a dummy variable Group to Individual Arm. Specifically, this variable equals 
one (1) if the farmer was assigned to the Group to Individual Arm (i.e., participating 
first in the group exercise before the individual exercise) and zero (0) if the farmer 
was assigned to the Individual to Group Arm (i.e., participating in the individual 
exercise before the group exercise). 
In order to examine the effect of group exercise on individual risk preference, 
we created a dummy variable Farmer had group exercise to represent the farmer’s 
experience when they participate in the individual exercise. Specifically, the variable 
equals one (1) if the farmer had already participated in a group exercise and zero (0) 
if otherwise. 
Finally and similarly, in order to examine the effect of individual exercise on 
group risk preference, we created another dummy variable Farmer had individual 
exercise to represent the farmer’s experience when they participate in the group 
exercise. Specifically, the variable equals one (1) if the farmer had already 
participated in an individual exercise and zero (0) if otherwise. 
4.2.3.3 Control variables 
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We also make use of other information in our survey to construct a number of 
individual characteristics to be used as control variables in our estimations. 
Specifically, the list of individual characteristics includes the gender of the farmer 
(1=female; 0=male), the age of the farmer (in years), the number of years of 
education of the farmer, the size of household, the size of farmland the household 
owned, the value of productive assets the household owned and also the value of 
livestock the household owned. We call this set of variables individual 
characteristics. 
 
4.2.4 Statistical Approach 
We use both descriptive statistics and regression analyses to examine our 
empirical propositions. In our regression analysis, we use robust estimates of the 
standard errors with the clustering of observations at the village level. 
4.2.4.1 Fixed effects model 
We specify our fixed effects (FE) regression model as follows. 
 
CERij = bo + b1*Treatment variableij + b2*Individual characteristicsij  + μj + 
υk + eij.                                 (1) 
 
CERij is certainty equivalent ratio. Individual characteristicsij is the set of individual 
characteristics as defined before. We also include village dummy variables, μj, and 
enumerator dummy variables, υk, to control for unobserved heterogeneities of the 
villages and of enumerators.  
In this model, Treatment Variable can be one of the three variables that we 
discussed above, namely Group to Individual Arm, Farmer had group exercise and 
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Farmer had individual exercise. When the treatment variable is Group to Individual 
Arm, we are estimating the pure risk preference differential between groups and 
individuals. When the treatment variable is Farmer had group exercise, we are 
estimating the effects of group risk preference exercise on individual risk preference. 
Lastly, when the treatment variable is Farmer had individual exercise, we are 
estimating the effects of individual risk preference exercise on group risk preference. 
We hope that the estimate for the parameter b1 can tell us whether the above effects 
mentioned in section 4.2.2.3 exist. 
4.2.4.2 Fixed effects model with interaction terms with Lottery Win Percentage 
In order to examine whether the effects found vary by the winning percentage of 
the hypothetical lotteries, we conduct a further set of regression analysis as follow: 
 
CERij = co + c1*Treatment variableij + c2*Lottery Win Percentageij  + 
c3*Treatment variableij *Lottery Win Percentageij  + c4*Individual 
characteristicsij + μj + υk + eij.                          (2) 
 
In this model, Treatment Variable can be one of the three variables that we 
discussed above. Lottery Win Percentage is a set of eight dummy variables that 
represents the chance of winning in the hypothetical lotteries. We also include a set 
of eight interaction variable constructed by multiplying the Treatment Variable with 
the Lottery Win Percentage variable. We hope that the estimate for the parameter c1 
can tell us whether the expected effects mentioned in section 4.2.2.3 exist. 
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4.3. Empirical Results 
 
4.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of our sample farmers. There are 
more female farmers than male farmers in our sample. On average, 57 percent of our 
study respondents are female farmers, and the remaining 43 percent are male farmers. 
The average age of farmers is 47 years and most of the farmers have low literacy 
level. On average farmers attended 2.8 years of education. The average household 
size is 5.4 members. The farmers are poor. The average per capita livestock value is 
about 980 birr and also households on average own nearly 1.8 tsimad (less than 0.5 
hectare) of land for farming.  
Table 2 presents mean of individual characteristics of the farmers by the two 
experimental arms. The table shows that our sample in the two experiment arms is 
extremely well balanced. None of the individual characteristics are statistically 
different between the two experiment arms. Consequently, we created two perfectly 
balanced samples of farmers that are highly statistical balanced (288 farmers in 
Individual to Group Arm and 283 farmers in Group to Individual Arm). 
Table 3 describes famers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for the hypothetical 
lottery by experimental arms (Individual to Group versus Group to Individual arm). 
The first two columns (A1 & A2) respectively show individual and group WTP for 
the Individual to Group arm and the second two columns (D1 & D2) respectively 
display individual and group WTP for the Group to Individual arm. Overall, 
willingness to pay is low in the low winning percentages and it is higher in the 
highest winning percentages for both experimental arms.  
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Table 3 can help us to examine three main comparisons. First, comparing the 
individual WTP of the Individual to Group arm (A1) with the group WTP of the 
Group to Individual arm (D1) shows that groups in the Group to Individual arm on 
average show lower WTP in each lottery win percentage than the individuals in the 
Individual to Group arm. From table 3 we also observe a clear WTP difference 
between individual WTP in the Group to Individual arm (D2) and individual WTP in 
the Individual to Group arm (A1). WTP for the individuals in the Group to Individual 
arm is less than the WTP for the individuals in the Individual to Group arm in each 
lottery win percentages. It suggests that for those individuals who previously 
submitted group bid, their WTP decreased in each lottery win percentages. Third, the 
table also depicts that the group WTP of the Individual to Group arm (A2) and the 
group WTP of the Group to Individual arm (D1) are not significantly different. This 
supports that having prior knowledge and decision on individual WTP does not 
significantly affect the subsequent group’s willingness to pay or it means that for 
those groups who previously submitted individual bid, their WTP has not 
significantly changed.   
The graphical presentations tell a similar story to the WTP results. Figure 1 
shows mean CER for individuals in the Individual to Group Arm and the three 
member groups in the Group to Individual Arm. It can be observed that both 
individuals and the three member groups exhibit CER that varies approximately 
between 0.28 and 0.49, implying high risk aversion. However, the average group 
CER for the Group to Individual Arm is less than the average individual CER for the 
Individual to Group Arm in each lottery win percentage. It shows that the three 
member groups are more risk averse than the individuals (pure risk aggregation).  
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Figure 2 displays mean CER for individuals in Individual to Group Arm and 
Group to Individual Arm. As can be seen from the graph, individual risk preference 
line for subjects in Individual to Group Arm is above the individual risk preference 
line for subjects in Group to Individual Arm, suggesting that after submitting groups 
risk preference exercise as a group, the individuals in Group to Individual Arm 
become more risk averse. 
In Figure 3, we present mean CER for the small group in the Individual to 
Group Arm and Group to Individual Arm. As can be seen from the graph the two 
lines are nearly asymptotic, suggesting that after submitting individual risk 
preference exercise individually, the groups’ risk preference in the Individual to 
Group Arm has not significantly changed. 
 
4.3.2 Multivariate Results 
4.3.2.1 Main Proposition 
Our multivariate results are similar to the descriptive results as described 
above. Table 9 presents risk preference difference between individuals and the three 
member group (pure risk aggregation). When we regress CER on Group to 
Individual Arm, we find a statistically significant risk preference difference between 
groups and individuals. Groups are more risk averse than individuals in all of the 
nine lotteries, the risk aversion (CER) for the three member groups is higher by at 
least 0.09 (se=0.036) than the individuals, and values are significant at least at the 
five percent level.  
In table 11 we show how participation in prior group exercise affects 
individual risk preference. As can be seen from the table the risk aversion (CER) for 
the farmers who submitted a lottery bid through discussion in a group before 
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submitting an individual bid has increased. For example, at the 10% lottery win 
percentage the risk aversion (CER) in this group has increased by 0.14 (se=0.035) 
and values are significant at the one percent level (Column 1, row 1).  
In contrast, however, we find no evidence that participation in prior 
individual exercise affects group risk preference. In Table 10, we find no statistically 
significant result. 
4.3.2.2 Results by Lottery Win Percentage 
In table 12, our regression results are consistent with the results from (Shupp 
& Williams, 2008) and other similar studies on the risk preference differential 
between individuals and groups. Groups are more risk averse than individuals, risk 
aversion (CER) for the three member groups is higher by 0.115 (se=0.024) than the 
individuals and values are significant at the one percent level (Column 1, row 10). 
However, two basic differences between our findings and the existing literature are 
worth mentioning. First, our subjects (who are mainly poor farmers) in general are 
more risk averse than the subjects employed in the other studies (mainly students). 
Second, the results of other studies suggests that groups are more risk averse than 
individuals in low winning percentages, but groups tend to be less risk averse in the 
highest winning percentages. Our result, however, shows that groups are more risk 
averse on both low and high winning percentages.  
We also compared regression results on the impacts of group risk decision on 
the individual risk preference obtained using the above method with our descriptive 
statistics and regression results for robustness check. For such purpose, in Table 13, 
we regress CER on farmer had group exercise (1=Yes; 0=No) controlling for eight 
dummies for the lottery win percentages and eight interaction variables created by 
the interaction of group decision dummy and the eight dummies for lottery win 
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percentages. Results from such regression also show that for those individuals who 
previously submitted group bid, their risk aversion (CER) increased on average by 
0.110 (se=0.023) and the result is significant at the one percent level (Column 1, row 
10). In contrast, however, we find no evidence that participation in prior individual 
exercise affects group risk preference. In Table 14, we find no statistically significant 
result (Column 1, row 10). 
4.3.2.3 Heterogeneity Analysis 
In order to assess if the impacts of group risk decision varies with respect to 
socioeconomic covariates, we do impact heterogeneity analysis with respect to four 
key household characteristics (the gender of household head, age of household head, 
years of education of the household head and the size of land). Tables 15-18 show 
the heterogeneous effect of group risk decision on individual risk preference in 
relation to gender, age, education and land size owned by the household respectively.  
Table 15 presents impact heterogeneity by gender of the household head. As 
can be seen from the table, after doing the group exercise the individual risk aversion 
(CER) for the female participants is higher by 0.04(se=0.02) than the individual risk 
aversion (CER) for male participants and the result is significant at 1 percent level 
(Column 1, row 11). It suggests that the group exercise affects the individual risk 
preference of female participants more than it affects the male participants. We also 
find that older household heads are more responsive to the group risk preference 
exercise than the younger heads. The evidence shows that participation in prior group 
exercise affects the individual risk preference of the older household heads more than 
it affects the younger household heads. After the group exercise, the individual risk 
aversion (CER) for the older household heads is higher by 0.05 (se=0.02) than the 
younger household heads and the result is significant at the one percent level (Table 
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16-column 1, row 12). There is no evidence heterogeneity effect of group risk 
preference exercise by the level of household head’s education and land size 
ownership. 
 
4.4. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This research contributes to the growing literature on the aggregation and 
disaggregation of risk preference by investigating the effects of decisions made 
collectively by small groups under risk and uncertainties on individual decision 
behavior. It also examines if a prior structural manifestation of individual risk 
preference has an effect on the aggregation of individual risk preferences in small 
groups. We conduct a randomized field experiment that comprises two experimental 
arms and two experimental phases and we find evidence that support the following 
four main conclusions.  
(1) Our result shows that both individuals and groups in our study are on average 
risk averse. Our findings on the pure risk preference differential also show that 
on average the three person group are more risk averse than individuals. This 
finding is in line with the existing empirical literature on risk preference 
differential between individuals and a small member group (Shupp & Williams 
2008; Baker et al., 2008; Masclet et al., 2009; He et al., 2011; Sutter et al., 2012). 
Two basic differences between our findings and the existing literature are 
worth mentioning, however. First, our subjects (who are mainly poor farmers) in 
general are more risk averse than the subjects employed in the other studies (mainly 
students). Second, the results of other studies suggests that groups are more risk 
averse than individuals in low winning percentages, but groups tend to be less risk 
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averse in the highest winning percentages. Our result, however, shows that groups 
are more risk averse on both low and high winning percentages. 
(2) Turning to the impact of group risk preference, our results indicate that risk 
preference decisions made in a group influence the subsequent individual risk 
preference. Specifically, experiencing risk preference exercise in small groups 
and prior knowledge of group risk preference exercise has a significant effect on 
the subsequent individual risk preference. It means that individuals who 
participated in group decisions on risk and uncertainty will bring forward the risk 
preference of the group back to their individual risk preference. However, there 
are two reasons that explain this effect. First, it could be that the social influence 
from the group discussion which affects the individual risk preference. Second, it 
is also possible that individuals may simply put a figure from the group exercise 
(recalling effect). Individuals may recall what they did in the group exercise and 
simply put similar figure when they were asked to play the game individually. 
The economic implication of this result is quite large. Many economic 
decisions made collectively by small groups under risks and uncertainties have to be 
further managed by or executed by only individuals of the groups and our findings 
portrays that prior communications, knowledge, and decision making by small 
groups under risk and uncertainties can subsequently affect individual decisions.  
(3) Using our experimental setting, we also find that risk preference decisions made 
individually does not significantly influence the subsequent group risk preference. 
Specifically, on average groups decisions are not significantly affected by the 
fact that participants had prior knowledge and decision making on individual risk 
preference. This result is very similar to the findings in Shupp & Williams 
(2008).   
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(4) Finally, we also observe results obtained from two-arm one-stage research design 
are qualitatively similar as results obtained from one-arm two-stage research 
design. This tells us, the structural manifestation of individual risk preference has 
no significant effects on the risk preference of small groups. Thus, 
methodologically the use of one arm two phases or two arms one phase 
approaches for risk aggregation does not matter.  
Further research on aggregating and disaggregating risk preference with real 
money payoffs would be interesting to further investigate the worries of hypothetical 
bias. Moreover, more work needs to be done in order to find out whether the results 
found in this study are not affected by the recalling effect. Also, to understand how 
recalling effect influences our result, experimental design that controls for recalling 
effect can address such problem. It is possible also to do the same experimental 
exercise in the future with the same households and see if the impact still matters, 
because the recalling effect should not last for months.   
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1 
Summary statistics of sample farmers in Tigray Region in Northern Ethiopia (N=571) 
 N Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
A. Demographic characteristics      
Gender (1=Female; 0=Male) 571 0.57 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Age (in years) 571 46.89 13.25 20.00 99.00 
Years of education 571 2.79 4.57 0.00 18.00 
Size of household 571 5.36 2.01 1.00 11.00 
B. Wealth and assets      
Size of farmland (in tsimad) 571 1.83 1.71 0.00 12.00 
Value of livestock (in 1,000 Birr) 570 5.29 6.39 0.00 64.30 
Value of productive assets (in 1,000 Birr) 569 0.50 1.36 0.00 20.30 
Data source: Author’s survey. 
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Table 2 
Mean comparison of farmer characteristics between experimental arms 
 Individual to Group 
arm 
(N=283) 
Group to Individual 
arm 
(N=288) 
Difference 
 (1) (2) (2) – (1) 
A. Demographic characteristics    
Gender (1=Female; 0=Male) 0.55 0.58 0.02 (0.04) 
Age (in years) 47.25 46.54 -0.70 (1.11) 
Years of education 2.44 3.14 0.70 (0.38) 
Size of household 5.31 5.41 0.09 (0.17) 
B. Wealth and assets    
Value of livestock (in 1,000 Birr) 5.19 5.38 0.19 (0.53) 
Value of productive assets (in 1,000 Birr) 0.53 0.46 -0.07 (0.11) 
Size of farmland (in tsimad) 1.84 1.80 -0.04 (0.14) 
Data source: Author’s survey. 
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Table 3 
Willingness to pay (WTP) for farmers 
Lottery win 
percentage 
Individual to Group arm: 
Individual 
(A1) 
Individual to Group arm: 
Group 
(A2) 
Group to individual arm: 
Group 
(D1) 
Group to Individual arm: 
Individual 
(D2) 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
10% 4.86 4.34 3.62 3.12 3.71 3.47 3.76 3.44 
20% 8.21 5.78 6.30 5.14 6.12 5.45 6.32 5.30 
30% 11.85 7.87 9.00 7.70 8.54 7.53 9.21 7.60 
40% 15.66 10.37 12.16 10.66 11.10 9.79 11.97 9.73 
50% 19.55 13.05 15.17 13.26 14.30 12.91 14.74 12.04 
60% 23.76 15.54 18.32 15.79 18.05 16.26 17.85 14.36 
70% 28.22 18.32 21.45 18.37 21.52 19.47 21.07 16.39 
80% 32.98 21.02 24.65 21.09 25.01 22.58 24.41 18.87 
90% 37.94 23.84 26.84 22.10 28.63 25.60 28.01 21.52 
Data source: Author’s survey. 
Note: For an easy comparison among experimental, the group WTP is divided by three (number of person in a group) 
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Table 4 
Simple differencing for pure risk preference differential between experimental arms in Phase 1 
Lottery win 
percentage 
Individual to Group arm: Individual (A1) 
(N=283) 
(1) 
Group to Individual arm: Group (D1) 
(N=283) 
(2) 
Difference 
 
(1) – (2) 
CER r CER r CER r 
10% 0.486 0.263 0.374 0.330 0.111*** (0.034) -0.066*** (0.019) 
20% 0.410 0.367 0.309 0.441 0.101*** (0.023) -0.074*** (0.016) 
30% 0.394 0.438 0.287 0.520 0.107*** (0.021) -0.081*** (0.016) 
40% 0.391 0.499 0.280 0.583 0.110*** (0.021) -0.083*** (0.016) 
50% 0.391 0.577 0.289 0.630 0.101*** (0.022) -0.073*** (0.017) 
60% 0.395 0.614 0.304 0.674 0.091*** (0.022) -0.060*** (0.018) 
70% 0.403 0.672 0.311 0.724 0.092*** (0.023) -0.051*** (0.019) 
80% 0.412 0.738 0.316 0.781 0.096*** (0.023) -0.042*** (0.020) 
90% 0.421 0.817 0.321 0.845 0.100*** (0.024) -0.028 (0.021) 
Average 0.412 0.551 0.308 0.612 0.104***(0.008) -0.061***(0.006) 
Data source: Author’s survey. 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively. 
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Table 5 
Simple differencing for the effects of within-arm aggregation on risk preference 
Lottery win 
percentage 
Individual to Group arm: Individual (A1) 
(N=288) 
(1) 
Individual to Group arm: Group (A2) 
(N=288) 
(2) 
Difference 
 
(1) – (2) 
CER r CER r CER r 
10% 0.486 0.263 0.362 0.332 0.123*** (0.028) -0.069*** (0.015) 
20% 0.410 0.367 0.315 0.434 0.095*** (0.019) -0.066*** (0.013) 
30% 0.394 0.438 0.300 0.508 0.094*** (0.018) -0.070*** (0.013) 
40% 0.391 0.499 0.303 0.563 0.087*** (0.018) -0.063*** (0.014) 
50% 0.391 0.557 0.303 0.618 0.087*** (0.018) -0.060*** (0.015) 
60% 0.395 0.614 0.303 0.672 0.090*** (0.018) -0.058*** (0.016) 
70% 0.403 0.672 0.306 0.728 0.096*** (0.018) -0.055*** (0.017) 
80% 0.412 0.739 0.308 0.784 0.104*** (0.018) -0.045* (0.018) 
90% 0.419 0.817 0.298 0.880 0.121*** (0.018) -0.063*** (0.016) 
Average 0.412 0.552 0.312 0.613 0.100***(0.007) -0.062***(0.005) 
Data source: Author’s survey. 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively. 
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Table 6 
Simple differencing for the effects of within-arm disaggregation on risk preference (D1 versus D2) 
Lottery win 
percentage 
Group to Individual arm: Group (D1) 
(N=288) 
(1) 
Group to Individual arm: Individual (D2) 
(N=288) 
(2) 
Difference 
 
(1) – (2) 
CER r CER r CER r 
10% 0.371 0.332 0.376 0.326 -0.005 (0.018) 0.006 (0.009) 
20% 0.305 0.444 0.315 0.432 -0.010 (0.015) 0.012 (0.009) 
30% 0.284 0.522 0.306 0.501 -0.022 (0.014) 0.021 (0.011) 
40% 0.277 0.585 0.299 0.565 -0.021 (0.013) 0.020 (0.010) 
50% 0.286 0.633 0.294 0.625 -0.008 (0.013) 0.008 (0.012) 
60% 0.300 0.677 0.297 0.678 0.003 (0.014) -0.001 (0.014) 
70% 0.307 0.727 0.301 0.742 0.006 (0.015) -0.015 (0.013) 
80% 0.312 0.784 0.304 0.802 0.007 (0.015) -0.018 (0.015) 
90% 0.318 0.847 0.313 0.873 0.005 (0.015) -0.026 (0.015) 
Average 0.307 0.617 0.312 0.616 -0.005 (0.005) 0.001 (0.004) 
Data source: Author’s survey. 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively. 
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Table 7 
Simple differencing for the effects of individual risk preference exercise on group risk preference 
Lottery win 
percentage 
Individual to Group arm: Group (A2) 
(N=283) 
(1) 
Group to Individual arm: Group (D1) 
(N=288) 
(2) 
Difference 
 
(1) – (2) 
CER r CER r CER r 
10% 0.362 0.333 0.375 0.330 -0.012 (0.028) 0.002 (0.015) 
20% 0.315 0.435 0.309 0.442 0.006 (0.022) -0.007 (0.014) 
30% 0.300 0.509 0.287 0.520 0.012 (0.021) -0.011 (0.015) 
40% 0.304 0.563 0.280 0.583 0.023 (0.021) -0.020 (0.166) 
50% 0.303 0.618 0.289 0.631 0.014 (0.022) -0.012 (0.017) 
60% 0.305 0.673 0.304 0.675 0.001 (0.022) -0.002 (0.018) 
70% 0.306 0.729 0.311 0.725 -0.004 (0.023) 0.004 (0.019) 
80% 0.308 0.784 0.316 0.781 -0.008 (0.023) 0.003(0.022) 
90% 0.299 0.879 0.323 0.843 -0.025 (0.023) 0.035** (0.017) 
Average 0.312 0.613 0.308 0.612 0.004 (0.007) 0.001 (0.006) 
Data source: Author’s survey. 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively. 
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Table 8 
Simple differencing for the effects of group risk preference exercise on individual risk preference 
Lottery win 
percentage 
Individual to Group arm: Individual 
(A1) 
(N=283) 
(1) 
Group to Individual arm: Individual 
(D2) 
(N=288) 
(2) 
Difference 
 
(1) – (2) 
CER r CER r CER r 
10% 0.486 0.263 0.378 0.325 0.108*** (0.034) -0.062*** (0.019) 
20% 0.410 0.368 0.317 0.431 0.092*** (0.024) -0.063*** (0.016) 
30% 0.395 0.439 0.309 0.499 0.086*** (0.022) -0.060*** (0.017) 
40% 0.391 0.500 0.302 0.564 0.090*** (0.022) -0.064*** (0.017) 
50% 0.391 0.558 0.299 0.623 0.092*** (0.022) -0.065*** (0.018) 
60% 0.396 0.614 0.300 0.677 0.096*** (0.021) -0.063*** (0.020) 
70% 0.403 0.673 0.304 0.740 0.100*** (0.021) -0.067*** (0.018) 
80% 0.412 0.739 0.309 0.801 0.104*** (0.022) -0.061*** (0.019) 
90% 0.422 0.815 0.314 0.873 0.108*** (0.022) -0.058*** (0.019) 
Average 0.412 0.552 0.313 0.612 0.099***(0.008) -0.060***(0.006) 
Data source: Author’s survey. 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively. 
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Table 9 
OLS estimates for pure risk preference differential in CER between experimental arms in Phase 1 (A1 versus D1) 
 Dependent variable: CER 
Lottery win percentage 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Farmer in Group to Indvidual Arm (1=Yes; 
0=No) 
-0.149*** 
(0.035) 
-0.112*** 
(0.027) 
-0.114*** 
(0.028) 
-0.112*** 
(0.029) 
-0.103*** 
(0.034) 
-0.093** 
(0.035) 
-0.091** 
(0.036) 
-0.096** 
(0.037) 
-0.096** 
(0.041) 
Gender (1=Female; 0=Male) 0.054 
(0.041) 
0.027 
(0.030) 
0.020 
(0.024) 
0.010 
(0.024) 
0.011 
(0.023) 
0.016 
(0.022) 
0.015 
(0.023) 
0.013 
(0.024) 
0.015 
(0.024) 
Age (in years) 0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Years of education -0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.000 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
Size of household 0.010 
(0.007) 
0.010* 
(0.006) 
0.010* 
(0.005) 
0.010* 
(0.006) 
0.010 
(0.007) 
0.006 
(0.008) 
0.005 
(0.008) 
0.005 
(0.008) 
0.002 
(0.008) 
Size of farmland (in tsimad) -0.016 
(0.009) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.013* 
(0.007) 
-0.013* 
(0.007) 
-0.013* 
(0.007) 
-0.012 
(0.008) 
-0.012 
(0.008) 
Value of livestock (in 1,000 Birr) -0.006** 
(0.003) 
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
Value of productive assets (in 1,000 Birr) 0.004 
(0.011) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.008* 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.008) 
0.001 
(0.008) 
0.000 
(0.008) 
0.001 
(0.008) 
Village dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Enumerator dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 568 568 568 568 568 568 568 567 568 
Adjusted R-square 0.256 0.321 0.349 0.364 0.365 0.356 0.352 0.356 0.349 
Data source: Author’s survey. 
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Note: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the village level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 
% level respectively. 
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Table 10 
OLS estimates of the effects of individual risk preference exercise on group CER (A2 versus D1) 
 Dependent variable: CER 
Lottery win percentage 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Farmer had individual exercise (1=Yes; 
0=No) 
-0.024 
(0.050) 
-0.000 
(0.037) 
0.015 
(0.035) 
0.033 
(0.034) 
0.023 
(0.035) 
0.010 
(0.036) 
-0.006 
(0.037) 
0.004 
(0.036) 
-0.009 
(0.038) 
Gender (1=Female; 0=Male) 0.035 
(0.039) 
0.007 
(0.028) 
-0.009 
(0.026) 
-0.011 
(0.026) 
-0.017 
(0.027) 
-0.012 
(0.026) 
-0.016 
(0.027) 
-0.018 
(0.027) 
-0.013 
(0.027) 
Age (in years) 0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Years of education -0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
Size of household -0.006 
(0.007) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
Size of farmland (in tsimad) -0.011 
(0.009) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
Value of livestock (in 1,000 Birr) -0.001 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
-0.000 
(0.002) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
Value of productive assets (in 1,000 Birr) 0.004 
(0.008) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
0.000 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
Village dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Enumerator dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 568 568 568 568 568 568 568 567 559 
Adjusted R-square 0.375 0.454 0.499 0.527 0.526 0.519 0.512 0.526 0.508 
Data source: Author’s survey. 
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Note: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the village level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 
% level respectively.  
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Table 11 
OLS estimates of the effects of group risk preference exercise on individual CER (A1 versus D2) 
 Dependent variable: CER 
Lottery win percentage 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Farmer had group exercise (1=Yes; 0=No) -0.139*** 
(0.034) 
-0.099*** 
(0.022) 
-0.092*** 
(0.022) 
-0.089*** 
(0.022) 
-0.092*** 
(0.026) 
-0.096*** 
(0.025) 
-0.098*** 
(0.026) 
-0.105*** 
(0.027) 
-0.106*** 
(0.028) 
Gender (1=Female; 0=Male) 0.010 
(0.037) 
-0.013 
(0.027) 
-0.013 
(0.026) 
-0.024 
(0.026) 
-0.018 
(0.026) 
-0.022 
(0.025) 
-0.025 
(0.024) 
-0.026 
(0.024) 
-0.026 
(0.024) 
Age (in years) 0.002 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Years of education -0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.0001 
(0.003) 
-0.000 
(0.003) 
-0.0001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.0001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
Size of household 0.012* 
(0.007) 
0.013** 
(0.005) 
0.010* 
(0.006) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
0.007 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.007) 
Size of farmland (in tsimad) -0.013 
(0.009) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.000 
(0.006) 
-0.000 
(0.006) 
-0.000 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.007) 
Value of livestock (in 1,000 Birr) -0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
0-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
Value of productive assets (in 1,000 Birr) -0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.010** 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.000 
(0.004) 
Village dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Enumerator dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 568 568 568 568 568 568 568 568 567 
Adjusted R-square 0.149 0.228 0.253 0.282 0.299 0.315 0.320 0.325 0.329 
Data source: Author’s survey. 
Note: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the village level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 
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% level respectively.  
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Table 12 
OLS estimates for pure risk preference differential in CER between experimental arms in Phase 1 (A1 versus D1) 
 Coefficient estimates 
Constant 0.486*** (0.017) 
LOT20 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 20%; 0=if otherwise) -0.076** (0.024) 
LOT30 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 30%; 0=if otherwise) -0.091*** (0.024) 
LOT40 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 40%; 0=if otherwise) -0.095*** (0.024) 
LOT50 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 50%; 0=if otherwise) -0.095*** (0.024) 
LOT60 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 60%; 0=if otherwise) -0.090*** (0.024) 
LOT70 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 70%; 0=if otherwise) -0.083*** (0.024) 
LOT80 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 80%; 0=if otherwise) -0.074** (0.024) 
LOT90 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 90%; 0=if otherwise) -0.065** (0.024) 
Farmer in Group to Individual Arm (1=Yes; 0=No) -0.115*** (0.024) 
Farmer in Group to Individual Arm * LOT20 0.011 (0.034) 
Farmer in Group to Individual Arm * LOT30 0.005 (0.034) 
Farmer in Group to Individual Arm * LOT40 0.001 (0.034) 
Farmer in Group to Individual Arm * LOT50 0.010 (0.034) 
Farmer in Group to Individual Arm * LOT60 0.020 (0.034) 
Farmer in Group to Individual Arm * LOT70 0.019 (0.034) 
Farmer in Group to Individual Arm * LOT80 0.015 (0.034) 
Farmer in Group to Individual Arm * LOT90 0.012 (0.034) 
Total number of observations 5134 
R-Squared 0.042 
Data source: Author’s survey. 
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Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively.  
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Table 13 
OLS estimates of the effects of group risk preference exercise on individual CER (A1 versus D2) 
 Coefficient estimates 
Constant 0.486*** (0.016) 
LOT20 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 20%; 0=if otherwise) -0.076*** (0.023) 
LOT30 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 30%; 0=if otherwise) -0.091*** (0.023) 
LOT40 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 40%; 0=if otherwise) -0.095*** (0.023) 
LOT50 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 50%; 0=if otherwise) -0.095*** (0.023) 
LOT60 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 60%; 0=if otherwise) -0.090*** (0.023) 
LOT70 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 70%; 0=if otherwise) -0.083*** (0.023) 
LOT80 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 80%; 0=if otherwise) -0.074** (0.023) 
LOT90 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 90%; 0=if otherwise) -0.064** (0.023) 
Farmer had group exercise (1=Yes; 0=No) -0.110*** (0.023) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT20 0.016 (0.032) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT30 0.022 (0.032) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT40 0.018 (0.032) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT50 0.014 (0.032) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT60 0.011 (0.032) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT70 0.008 (0.032) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT80 0.003 (0.032) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT90 -0.001 (0.032) 
Total number of observations 5138 
R-Squared 0.041 
Data source: Author’s survey. 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively.  
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Table 14 
OLS estimates of the effects of individual risk preference exercise on group CER (A2 versus D1) 
 Coefficient estimates 
Constant 0.371*** (0.016) 
LOT20 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 20%; 0=if otherwise) -0.065** (0.023) 
LOT30 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 30%; 0=if otherwise) -0.087*** (0.023) 
LOT40 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 40%; 0=if otherwise) -0.094*** (0.023) 
LOT50 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 50%; 0=if otherwise) -0.085*** (0.023) 
LOT60 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 60%; 0=if otherwise) -0.070** (0.023) 
LOT70 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 70%; 0=if otherwise) -0.064** (0.023) 
LOT80 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 80%; 0=if otherwise) -0.059* (0.023) 
LOT90 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 90%; 0=if otherwise) -0.053 (0.023) 
Farmer had individual exercise (1=Yes; 0=No) -0.009 (0.023) 
Farmer had individual exercise * LOT20 0.018 (0.032) 
Farmer had individual exercise * LOT30 0.024 (0.032) 
Farmer had individual exercise * LOT40 0.035 (0.032) 
Farmer had individual exercise * LOT50 0.026 (0.032) 
Farmer had individual exercise * LOT60 0.013 (0.032) 
Farmer had individual exercise * LOT70 0.008 (0.032) 
Farmer had individual exercise * LOT80 0.004 (0.032) 
Farmer had individual exercise * LOT90 -0.011 (0.032) 
Total number of observations 5129 
R-Squared 0.01 
Data source: Author’s survey. 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively. 
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Table 15 
OLS estimates of the effects of group risk preference exercise on individual CER (A1 versus D2), heterogeneity with respect to gender of the 
household head 
 (1) 
Constant 0.49
***
 (0.02) 
LOT20 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 20%; 0=if otherwise) -0.08***(0.02) 
LOT30 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 30%; 0=if otherwise) -0.09***(0.02) 
LOT40 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 40%; 0=if otherwise) -0.09***(0.02) 
LOT50 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 50%; 0=if otherwise) -0.10***(0.02) 
LOT60 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 60%; 0=if otherwise) -0.09***(0.02) 
LOT70 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 70%; 0=if otherwise) -0.08***(0.02) 
LOT80 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 80%; 0=if otherwise) -0.07***(0.02) 
LOT90 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 90%; 0=if otherwise) -0.06***(0.02) 
Farmer had group exercise (1=Yes; 0=No) -0.08
***
(0.02) 
Farmer had group exercise * Female household head -0.04***(0.02) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT20 0.02(0.03) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT30 0.02(0.03) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT40 0.02(0.03) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT50 0.02(0.03) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT60 0.01(0.03) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT70 0.01(0.03) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT80 0.00(0.03) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT90 -0.00(0.03) 
Household characteristics Yes 
Observations 5138 
R
2
 0.043 
Data source: Author’s survey. 
Note: Household characteristics includes female household head (1=yes; 0=no), age of household head, years of education of household head and 
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size of land (in tsimad) .Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively. 
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Table 16 
OLS estimates of the effects of group risk preference exercise on individual CER (A1 versus D2), heterogeneity with respect to household 
head age  
 (1) 
Constant 0.49***(0.02) 
LOT20 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 20%; 0=if otherwise) -0.08***(0.02) 
LOT30 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 30%; 0=if otherwise) -0.09***(0.02) 
LOT40 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 40%; 0=if otherwise) -0.09***(0.02) 
LOT50 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 50%; 0=if otherwise) -0.10***(0.02) 
LOT60 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 60%; 0=if otherwise) -0.09***(0.02) 
LOT70 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 70%; 0=if otherwise) -0.08***(0.02) 
LOT80 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 80%; 0=if otherwise) -0.07***(0.02) 
LOT90 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 90%; 0=if otherwise) -0.06***(0.02) 
Farmer had group exercise (1=Yes; 0=No) -0.10***(0.02) 
Farmer had group exercise * Middle age (1=if age between 40 & 59) -0.01(0.01) 
Farmer had group exercise * Old age (1=if age over 60) -0.05***(0.02) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT20 0.02(0.03) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT30 0.02(0.03) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT40 0.02(0.03) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT50 0.02(0.03) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT60 0.01(0.03) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT70 0.01(0.03) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT80 0.00(0.03) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT90 -0.00(0.03) 
Household characteristics Yes 
Observations     5138 
R
2
      0.04 
Data source: Author’s survey. 
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Note: Age group 20-39 is omitted for reference. Household characteristics includes female household head (1=yes; 0=no), age of household head, 
years of education of household head and size of land (in tsimad) .Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical 
significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively. 
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Table 17 
OLS estimates of the effects of group risk preference exercise on individual CER (A1 versus D2), heterogeneity with respect to years of 
education of the head 
 (1) 
Constant 0.50***(0.02) 
LOT20 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 20%; 0=if otherwise) -0.08***(0.02) 
LOT30 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 30%; 0=if otherwise) -0.09***(0.02) 
LOT40 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 40%; 0=if otherwise) -0.09***(0.02) 
LOT50 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 50%; 0=if otherwise) -0.10***(0.02) 
LOT60 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 60%; 0=if otherwise) -0.09***(0.02) 
LOT70 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 70%; 0=if otherwise) -0.08***(0.02) 
LOT80 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 80%; 0=if otherwise) -0.07***(0.02) 
LOT90 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 90%; 0=if otherwise) -0.06***(0.02) 
Farmer had group exercise (1=Yes; 0=No) -0.10***(0.02) 
Farmer had group exercise * Years of education -0.00*(0.00) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT20 0.02(0.03) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT30 0.02(0.03) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT40 0.02(0.03) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT50 0.02(0.03) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT60 0.01(0.03) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT70 0.01(0.03) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT80 0.00(0.03) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT90 -0.00(0.03) 
Household characteristics Yes 
Observations 5138 
R
2
 0.05 
Data source: Author’s survey. 
Note: Household characteristics includes female household head (1=yes; 0=no), age of household head, years of education of household head and 
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size of land (in tsimad) .Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively.  
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Table 18 
OLS estimates of the effects of group risk preference exercise on individual CER (A1 versus D2), heterogeneity with respect to size of land 
 (1) 
Constant 0.50***(0.02) 
LOT20 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 20%; 0=if otherwise) -0.08***(0.02) 
LOT30 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 30%; 0=if otherwise) -0.09***(0.02) 
LOT40 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 40%; 0=if otherwise) -0.09***(0.02) 
LOT50 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 50%; 0=if otherwise) -0.10***(0.02) 
LOT60 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 60%; 0=if otherwise) -0.09***(0.02) 
LOT70 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 70%; 0=if otherwise) -0.08***(0.02) 
LOT80 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 80%; 0=if otherwise) -0.07***(0.02) 
LOT90 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 90%; 0=if otherwise) -0.06***(0.02) 
Farmer had group exercise (1=Yes; 0=No) -0.10***(0.02) 
Farmer had group exercise * Size of land -0.00 (0.00) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT20 0.02(0.03) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT30 0.02(0.03) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT40 0.02(0.03) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT50 0.02(0.03) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT60 0.01(0.03) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT70 0.01(0.03) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT80 0.00(0.03) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT90 -0.00(0.03) 
Household characteristics Yes 
Observations 5138 
R
2
 0.05 
Data source: Author’s survey. 
Note: Household characteristics includes female household head (1=yes; 0=no), age of household head years of education of household head and 
size of land (in tsimad) .Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively. 
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Figure 1 Mean CER between individuals in Individual to Group arm and the three 
member groups in Group to Individual arm 
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Figure 2 Individual CER average with & without group                 Figure 3 Group CER average with & without individual risk 
risk preference exercise                 
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Figure 4 Profile of the randomized experimental study (on the previous page) 
Appendix 
Appendix 1 
OLS estimates of the effects of group risk preference exercise on individual CER (A1 versus D2), triple heterogeneity with respect to gender of 
the household head 
 (1) 
Constant 0.50***(0.02) 
LOT20 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 20%; 0=if otherwise) -0.08***(0.02) 
LOT30 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 30%; 0=if otherwise) -0.09***(0.02) 
LOT40 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 40%; 0=if otherwise) -0.09***(0.02) 
LOT50 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 50%; 0=if otherwise) -0.10***(0.02) 
LOT60 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 60%; 0=if otherwise) -0.09***(0.02) 
LOT70 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 70%; 0=if otherwise) -0.08***(0.02) 
LOT80 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 80%; 0=if otherwise) -0.07***(0.02) 
LOT90 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 90%; 0=if otherwise) -0.06***(0.02) 
Farmer had group exercise (1=Yes; 0=No) -0.11***(0.02) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT20* Female household head -0.04(0.03) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT30* Female household head -0.04(0.03) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT40* Female household head -0.04(0.03) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT50* Female household head -0.04(0.03) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT60* Female household head -0.05(0.03) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT70* Female household head -0.05(0.03) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT80* Female household head -0.05(0.03) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT90* Female household head -0.05(0.03) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT20 0.04(0.04) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT30 0.04(0.04) 
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Farmer had group exercise * LOT40 0.04(0.04) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT50 0.04(0.04) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT60 0.04(0.04) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT70 0.04(0.04) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT80 0.03(0.04) 
Farmer had group exercise * LOT90 0.03(0.04) 
Household characteristics Yes 
Observations 5138 
R
2
 0.04 
Data source: Author’s survey. 
Note: Household characteristics includes female household head (1=yes; 0=no), age of household head, years of education of household head and 
size of land (in tsimad) .Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectivel
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 Appendix 2 
 
Experiment Instructions for Enumerators 
 
Individual to Group Arm should have three respondents. Individual to Group Arm 
respondents should first answer Individual Risk Preference Exercise individually and 
separately. No other people should be around. Make sure that the respondents do not 
communicate with each other before or after their individual exercise. After all 
respondents in Individual to Group Arm have completed Individual Risk Preference 
Exercise, respondents in Individual to Group Arm should form a group to answer 
Group Risk Preference Exercise together. 
 
Group to Individual Arm should have three respondents. Group to Individual Arm 
respondents should first answer Group Risk Preference Exercise together as a 
group. No other people should be around the group. After all respondents in Group 
to Individual Arm have completed Group Risk Preference Exercise together as a 
group, respondents should answer Individual Risk Preference Exercise individually 
and separately. No other people should be around. Make sure that the respondents 
do not communicate with each other before or after their individual exercise. 
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Appendix 3: Individual Risk Preference Exercise 
 
Enumerator please read the following instructions to respondents: 
In this part, we are going to play nine hypothetical lottery games individually. In 
each of the nine hypothetical games, there are some chances to win 100 birr of cash 
and the nine games carry different chances of winning. The chances range from one 
out of ten (1/10), two out of ten (2/10), and step-by-step up to nine out of ten (9/10). 
You can understand the chances with the example of drawing one ball from a bag 
containing ten balls. If there are one red ball and nine white balls in the bag, the 
chance of winning 100 birr in this lottery is one out of ten (1/10). You will win 100 
birr if you pick a red ball. You will win nothing if you pick a white ball. 
 
 Do you understand the instructions? 
1=Yes_____ (Continue) 2=No____ (Repeat instructions and answer questions) 
 
Now, as you understand the instructions, we will ask you to make one decision for 
each of the nine lottery games. Suppose you have to pay cash in order to play the 
lotteries. Suppose for each lottery you have 100 birr of cash and you can use some of 
the cash to pay for the lottery. If you win the lottery, the final cash amount will be the 
100 birr in hand minus your payment plus 100 birr from winning. If you do not win 
the lottery, the final cash amount will only be the 100 birr in hand minus your 
payment. Please tell us the MAXIMUM amount of cash that you are willing to pay 
for each lottery. (Enumerator: All the nine lotteries must be asked and answered.) 
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No Lottery Options What is the MAXIMUM amount of cash (up 
to 100 birr) that you are willing to pay in 
order to play this lottery? 
01 1 out of 10 chance of winning 100 birr 
(1 red ball, 9 white balls) 
 
02 2 out of 10 chance of winning 100 birr 
(2 red balls, 8 white balls) 
 
03 3 out of 10 chance of winning 100 birr 
(3 red balls, 7 white balls) 
 
04 4 out of 10 chance of winning 100 birr 
(4 red balls, 6 white balls) 
 
05 5 out of 10 chance of winning 100 birr 
(5 red balls, 5 white balls) 
 
06 6 out of 10 chance of winning 100 birr 
(6 red balls, 4 white balls) 
 
07 7 out of 10 chance of winning 100 birr 
(7 red balls, 3 white balls) 
 
08 8 out of 10 chance of winning 100 birr 
(8 red balls, 2 white balls) 
 
09 9 out of 10 chance of winning 100 birr 
(9 red balls, 1 white ball) 
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Appendix 4: Group Risk Preference Exercise 
 
Enumerator please read the following instructions to respondents: 
In this part, we are going to play nine hypothetical lottery games. In each of the nine 
hypothetical games, there are some chances to win 300 birr of cash and the nine 
games carry different chances of winning. The chances range from one out of ten 
(1/10), two out of ten (2/10), and step-by-step up to nine out of ten (9/10). You can 
understand the chances with the example of drawing one ball from a bag containing 
ten balls. If there are one red ball and nine white balls in the bag, the chance of 
winning 300 birr in this lottery is one out of ten (1/10). Your group will win 300 birr 
if your group picks a red ball. Your group will win nothing if your group picks a 
white ball. 
 
 Do you all understand the instructions? 
1=Yes_____ (Continue) 2=No____ (Repeat instructions and answer questions) 
 
Now, as you all understand the instructions, we will ask your group to make one 
decision for each of the nine lottery games. Suppose your group have to pay cash in 
order to play the lotteries. Suppose for each lottery your group have 300 birr of cash 
and your group can use some of the cash to pay for the lottery. If your group wins the 
lottery, the final cash amount will be the 300 birr in hand minus your payment plus 
300 birr from winning. If your group does not win the lottery, the final cash amount 
will only be the 300 birr in hand minus your payment. The cash will be shared 
equally. Please tell us the MAXIMUM amount of cash that your group is willing to 
pay for each lottery. For each lottery, your group has one minute to discuss and 
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make one group decision. Your group must make one decision. (Enumerator: All the 
nine lotteries must be asked and answered. Extra 30 seconds only if the group fails to 
agree within one minute. No more extension.) 
No Lottery Options What is the MAXIMUM amount 
of cash (up to 300 birr) that your 
group is willing to pay in order to 
play this lottery? 
Extra 
time? 
(1=Yes; 
2=No) 
01 1 out of 10 chance of winning 300 birr 
(1 red ball, 9 white balls) 
  
02 2 out of 10 chance of winning 300 birr 
(2 red balls, 8 white balls) 
  
03 3 out of 10 chance of winning 300 birr 
(3 red balls, 7 white balls) 
  
04 4 out of 10 chance of winning 300 birr 
(4 red balls, 6 white balls) 
  
05 5 out of 10 chance of winning 300 birr 
(5 red balls, 5 white balls) 
  
06 6 out of 10 chance of winning 300 birr 
(6 red balls, 4 white balls) 
  
07 7 out of 10 chance of winning 300 birr 
(7 red balls, 3 white balls) 
  
08 8 out of 10 chance of winning 300 birr 
(8 red balls, 2 white balls) 
  
09 9 out of 10 chance of winning 300 birr 
(9 red balls, 1 white ball) 
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CHAPTER 5 
Eliciting Responses to Sensitive Questions in the Field: A Randomized Experiment 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Researchers in the social sciences often conduct research with survey data on 
topics that are considerably sensitive in nature. A large body of empirical work has been 
done on topics related to abortion (Schuman et al., 1981; Peytchev, et al., 2010), drugs 
(Timothy et al., 1989; Aquilino & Sciuto, 1990; Turner, et al., 1998), sexual behaviors 
(Turner, et al., 1998), child labors (Dumas, 2007), and domestic violence (Koenig, et al., 
2006; Rabel et al., 2014). 
One major difficulty that researchers face in examining the empirical patterns of 
these sensitive topics is about the availability and the reliability of data. In order to 
conduct an empirical study on these topics, data need to be collected from the field. 
However, as already shown in the existing literature, many people are not willing to take 
part in field surveys and to response to such questions. And even if people agree to 
participate in field survey, they may not necessarily tell the truth. First, some survey 
questions may be intrusive, socially undesirable or sometimes respondent perceives 
some level of threat of disclosure (Tourangeau & Yan, 2007). Second, respondents may 
not critically read the questions and rush their answer due to lack of motivation, 
cooperation or sense of obligation (Jobber & Saundrens, 1988). 
In order better study topics that may be sensitive in nature, some researchers 
have proposed different ways to improve the method of field data collection. 
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Specifically, some have suggested that respondents shall be provided with high 
participation incentives so that they are more motivated to cooperate and provide 
truthful responses to sensitive questions (Jobber & Saundrens, 1988). Some others have 
also suggested that field survey should be designed in a way that encourage a more 
friendly and less frightening environment so that respondents will feel more comfortable 
with providing truthful responses (Lee 1993; Barnett, 1998; Schaeffer, 2000; 
Tourangeau & Yan, 2007; Beatty & Herrmann 2009).  
There are also studies that examine the effects of incentives on the quality of 
survey responses. In fact, many studies find out incentives also improve response quality 
which is equally important as the improvements in response rates (McDaniel & Rao, 
1980; Goetz et al., 1984; Brennan, 1992; Willimack et al, 1995; Shettle and Mooney, 
1999). These studies demonstrate that incentives improve response quality in terms of 
reducing item nonresponse rates and refusal rates to open ended questions. 
The existing literature has largely been focusing on examining ways to reduce 
survey nonresponse per se. A large body of literature has shown that both monetary and 
non-monetary incentives can increase survey response rates (Goetz et al., 1984; Joseph 
& Peter, 1986; Jobber & Saunders, 1988; Willimack et al, 1995; Kalantar & Talley, 
1999; Singer et al, 1999; Leung et al., 2002; Leung et al., 2004; Ryu et al., 2005; Baron 
et al., 2008; Haris et al., 2008; Wetzels et al., 2008; Petrolia & Bhattacharjee, 2009).
33
 
                                                     
33
 The majority of these studies focus on mail and telephone surveys and, few studied on face-to-face 
surveys. Most of these studies found that, incentives improve response rates, particularly in mail surveys 
and also in other survey studies (Armstrong, 1975; Goetz et al., 1984; Joseph & Peter, 1986; Singer et al, 
1999; Leung et al., 2002; Leung et al., 2002; Ryu et al., 2005; Baron et al., 2008; Petrolia & Bhattacharjee, 
2009). Specifically, it has been documented that monetary incentives are more powerful and effective than 
non-monetary incentives such as gifts or lotteries in improving response rates in mail and other surveys 
(Leung et al., 2002; Leung et al., 2004; Ryu et al., 2005; Petrolia & Bhattacharjee, 2009). In fact, the 
suggestion is that the uses of monetary incentives appear to affect response rates because monetary 
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Yet, despite the growing literature on the use of incentives to improve response rates and 
response quality in broad ranges of survey modes, there are still some fundamental 
unanswered questions. 
The first important question is whether respondents report to sensitive questions 
honestly or not. In this case, there are evidences that show respondents underreport 
responses to sensitive questions (Bradburn, 1983; Wish, Hoffman, & Nemes, 1997; 
Tourangeau & Yan, 2007). The second question builds on the first one. The second 
important question is how to improve responses to sensitive questions.  
Although field surveys are one of the major methods of how researchers collect 
data from the field, only a few empirical studies have been designed to examine whether 
and how researchers can better obtain information about sensitive questions from 
respondents (Locke et al., 1992; Aquilino, 1994; Tourangeau & Smith, 1996; Jobe et al., 
1996). While there are some empirical studies on mechanisms that improve responses to 
sensitive questions, these studies mainly compare the disclosure level of sensitive 
questions (response to sensitive questions) among survey modes (Locke et al., 1992; 
Aquilino, 1994; Tourangeau & Smith, 1996; Jobe et al., 1996; Brakel et al., 2008),
34
 
and only a few studies evaluate the impact of promised incentive on responses to 
sensitive questions (Brakel et al., 2008).
35
 
                                                                                                                                                            
incentive induce respondents’ motivation, cooperation and sense of obligations to the task for which they 
are being paid (Goetz et al., 1984). 
34
 It has been shown that disclosure level of sensitive questions (response to sensitive questions) is higher 
for self-administered survey studies than interviewer assisted surveys (Locke et al., 1992; Aquilino, 1994; 
Jobe et al., 1996; Tourangeau & Smith, 1996; Brakel et al., 2008) 
35
 This study investigates the effect of a promised incentive of 10 euro on responses to sensitive questions 
and the findings shows that the 10 euro promised incentive has no significant impact on the responses to 
sensitive questions (Brakel et al., 2008) 
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In this study, we have two overall goals. First, financial incentives can affect the 
decision of households to take part in the survey studies, and our assumption is if 
incentives induce willingness to participate, households may also behave differently 
with incentives or without incentives in their response to sensitive questions after taking 
part to participate. So, we expect high financial incentive to have a positive impact on 
the response to sensitive questions.  
Second, the presentation of sensitive questions in the form of framed or 
unframed questions may affect responses to sensitive questions. That is, through the use 
of framed questions it may be possible to present case specific people’s behavior that 
may reduce threats, create relaxation or motivate respondents in providing honest reports 
to sensitive questions (Iarossi, 2006). So, we expect framed questions will have positive 
effects on responses to sensitive questions.  
In order to achieve these two goals, we conduct a randomized field experiment 
among a large number of rural households in the Northern part of Ethiopia. Specifically, 
we develop two sets of experimental interventions on collecting data from the field and 
randomly allocate our targeted respondents to these two sets of interventions. In the first 
intervention, we vary the amount of financial incentives that survey participants can get 
from completing our survey. In the second intervention, we randomized these two 
groups to get either survey with framed or unframed questions.  
Then, we compare responses to the sensitive questions by financial incentive and 
survey form type. We also compare responses by grouping in to two sub domains using 
the sensitivity levels of the questions (less sensitive and high sensitive survey questions). 
And then, we further grouped the questions in to four socioeconomic domains (health, 
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social protection, loan and finance, common pool and gender and intra household) to see 
if responses differ by domain. 
 Our study has a few limitations, however. First, due to a low literacy level of 
the households in our study area, we could not apply self-administrated surveys (our 
field survey was assisted by interviewers).To get reliable information, we hired well 
trained enumerators who have years of experience in a similar job. We also provided 
them training and a toolkit of instructions. Further, in order to deal with possible 
heterogeneities among enumerators, we include enumerator dummy variables in our 
regression analyses. Second, due to resource constraint, our financial incentive 
experiment has two experimental arms (high pay and low pay) to investigate the impact 
of incentives on responses to sensitive questions; the no-pay experimental arm is not 
included in our study. We planned to include the third experimental arm in the coming 
follow-up survey that will be held in October 2016. Third, because of the flip coin 
procedure that is used to assign households either in the high pay or low pay group, the 
number of households in the two groups (high pay and low pay) is not exactly equal. 
However, high pay and low pay groups are perfectly balanced. We also control for 
household, village and enumerator characteristics in our regression estimates in order to 
get reliable causal impacts.   
The rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses our research venue and 
our research methodology, which includes the sampling procedure, the survey design, 
the two experimental interventions on data collection, data collection and the statistical 
approach. Section 3 presents the empirical results on the effects of the two interventions 
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(financial incentives and framed survey questions) on responses to the sensitive 
questions. Section 4 discusses the results and concludes. 
  
 172 
5.2 Research Methodology 
 
5.2.1 Sampling Method 
Our sample includes approximately 1152 rural households drawn from 32 
villages in four districts, Ganta-Afeshum, Gulo-Maheda, Enderta and Hintalo-Wajirat, in 
the Tigray regional state, northern Ethiopia.
36
There were four main steps in the 
formation of the sample.  
First, we selected four districts (or Weredas) from different parts of the Tigray 
region to be our study districts. Then, we randomly selected eight villages (or Tabyas) in 
each of the four sample districts to obtain a sample of 32 villages. Third, in each of the 
32 villages we randomly selected three sub-villages (or Kushets) to obtain 96 
sub-villages. In the fourth step, 12 households in each of the 96 sub villages were 
randomly drawn and we obtained a sample of 1,152 rural households from such 
sampling frame for this study. 
 
5.2.2 Experimental interventions 
We conducted a randomized controlled trial (RCT) of two interventions to 
understand the effects of financial incentive, and framed survey questions on the 
responses to sensitive questions.  
5.2.2.1 Financial incentive intervention 
The first set of intervention is providing different levels of financial incentives to 
the sample households. The high pay (ETB 15) and the low pay (ETB 5). For the 
                                                     
36
 The study is part of an on-going RCT research on the cost effectiveness of integrating weather index 
agricultural insurance into the productive safety net program in Northern Ethiopia. 
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purpose of this intervention, we randomly assign households using flipping a coin. 
Particularly, after asking their willingness to take in the survey, we flip a coin and let the 
responds know how much he/she will get before commencing the survey. Consequently, 
our sample is divided in to two intervention groups: 625 households received a high pay 
incentive (ETB 15) and 513 households were given a low pay incentive (ETB 5).
37
  
5.2.2.2 Framed survey questions intervention 
In this second set of intervention, we prepare two sets of survey questions- 
survey with framed questions and survey with unframed questions. The two forms of the 
questions have similar content but the framed questions have elaborations about human 
behavior that are intended to reduce the nature of intrusiveness, undesirable and threat of 
disclosure in the questions. Both the framed and unframed questionnaires comprised 22 
questions with varying degree of sensitivity levels. Random assignment of intervention 
to the individual households was achieved by alternating the questionnaire type when we 
interviewed the households. Accordingly, 572 households were interviewed using the 
framed questionnaire and 571 households were interviewed with unframed questionnaire 
type.  
5.2.2.3 Individual randomized allocation to experimental interventions 
The sample households were randomized to the four experimental groups. We 
randomized by alternating the questionnaire type used for the interview as we move 
from one household to another household.
38
 As a result of the randomization, half of the 
                                                     
37
 The numbers of households in these two strata is not exactly equal; however, as can be seen from table 
3 the two groups are nearly perfectly balanced.  
38
 Twenty four enumerators (interviewers) were randomly assigned to do the survey in four districts and 
32 villages. We also assigned one supervisor in each district to supervise 6 enumerators throughout the 
study. The supervisors assigned interviewers to a respondent, and they were told to alternate the 
questionnaire type as they move from one respondent to another respondent. In this manner, the 
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respondents were interviewed using a questionnaire with framed questions and half 
using a questionnaire with unframed question (See Fig.1 for the study organization).  
 
5.2.3 Data Collection 
After excluding two households who refused to participate and seven 
non-contacted households, this study uses the responses from the remaining 1,143 
households. All the 1,143 sample households were face to face interviewed in November 
2015.  
After collecting the supplementary survey information in the manner mentioned 
in the above paragraphs, we then matched the supplementary survey information with 
that of the information collected in the main survey to create a full set of cross-sectional 
survey data. By doing so, it is possible to use household characteristics and other control 
variables from the main survey for balancing and other statistical analysis. For example, 
as part of assessing the validity of our randomization process, respondents’ 
characteristics in the two experimental arms were examined using two-sample t-test. 
Due to the large scale of our RCT study, the household characteristic of the sample rural 
households is perfectly balanced between the experimental arms (Table 2 & table 3). 
5.2.1 Dependent variables 
Our RCT intervention allows us to create two dependent variables. The first one 
is a dummy variable for Response to the sensitive question which takes one (1) if the 
household’s response to the sensitive question is ‘yes’ and zero (0) otherwise. The 
second dependent variable is a continuous variable (Response to less sensitive questions) 
                                                                                                                                                            
enumerators have taken proper registration the sequence of alternation of questionnaire type throughout 
the study. 
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created by the count for the number of positive responses to the less sensitive questions 
provided by each household. To measure the sensitivity level of the survey questions, we 
adopt a 5-point scale design (1=extremely low sensitive and 5=extremely high sensitive) 
and ask academicians and local experts in Ethiopia to rate the sensitivity level to each of 
questions based on the 5-point scale. Then, we classify questions with an average score 
of less than 3 as less sensitive questions and the questions with score values of 3 and 
above as high sensitive questions.  
 There are two testable hypotheses associated with these dependent variables. The first 
hypothesis is that the high incentive (ETB 15) groups will provide high responses to the 
sensitive questions. The second hypothesis is those households who are interviewed 
using framed questions will provide more positive responses to the sensitive questions.  
5.2.2 Treatment variables 
Financial incentive and the framed questions are the two major treatment 
variables of our intervention expected to influence the dependent variable (response to 
sensitive questions). Certain designing features such as the presentation of survey 
questions in framed questions as compared to unframed questions may influence 
response to sensitive questions. The following example clarifies the difference between 
our framed and unframed presentation of survey questions. 
Framed question: “Here is something that has been said about some people in this area. 
They don’t always wash their hands after going to the toilet. Sometimes, they even shake 
hands with friends without washing their hands. Have you ever shaken hands with your 
friends without washing your hands after going to the toilet?” 
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Unframed question: “Have you ever shaken hands with your friends without washing 
your hands after going to the toilet?” 
 
We defined a dummy variable Framed questionnaire to capture the effect of 
survey with framed questions on responses to sensitive questions. We first define the 
dummy variable Framed questionnaire to represent whether the household was 
interviewed using the framed questions or unframed questions. Specifically, the variable 
equals one (1) if the household was interviewed using framed questions and equals zero 
(0) if it was otherwise.  
Receiving either in the form of high pay or low pay incentive is another 
treatment variable that could affect responses to sensitive questions. Thus, we created 
another dummy variable High pay to represent whether the household received a 
participation incentive of ETB 15 or ETB 5. Specifically, this variable equals one (1) if 
the respondent received a participation incentive of ETB 15 and equal zero (0) if it was 
otherwise.  
5.2.3 Control variables 
We make use of other household information in the survey to construct a number 
of household characteristics to be used as control variables in our estimations. 
Specifically, the list of household variables includes the gender of the household head 
(1=female; 0=male), the age of the household head, the number of years of education of 
the household head received, the size of household, and also the size of farmland the 
household owned. We also collect information about the numeracy level, the level of 
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risk aversion and the community trust score of the households.
39
 We call this set of 
household variables household characteristics.  
 
5.2.4 Statistical Approach 
We use descriptive statistics and regression analyses to estimate the effects of the 
two interventions on household’s responses to sensitive questions. In our regression 
analyses, we use both ordinary least square (OLS) model as well as logistic probability 
models.  
5.2.4.1 Responses to individual questions 
Response to individual questions is observed over the zero and one. To estimate 
the effects of our two interventions on the responses to sensitive questions, we employ a 
logit probability model as follows: 
 
P(Positiveresponse)=Ʌ(b0+b1*Framed_questionnaireij+b2*High_payij+ 
b3*Framed_questionnaire*High_pay ij + b4*Household Characteristicsij  
+μj+υk).                                                 (1)  
 
P(Positive response) is the probability of positive responses to the sensitive 
question. For each sensitive question, we developed a similar set of logistic regression 
equation. High_payij is a dummy variable that equals one (1) if the household received 
ETB 15 for participating in the survey and equals zero (0) if the household received only 
                                                     
39
 Numeracy level is the average for the number of numeracy questions correctly answered. Risk attitude 
is constructed from the willingness to take agricultural risks on 10 points scale (1=completely unwilling 
and 10 completely willing). The community trust score is constructed based on the respondents view if the 
most people in this Kushet can be trusted using 5-point scale (1=fully trust them and 5 do not trust them) 
 178 
ETB 5. Framed_questionnaireij is a dummy variable that equals one (1) if framed 
questions were used for conducting the field survey with the household and equals zero 
(0) if unframed questions were used instead. Framed_questionnaire*High_pay is an 
interaction variable of framed questionnaire and high pay. Household Characteristicsij is 
the set of household characteristics as defined before. We also include village dummy 
variables, μj, and enumerator dummy variables, υk, to control for possible heterogeneities 
among villages and among enumerators. We hope that the estimates for the parameters 
b1, b2 and b3 can tell us the effect of the two interventions (and their interaction) on the 
household’s response.  
5.2.4.2 Responses to questions by level of question sensitivity 
We also want to understand the impact of our intervention by the level of 
sensitivity of the questions, we estimate ordinary least square (OLS) model as follows. 
 
Response_less_sensitiveij = b0+ b1*Framed_questionnaireij +b2 *High_payij + 
b3 *Framed_questionnaire*High_pay ij + b4 *Household Characteristicsij +μj + 
υk + eij.                                   (2) 
 
Response_less_sensitiveij is a count of the number of positive responses to the 
less sensitive survey questions for each household. Framed_questionnaireij is a dummy 
variable that equals (1) if the household is interviewed using the framed questions and 
equal to zero (0) if it was otherwise.  
5.2.4.3 Responses to questions by type of questions 
To understand the impact of our intervention by socioeconomic domains, we 
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further estimate ordinary least square (OLS) model as follows. 
 
ResponseSocioeconomic_ij = b0+ b1*Framed_questionnaireij +b2 *High_payij  
+ b3 *Framed_questionnaire*High_pay ij + b4 *Household Characteristicsij  
+μj + υk + eij.                              (3) 
 
ResponseSocioeconomic_ij is a count of the number of positive responses to the 
sensitive questions grouped in to four socioeconomic domains (health, social protection, 
loan and finance, common pool and gender and intra household). It represents for these 
four different socioeconomic variables  
 
 
5.3. Empirical Results 
 
5.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 provides the summary characteristics of our study households. There are 
more female household heads than men household heads in the study sample (54% 
versus 46% respectively). The average size of the household is about 5.3 persons to a 
household with nearly 47 years of household heads age. Most of the household heads 
have low level of education (on average household heads attend 2.8 years of education). 
The numeracy level of the study households is also very lower (on average the number 
of numeracy questions correctly answered by household is nearly 1 out of 3 numeracy 
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measurement questions). In panel B we also present summary statistics of several wealth 
and assets. The households in our study area are small farm holders. On average a 
household owns about 2.4 tsimad (less than one hectare) of land. Panel C reports 
numeracy level, risk aversion and community trust scores of the heads of the household.  
To assess the validity of our randomization process, respondents’ characteristics 
in the two experimental arms were examined using two-sample t-test. Table 2 and 3 
present the mean comparison of respondents’ characteristics by intervention groups. 
Randomization resulted in a very similar household characteristic between the two 
experimental interventions, as shown by the insignificant mean difference (Table 
2-Column 3, row 1-10) and (Table 3-Column 3, row 1-10). The key control variables are 
nearly perfectly balanced in the two experimental arms.  
In table 7 we present mean comparison of response frequencies by survey 
questionnaire type to see the effects of framed questionnaire in improving responses to 
sensitive questions. From descriptive statistics point of view, it seems that the 
presentation of survey question either in a framed or unframed question does not matter. 
Reviewing the mean difference for each sensitive question demonstrates that almost in 
all the 14 sensitive questions there is no significant difference among the two groups 
(Column 6, row 1-14). 
Table 7 also provides a descriptive overview of mean comparisons between high 
pay and low pay incentive groups. Overall, the response frequencies were positive and 
significantly higher for the high pay incentive groups. Out of the 14 sensitive questions 
frequency of positive responses were higher for the high pay groups in ten of the 
questions but values are statistically significant for three questions. In some of the 
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questions the high pay incentive improves response rate to sensitive question up to 8.7 
percent improvement and such improvement were significant at the one percent level 
(Column 3, 9). However, comparing high pay incentive and low pay incentive without 
considering the survey questionnaire type may not give us a clear understanding whether 
the effect comes from the financial incentive or the framing.  
Table 9 provides mean response comparison between the households who 
received framed questions with an incentive of ETB 15 (Framed -high pay) versus those 
households who were interviewed using framed questions with an incentive of ETB 5 
(Framed -low pay). Out of the 14 sensitive questions percent response were higher for 
the framed questionnaire- high pay groups in five of the questions. As compared to table 
7 the number has increased from three to five after we control for the framed 
questionnaire. In table 9, we also compared unframed-high pay and unframed-low pay. 
Similarly, out of the 14 sensitive questions percent response were higher for the 
unframed-high pay groups in five of the questions. It seems that, by the descriptive 
statistics, high pay incentive significantly improves responses to sensitive questions. On 
the other hand, the presentation of similar questions in a framed or unframed survey 
question does not significantly affect responses to sensitive questions. Yet, the findings 
from descriptive statistics may be biased because of different confounding factors.  
 
5.3.2 Multivariate Results 
5.3.2.1 Individual questions 
When we run the logistic regression model controlling for household and 
individual characteristics, enumerators and village specific effects, our intervention 
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variables insignificantly affect responses to sensitive questions. For example, Table 11 
indicates that the impact of financial incentive, and framed question on responses to the 
sensitive questions and we observe no significant effect of either treatments (Column 4, 
row 1-14). 
5.3.2.2 By question sensitivity 
Table 12 reports the effect of financial incentive, and framed questions on the 
responses to the less sensitive questions. The statistical estimate is conducted using OLS 
regression controlling for household and individual characteristics, enumerator and 
village specific effects. We find financial incentive has positive and significant impact 
on responses to less sensitive questions, statistically significant at the five percent level 
(Column 2, row 2).  
3.2.3 By question type 
We also examine the impact by grouping the sensitive question in four 
socioeconomic domains. However, our result shows that none of the coefficients either 
for financial incentive or framed question were significant, suggesting that financial 
incentive and framed questions do not affect response  sensitive questions by 
socioeconomic grouping (Table 13 & table 14). 
 
5.4. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This study examines the effects of financial incentive, and the framing of survey 
questions on the responses to sensitive survey questions. We conducted a randomized 
field experiment among a large number of rural households selected from 32 village 
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communities in Northern Ethiopia. We evaluate the effects of two different 
interventions.  
The first intervention consists of two types of financial incentive groups- the 
high pay (ETB 15) intervention group and the low pay (ETB 5) intervention group. For 
the second type of intervention, we prepare two types of survey questions –survey with 
framed questions and survey with unframed questions.  
We compare the response rate among those receiving high financial incentive 
and low financial incentive; and among those who were interviewed using framed 
survey questions and unframed survey questions. We also compare response by 
grouping them into two sensitivity levels (less sensitive ones and more sensitive ones). 
We further grouped the questions in to five socioeconomic domains (health, social 
protection, loan and finance, common pool and gender and intra household) to see if 
responses differ by domain.  
The result shows that high financial incentive improves response to the little 
sensitive survey questions, but the survey with framed questions does not. Respondents 
in the high pay category were more likely to provide more positive responses to the little 
sensitive questions. However, providing survey incentives in the case of high sensitive 
questions does not significantly affect responses. In respect to the socioeconomic 
domains, both the financial incentive and the framing of questions do not matter. 
Besides, the use of framed survey question does not significantly improve response for 
sensitive questions in all the cases.  
This study has a few limitations that should be addressed in the future research. 
First, our financial incentive experiment has two experimental arms (high pay and low 
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pay) and we suggest future research with no-pay third experimental arm. Second, our 
results suggest that financial incentive may positively affect responses to less sensitive 
questions. This positive effect can be emanated from two behavioral effects. First, it 
could be that those who got high financial incentive are motivated or create a sense of 
belongings to provide more positive responses to the sensitive questions. Second, it is 
also possible that those in the low incentive group are disappointed and as a result, they 
were not willing to cooperate and provide more positive responses to the sensitive 
questions.  
Overall, our findings suggest that the use of financial incentive may trigger the 
respondents to provide more positive responses to little sensitive questions among a 
representative sample of rural farmers in Northern Ethiopia. However, no relationship 
between financial incentive and responses to high sensitive questions was found.  
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Data Source: Author’s survey. 
Note: Numeracy level is the average for the number of questions correctly answered. Risk attitude is constructed from the willingness 
to take agricultural risks on 10 points scale (1=completely unwilling and 10 completely willing). Community trust score is constructed 
based on the respondent view if the most people in this Kushet can be trusted using 5-point scale (1=fully trust them and 5 do not trust 
them). Size of farmland is measured in tsimad and 1 tsimad equals 0.25 hectare. 
  
Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1 
Summary statistics of rural households in Northern Ethiopia in 2015 (N=1,143) 
 Mean S.D. Min Max 
E. Demographic characteristics     
Female household head (1=Yes; 0=No) 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Age of household head (in years) 47.25 13.46 18.00 99.00 
Years of education of household head 2.80 4.60 0.00 19.00 
Size of household 5.32 2.12 1.00 12.00 
F. Wealth and assets     
Size of farmland (in tsimad) 2.41 1.98 0.25 18.00 
Value of livestock (in Birr) 5,689.7 6,752.8 0.0 50,540.0 
Value of productive assets (in Birr) 562.3 1,126.0 0.0 20,445.0 
G. Numeracy level, risk attitude and trust level     
Numeracy level 1.39 1.12 0.00 3.00 
Risk aversion 6.21 3.13 1.00 10.00 
General trust level  2.45 1.01 1.00 5.00 
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Table 2 
Mean comparison by questionnaire type for the sample of rural households in Northern Ethiopia in 2015 
 Framed 
question 
(N=572) 
Unframed 
question 
(N=571) 
Difference 
(1) – (2) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Demographic characteristics    
Female household head (1=Yes; 0=No) 0.53 0.54 -0.02 (0.03) 
Age of household head (in years) 47.44 47.06 0.38 (0.80) 
Years of education of household head 2.85 2.73 0.12 (0.27) 
Size of household 5.25 5.38 -0.12 (0.12) 
Wealth and assets    
Size of farmland (in tsimad) 2.27 2.54  -0.26** (0.11) 
Value of livestock (in Birr) 5,590.0 5,789.5 -199.5 (399.6) 
Value of productive assets (in Birr) 517.5 607.1 -89.5 (66.6) 
Numeracy level, risk attitude and trust level    
Numeracy level 1.37 1.42 -0.04 (0.06) 
Risk aversion 6.24 6.17 0.06 (0.19) 
Community trust score  2.42 2.48 -0.05 (0.05) 
Data source: Data Source: Author’s survey. 
Note: Numeracy level is the average for the number of numeracy questions correctly answered. Risk attitude is constructed from the 
willingness to take agricultural risks on 10 points scale (1=completely unwilling and 10 completely willing). Community trust score is 
constructed based on the respondent view if the most people in this Kushet can be trusted using 5-point scale (1=fully trust them and 5 
do not trust them). Size of farmland is measured in tsimad and 1 tsimad equals 0.25 hectare. Standard errors reported in parentheses are 
robust standard errors. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively.. 
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Table 3 
Mean comparison by financial incentive for the sample of rural households in Northern Ethiopia in 2015 
 High pay 
(N=625) 
Low pay 
(N=513) 
Difference 
(1) – (2) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Demographic characteristics    
Female household head (1=Yes; 0=No) 0.53 0.55 -0.02 (0.02) 
Age of household head (in years) 47.13 47.34 -0.21 (0.80) 
Years of education of household head 3.01 2.54 0.45*(0.27) 
Size of household 5.35 5.28 0.06 (0.12) 
Wealth and assets    
Size of farmland (in tsimad) 2.41 2.37 0.02 (0.11) 
Value of livestock (in Birr) 5,917.7 5,438.7 478.9(402.7) 
Value of productive assets (in Birr) 561.0 566.7 -5.6(67.3) 
Numeracy level, risk attitude and trust level    
Numeracy level 1.41 1.38 0.03 (0.06) 
Risk aversion 6.28 6.11 0.17 (0.19) 
Community trust score  2.49 2.41 0.08 (0.05) 
Data source: Author’s survey. 
Note: Numeracy level is the average for the number of numeracy questions correctly answered. Risk attitude is constructed from the 
willingness to take agricultural risks on 10 points scale (1=completely unwilling and 10 completely willing). Community trust score is 
constructed based on the respondent view if the most people in this Kushet can be trusted using 5-point scale (1=fully trust them and 5 
do not trust them). Size of farmland is measured in tsimad and 1 tsimad equals 0.25 hectare. Standard errors reported in parentheses are 
robust standard errors. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively.. 
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Table 4 
Breakdown of responses elicited from rural households in Northern Ethiopia (N=1,143) 
 
List of questions 
(1=Yes; 0=No) 
 
N 
Number of positive 
responses 
 
Number of negative 
responses 
Number of no 
responses (Missing 
or not answering) 
Question 1* 1142 336 806 1 
Question 2 1141 43 1098 2 
Question 3* 1142 239 903 1 
Question 4* 1140 166 974 3 
Question 5 1141 27 1114 2 
Question 6 1142 75 1067 2 
Question 7* 1142 208 934 1 
Question 8 1087 79 1008 56 
Question 9 1141 93 1048 2 
Question 10* 1134 156 978 9 
Question 11*  894 123 771 249 
Question 12* 1141 145 996 2 
Question 13* 1141 113 1028 2 
Question 14* 891 245 646 252 
Question 15* 1099 124 975 44 
Question 16 886 44 842 257 
Question 17* 890 100 790 253 
Question 18* 1081 475 606 62 
Question 19 1137 93 1044 6 
Question 20 1136 113 1023 7 
Question 21* 1139 237 902 4 
Question 22* 1140 214 926 3 
Data Source: Author’s survey. 
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Table 5 
Percentage of positive responses eliciting from rural households in Northern Ethiopia (N=1,143) 
Percentage of positive responses 
List of questions 
(1=Yes; 0=No) 
Full sample Framed question  Unframed 
question 
High Low 
Question 1 0.294 0.293 0.294 0.308 0.282 
Question 3 0.209 0.209 0.207 0.217 0.196 
Question 4 0.146 0.157 0.133 0.130 0.163 
Question 7 0.182 0.192 0.170 0.185 0.175 
Question 10 0.138 0.136 0.137 0.119 0.158 
Question 11  0.138 0.132 0.141 0.144 0.125 
Question 12 0.127 0.123 0.131 0.134 0.115 
Question 13 0.099 0.096 0.101 0.086 0.111 
Question 14 0.275 0.255 0.293 0.299 0.245 
Question 15 0.113 0.114 0.111 0.117 0.107 
Question 17 0.112 0.105 0.118 0.107 0.116 
Question 18 0.439 0.454 0.422 0.464 0.410 
Question 21 0.208 0.213 0.201 0.218 0.197 
Question 22 0.188 0.192 0.181 0.193 0.182 
Data Source: Author’s survey. 
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Table 6 
Percentage of positive responses elicited from rural households in Northern Ethiopia (N=1,143) 
Percentage of positive responses 
List of questions 
(1=Yes; 0=No) 
Whole sample Framed and High Framed and Low Unframed and High Unframed and Low 
Question 1 0.294 0.282 0.305 0.318 0.258 
Question 3 0.209 0.230 0.183 0.205 0.211 
Question 4 0.146 0.133 0.183 0.126 0.143 
Question 7 0.182 0.185 0.198 0.186 0.151 
Question 10 0.138 0.103 0.167 0.132 0.147 
Question 11  0.138 0.097 0.110 0.129 0.083 
Question 12 0.127 0.136 0.106 0.132 0.123 
Question 13 0.099 0.084 0.106 0.088 0.115 
Question 14 0.275 0.185 0.206 0.271 0.187 
Question 15 0.113 0.113 0.106 0.113 0.099 
Question 17 0.112 0.068 0.095 0.094 0.091 
Question 18 0.439 0.470 0.381 0.410 0.394 
Question 21 0.208 0.227 0.198 0.208 0.195 
Question 22 0.188 0.201 0.183 0.186 0.179 
Data Source: Author’s survey. 
  
 194 
Table 7 
Mean comparison of response frequencies by financial incentive and framed question for a sample of rural households in Northern 
Ethiopia (N=1,143) 
Percentage of positive responses 
List of questions 
(1=Yes; 0=No) 
High pay Low pay Difference Framed  Unframed  Difference 
 (1) (2) (1) – (2) (1) (2) (1) – (2) 
Question 1 0.315 0.282 0.033 (0.027) 0.292 0.294 -0.001 (0.026) 
Question 3 0.243 0.196 0.046* (0.025) 0.210 0.207 0.003 (0.023) 
Question 4 0.117 0.162 -0.045* (0.021) 0.156 0.138 0.022 (0.020) 
Question 7 0.183 0.175 0.007 (0.022) 0.192 0.170 0.022 (0.021) 
Question 10 0.133 0.157 -0.023 (0.021) 0.137 0.137 0.000(0.018) 
Question 11  0.126 0.099 0.027 (0.027) 0.119 0.127 -0.008 (0.023) 
Question 12 0.117 0.115 0.001 (0.018) 0.121 0.131 -0.010 (0.018) 
Question 13 0.093 0.111 -0.017 (0.018) 0.094 0.101 -0.007 (0.016) 
Question 14 0.329 0.241 0.087** (0.035) 0.268 0.305 -0.036 (0.034) 
Question 15 0.108 0.108 0.000 (0.019) 0.117 0.113 0.003 (0.018) 
Question 17 0.090 0.106 -0.015 (0.022) 0.089 0.108 -0.019 (0.022) 
Question 18 0.483 0.410 0.073** (0.032) 0.454 0.415 0.039 (0.029) 
Question 21 0.234 0.197 0.037 (0.024) 0.209 0.201 0.008 (0.0220 
Question 22 0.209 0.181 0.027 (0.024) 0.191 0.181 0.010 (0.022) 
Data Source: Author’s survey. 
Note: Standard errors for paired t-test are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively. 
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Table 8 
Mean comparison of response frequencies by framed question for a sample of rural households in Northern Ethiopia (N=1,143) 
Percentage of positive responses 
List of questions 
(1=Yes; 0=No) 
High and 
Framed 
High and 
Unframed 
Difference Low and Framed  Low and 
Unframed  
Difference 
 (1) (2) (1) – (2) (1) (2) (1) – (2) 
Question 1 0.139 0.161 -0.022 (0.021) 0.155 0.126 0.029 (0.023) 
Question 3 0.113 0.104 0.009 (0.018) 0.093 0103 -0.009 (0.019) 
Question 4 0.065 0.064 0.001 (0.014) 0.093 0.070 0.023 (0.017) 
Question 7 0.091 0.094 -0.003 (0.017) 0.101 0.074 0.027 (0.018) 
Question 10 0.051 0.067 -0.016 (0.013) 0.085 0.072 0.013 (0.017) 
Question 11  0.048 0.065 -0.017 (0.013) 0.056 0.040 0.015 (0.013) 
Question 12 0.067 0.067 0.000 (0.014) 0.054 0.060 -0.005 (0.014) 
Question 13 0.041 0.044 -0.003 (0.011) 0.054 0.056 -0.001 (0.014) 
Question 14 0.091 0.137 -0.046** (0.019) 0.105 0.091 0.013 (0.019) 
Question 15 0.056 0.057 -0.001 (0.013) 0.054 0.048 0.005 (0.014) 
Question 17 0.033 0.048 -0.014 (0.011) 0.048 0.044 0.003 (0.013) 
Question 18 0.232 0.208 0.024 (0.026) 0.194 0.192 0.001 (0.027) 
Question 21 0.112 0.105 0.006 (0.018) 0.101 0.095 0.005 (0.019) 
Question 22 0.099 0.094 0.004 (0.017) 0.093 0.087 0.005 (0.018) 
Data Source: Author’s survey. 
Note: Standard errors for paired t-test are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively. 
  
 196 
Table 9 
Mean comparison of response frequencies by financial incentive for a sample of rural households in Northern Ethiopia (N=1,143) 
Percentage of positive responses 
List of questions 
(1=Yes; 0=No) 
Framed and 
High 
Framed and 
Low 
Difference Unframed and 
High 
Unframed and 
Low 
Difference 
 (1) (2) (1) – (2) (1) (2) (1) – (2) 
Question 1 0.152 0.128 0.024 (0.021) 0.177 0.114 0.063***(0.022) 
Question 3 0.120 0.077 0.043***(0.017) 0.114 0.093 0.021 (0.019) 
Question 4 0.072 0.077  -0.004 (0.015) 0.070 0.063 0.007 (0.015) 
Question 7 0.102 0.083 0.019 (0.017) 0.103 0.066 0.036** (0.017) 
Question 10 0.056 0.070 -0.014 (0.014) 0.073 0.065 0.008 (0.015) 
Question 11  0.052 0.046 0.006 (0.012) 0.072 0.036 0.035***(0.013) 
Question 12 0.080 0.044 0.035***(0.014) 0.073 0.054 0.019 (0.015) 
Question 13 0.044 0.044 0.000 (0.012) 0.049 0.051 -0.001 (0.013) 
Question 14 0.093 0.086 0.006 (0.016) 0.151 0.082 0.068***(0.020) 
Question 15 0.060 0.044 0.016 (0.013) 0.063 0.044 0.019 (0.013) 
Question 17 0.036 0.040 -0.003 (0.011) 0.052 0.040 0.012 (0.012) 
Question 18 0.250 0.160 0.089***(0.025) 0.228 0.174 0.054** (0.026) 
Question 21 0.117 0.083 0.033** (0.017) 0.116 0.086 0.029 (0.018) 
Question 22 0.104 0.077 0.027* (0.017) 0.103 0.079 0.024 (0.017) 
Data Source: Author’s survey. 
Note: Standard errors for paired t-test are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively. 
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Table 10 
Effects of framed question and financial incentive on survey response: Logit probability estimate controlling for enumerator and 
village dummy 
List of questions (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(1=Yes; 0=No) N 
Framed 
(1=long; 0=short 
High pay (1=ETB15; 
0=ETB5) 
Framed * High pay 
Question 1 1093 0.150 (0.271) 0.188 (0.203) -0.302 (0.263) 
Question 3 974 -0.348 (0.329) -0.297 (0.287) 0.640 (0.394) 
Question 4 920 0.262 (0.277) -0.297 (0.290) -0.114 (0.448) 
Question 7 735 0.309 (0.279) 0.263 (0.324) -0.259 (0.358) 
Question 10 1130 -0.260 (0.424) -0.508 (0.5470 -0.010 (0.669) 
Question 11  670 0.397 (0.373) 0.540 (0.356) -0.943*(0.439) 
Question 12 1101 -0.232 (0.386) 0.148 (0.394) 0.059 (0.498) 
Question 13 626 -0.519 (0.387) -0.532 (0.435) 0.651 (0.514) 
Question 14 832 0.179 (0.299) 0.488 (0.306) -0.680 (0.417) 
Question 15 593 -0.161 (0.344) 0.137 (0.464) 0.361 (0.583) 
Question 17  880         -0.026 (0.358) -0.028 (0.376) -0.144 (0.539) 
Question 18 1033 -0.162 (0.252) -0.039 (0.223) 0.535 (0.305) 
Question 21 1042 0.068 (0.324) 0.214 (0.255) 0.002 (0.430) 
Question 22 987 0.079 (0.334) 0.097 (0.274) -0.037 (0.421) 
Data Source: Author’s survey. 
Note: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the village level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at 
the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively. 
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Table 11 
Effects of framed question and financial incentive on survey response: Logit probability estimate controlling for household & 
individual characteristics, enumerator and village dummy 
List of questions (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(1=Yes; 0=No) N 
Framed 
(1=long; 0=short 
High pay (1=ETB15; 
0=ETB5) 
Framed * High pay 
Question 1 971 0.269 (0.311) 0.199 (0.237) -0.388 (0.343) 
Question 3 856 -0.384 (0.382) -0.340 (0.346) 0.769 (0.475) 
Question 4 803 0.386 (0.370) -0.238 (0.344) -0.300 (0.560) 
Question 7 615 0.283 (0.354) 0.273 (0.373) -0.173 (0.409) 
Question 10 1002 -0.082 (0.563) -0.334 (0.638) -0.236 (0.793) 
Question 11  595 0.383 (0.527) 0.346 (0.448) -0.778 (0.569) 
Question 12 973 -0.529 (0.432) -0.024 (0.420) 0.411 (0.517) 
Question 13 490 -0.030 (0.509) -0202 (0.488) 0.301 (0.568) 
Question 14 733 0.065 (0.327) 0.402 (0.335) -0.677 (0.469) 
Question 15 485 -0.576 (0.463) -0.109 (0.554) 0.919 (0.699) 
Question 17          797 -0.332 (0.432) -0.014 (0.451) 0.206 (0.566) 
Question 18 869 -0.336 (0.314) -0.018 (0.272) 0.644 (0.411) 
Question 21 922 -0.053 (0.393) 0.017 (0.278) 0.182 (0.487) 
Question 22 922 -0.053 (0.393) 0.017 (0.278) 0.182 (0.487) 
Data Source: Author’s survey. 
Note: Household characteristics includes female household head (1=Yes; 0=No), age of household head, years of education of 
household head, size of household, size of farmland, numeracy level, risk aversion and community trust score. Robust standard errors 
adjusted for clustering at the village level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level 
respectively. 
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Table 12 
Effects of framed question and financial incentive by level of question sensitivity: OLS estimate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Response to less 
sensitive questions 
Response to less 
sensitive questions 
Response to high 
sensitive questions 
Response to high 
sensitive questions 
     
Framed questionnaire (1=framed 
questions; 0=unframed) 
0.099 (0.118) 0.022 (0.113) -0.024 (0.112) -0.048 (0.126) 
     
High pay (1=ETB15; 0=ETB5) 0.281** (0.100) 0.220** (0.105) -0.024 (0.119) -0.059 (0.127) 
     
Framed questionnaire*high pay -0.220 (0.135) -0.123 (0.1350 0.005 (0.146) 0.097 (0.160) 
     
Household and individual 
characteristics 
No Yes No Yes 
Enumerator dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Village dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observation (N) 764 689 865 785 
Adjusted R-square 0.362 0.381 0.475 0.482 
Data Source: Author’s survey. 
Note: Household characteristics includes female household head (1=Yes; 0=No), age of household head, years of education of 
household head, size of household, size of farmland, numeracy level, risk aversion and community trust score. Robust standard errors 
adjusted for clustering at the village level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level 
respectively. 
  
 200 
Table 13 
Effects of framed question and financial incentive by question type (Socio-economic domains): OLS estimate 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Response to health 
related questions 
Response to 
social protection 
related questions 
Response to loan 
& finance 
related questions 
Response to public 
good questions 
Response to 
gender & intra 
household related 
questions 
     
 
Framed questionnaire (1=framed 
questions; 0=unframed) 
0.053 (0.049) -0.009 (0.061) -0.020 (0.062) 0.020 (0.041) 0.033 (0.062) 
      
High pay (1=ETB15; 0=ETB5) 0.048 (0.0430 0.000 (0.055) -0.080 (0.059) 0.058 (0.040) 0.094 (0.065) 
      
Framed questionnaire*high pay -0.068 (0.053) 0.015 (0.079) 0.067 (0.086) -0.075 (0.057) -0.141 (0.091) 
      
Household and individual 
characteristics  
No No No No No 
Enumerator dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Village dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observation (N) 1138 1133 1128 890 852 
Adjusted R-square 0.281 0.381 0.396 0.417 0.232 
Data Source: Author’s survey. 
Note: Household characteristics includes female household head (1=Yes; 0=No), age of household head, years of education of 
household head, size of household, size of farmland, numeracy level, risk aversion and community trust scorel. Robust standard errors 
adjusted for clustering at the village level are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively. 
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 Table 14 
 Effects of framed question and financial incentive by question type (Socio-economic domains): OLS estimate 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Response to health 
related questions 
Response to social 
protection related 
questions 
Response to loan 
& finance 
related questions 
Response to 
public good 
questions 
Response to gender 
& intra household 
related questions 
     
 
Framed questionnaire (1=framed 
questions; 0=unframed) 
0.061 (0.054) -0.006 (0.070) -0.017 (0.072) -0.004 (0.041) -0.039 (0.064) 
      
High pay (1=ETB15; 0=ETB5) 0.045 (0.042) -0.010 (0.059) -0.083 (0.070) 0.018 (0.039) 0.061 (0.072) 
      
Framed questionnaire*high pay -0.058 (0.059) 0.030 (0.089) 0.064 (0.099) -0.021 (0.0570 -0.058 (0.100) 
      
Household and individual 
characteristics  
Yes 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Enumerator dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Village dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observation (N) 1138 1002 1000 799 773 
Adjusted R-square 0.281 0.393 0.412 0.410 0.253 
Data Source: Author’s survey. 
Note: Household characteristics includes female household head (1=Yes; 0=No), age of household head, years of education of 
household head, size of household, size of farmland, numeracy level, risk aversion and community trust score. Robust standard errors 
adjusted for clustering at the village level are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively. 
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Figure 1 Profile of the randomized experiment study 
 
Random sample of Households 
N=1,143 
Households receive 
framed questions 
N=572 
Households receive 
unframed questions 
N=571 
High pay incentive 
households 
N=308 
Low pay incentive 
households 
N=262 
High pay incentive 
households 
N=317 
Low pay incentive 
households 
N=251 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1 
Survey with unframed questions 
 
Questions (Enumerators must read these questions exactly as written. Do not 
change or shorten the questions) 
Please use the following codes: 1=Yes; 2=No; -88=Not applicable 
 
1. Have you ever shaken hands with your friends without washing your hands after 
going to the toilet?(Less sensitive; Health)* 
 
2. Have you ever eaten anything without washing your hands after going to the 
toilet? (Dropped) 
 
3. Have you ever refused a loan request from a close friend or relative even though 
you have the money in hand? (More sensitive; Loan and finance)* 
 
4. Have you ever intentionally delayed paying back a loan to a close friend or 
relative even though you have the money for the repayment? (More sensitive; 
Loan and finance)* 
 
5. If there is a woman giving birth, do you prefer to take her to traditional birth 
attendants? (Dropped) 
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6. Do you agree that it is not worthy to send female child to school? (Dropped) 
 
7. Have you ever knowingly stayed close to others when you are being infected 
with communicable diseases? (More sensitive; Health)* 
 
8. Have you ever under reported the age of your children in order to get such 
benefits? (Dropped) 
 
9. Have you ever knowingly used public or private transportation without paying 
for the service? (Dropped) 
 
10. As a buyer, have you ever received too much change from some sellers and 
knowingly kept it? (More sensitive; Loan and finance)*  
 
11. Have you ever intentionally graze your cattle, sheep or goats in these publicly 
restricted areas? (Less sensitive; Common pool)* 
 
12. Have you ever collected wood illegally from publicly restricted forest? (More 
sensitive; Common pool)* 
 
13. Have you ever pretended to be sick in order to get exemptions from PSNP or 
from other public works? (More sensitive; Social protection)* 
 
14. For female respondents: Have your husband ever shouted loudly at you or even 
physically beaten you up? (Less sensitive; Gender and intra household)* 
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For male respondents: Have you ever shouted loudly at your wife or even 
physically beaten your wife up?  
 
15. Have you ever under-declared the sales value to your partners (or other 
household members) so that you can use the money for your own personal 
consumption? (More sensitive; Gender and intra household)* 
 
16. For female respondents: Have you ever taken money out of your husband’s 
pocket without informing him? (Dropped) 
 
For male respondents: Have you ever taken money out of your wife’s pocket 
(Muday) without informing her? 
 
17. For female respondents: Have you ever taken grain out of the household grain 
storage for sale without informing your husband and then use the money for 
personal or household consumption? (More sensitive; Gender and intra 
household)* 
 
For male respondents: Have you ever taken grain out of the household grain 
storage for sale without informing your wife and then use the money for personal 
consumption? 
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18. For Orthodox Christians or Muslims: Have you ever eaten any food during the 
specified fasting period (hour) or skipped fasting for one day? (Less sensitive; 
Religion)* 
 
For others (no or other religion): Just tick here _________  
 
19. For Orthodox Christians: Have you ever eaten any meat, egg, milk and milk 
products during the fasting period? (Dropped) 
 
For Muslims: Have you ever prayed less than five times a day?  
 
For others (no or other religion): Just tick here _________  
 
20. Do you agree that some people in this village pay bribes to village leader in order 
to get access to irrigation water, agricultural package incentives, government 
transfers, or other NGO program benefits? (Dropped) 
 
21. Do you agree that some people in this village concealed some part of their wealth 
in order to join the PSNP program? (Less sensitive; Social protection)* 
 
22. Do you agree that some people in this village underreported their wealth in order 
to stay longer in the PSNP program? (Less sensitive; Social protection)* 
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Appendix 2 
Survey with framed questions 
 
Questions (Enumerators must read these questions exactly as written. Do not 
change or shorten the questions) 
Please use the following codes: 1=Yes; 2=No; -88=Not applicable 
 
1. Here is something that has been said about some people in this area. They don’t 
always wash their hands after going to the toilet. Sometimes, they even shake 
hands with friends without washing their hands. Have you ever shaken hands 
with your friends without washing your hands after going to the toilet? (Less 
sensitive; Health)* 
2. Here is something that has been said about some people in this area. They don’t 
always wash their hands after going to the toilet. Sometimes, they even eat food 
without washing their hands. Have you ever eaten anything without washing your 
hands after going to the toilet? (Dropped) 
 
3. Some people fear that others may not repay loans on time or repay loans at all. 
When they get a loan request from a close friend or relative, they refuse the 
request and pretend as if they have no money for lending. Have you ever refused 
a loan request from a close friend or relative even though you have the money in 
hand? (More sensitive; Loan and finance)* 
 
4. Sometimes people delayed paying back the loan they took from a close friend or 
relative but keep the money for personal use for additional days. Have you ever 
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intentionally delayed paying back a loan to a close friend or relative even though 
you have the money for the repayment? (More sensitive; Loan and finance)* 
 
5. Some people prefer to take a pregnant woman to traditional birth attendant for 
giving birth due to convenience, cost and tradition. If there is a woman giving 
birth, do you prefer to take her to traditional birth attendants? (Dropped) 
6. Some families prefer not to send their girls to school. Some of them traditionally 
perceive that it is not worthy sending girls to school. It is also believed that 
sending girls to school may spoil their behavior. Do you agree that it is not 
worthy to send female child to school? (Dropped) 
 
7. Some people do not like to keep good physical distances from others when being 
infected with communicable diseases such as the flu or cold. Have you ever 
knowingly stayed close to others when you are being infected with 
communicable diseases? (More sensitive; Health)* 
 
8. Some households underreport the age of their children in order to get child 
benefits from NGOs and the government or to get free transportation for their 
children. Have you ever under reported the age of your children in order to get 
such benefits? (Dropped) 
 
9. Sometimes people knowingly use public or private transportations without 
paying for the service. They may come up with cash in big denominations so that 
they are exempted from paying due to the lack of change. Or they may take 
advantages of the driver’s assistant (Woyala) who forgets to collect the fare. 
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Have you ever knowingly used public or private transportation without paying 
for the service? (Dropped) 
 
10. Sellers sometimes do not carefully count change for buyers and may give extra 
change to buyers. When this happens, some buyers intentionally keep the extra 
change. As a buyer, have you ever received too much change from some sellers 
and knowingly kept it? (More sensitive; Loan and finance)* 
 
11. Population in the area is increasing and there is not enough land for grazing. As 
such, some people send their cattle, sheep or goats intentionally to public areas 
that restrict grazing activities. Have you ever intentionally graze your cattle, 
sheep or goats in these publicly restricted areas? (Less sensitive; Common pool)* 
 
12. Some years ago, people in this area were able to collect wood from any forest for 
cooking, building houses, and for other household activities. This time, the 
government has restricted some areas in order to preserve the forest. However, 
some people still illegally collect wood from publicly restricted forest because of 
the high prices of wood and charcoal. Have you ever collected wood illegally 
from publicly restricted forest? (More sensitive; Common pool)* 
 
13. During the busy period of the agricultural season, some farmers in this area 
pretend to be sick in order to get exemptions from the PSNP or from other public 
works. Have you ever pretended to be sick in order to get exemptions from PSNP 
or from other public works? (More sensitive; Social protection)* 
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14. For female respondents: Some husbands have bad temper and can feel very angry 
or irritated with their wives. They may shout loudly at their wives or even 
physically beat up their wives. Have your husband ever shouted loudly at you or 
even physically beaten you up? (Less sensitive; Gender and intra household)* 
 
For male respondents: Some husbands have bad temper and can feel very angry 
or irritated with their wives. They may shout loudly at their wives or even 
physically beat up their wives. Have you ever shouted loudly at your wife or even 
physically beaten your wife up?  
 
15. Some husbands or wives in this area do not report the exact sales value of their 
produce to their partners. They may pretend that part of the produce for sale was 
stolen or lost and then use the extra money for their personal consumption. Have 
you ever under-declared the sales value to your partners (or other household 
members) so that you can use the money for your own personal consumption? 
(More sensitive; Gender and intra household)* 
 
16. For female respondents: As you may know, sometimes husbands in this area do 
not provide enough money to their wives for personal or household consumption. 
In some cases, the wives need to take money out of their husbands’ pocket 
without informing them. Have you ever taken money out of your husband’s 
pocket without informing him? (Dropped) 
 
For male respondents: As you may know, sometimes men need extra money for 
going out with friends and for drinking alcohol (Sewa, Tej, Areki or Beer). 
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However, they may not have enough money and choose to take money out of 
their spouse’s pocket (Muday). Have you ever taken money out of your wife’s 
pocket (Muday) without informing her? 
 
17. For female respondents: Related to the above question, sometimes wives take 
grain out of the household’s grain storage for sale without informing their 
husbands and use the money for personal or household consumption. Have you 
ever taken grain out of the household grain storage for sale without informing 
your husband and then use the money for personal or household consumption? 
(More sensitive; Gender and intra household)* 
 
For male respondents: Related to the above question, sometimes men take grain 
out of the household’s grain storage for sale without informing their wife and use 
the money for going out with friends or for drinking alcohol (Sewa, Tej, Areki or 
Beer). Have you ever taken grain out of the household grain storage for sale 
without informing your wife and then use the money for personal consumption? 
 
18. Some Orthodox Christians or Muslims do not strictly follow the fasting rules of 
their religion. For example, some may break fasting during the specified period 
(hour) and some may even totally skip fasting. Have you ever eaten any food 
during the specified fasting period (hour) or skipped fasting for one day? (Less 
sensitive; Religion)* 
 
For others (no or other religions): Just tick here _________  
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19. For Orthodox Christians: In the fasting period, followers should not consume 
meat, egg, milk and milk products. However, some followers still sometimes eat 
some of these foods and pretend as if they are strictly doing fasting. Have you 
ever eaten meat, egg, milk and milk products during the fasting period? 
(Dropped) 
 
For Muslims: There are praying rules for Muslims. Specifically, Muslims should 
practice Salat but some followers do not actually pray five times a day. Have you 
ever prayed less than five times a day?  
 
For others (no or other religions): Just tick here _________  
 
20. Some people pay bribes to their village leaders in order to get irrigation water 
access or extra water rations. Some need to pay bribes to get agricultural package 
incentives, government transfers, or other NGO program benefits. Some people 
pay bribes because they see others are doing it and they feel that it is ok if others 
are doing it. Do you agree that some people in this village pay bribes to village 
leader in order to get access to irrigation water, agricultural package incentives, 
government transfers, or other NGO program benefits? (Dropped) 
 
21. The PSNP program may not be able to identify households who correctly report 
their wealth from those who underreport their wealth. Many households report 
their wealth correctly but some households do not. Some underreport their wealth 
in order to join PSNP program. Do you agree that some people in this village 
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concealed some part of their wealth in order to join the PSNP program? (Less 
sensitive; Social protection)* 
 
22. Some people in this area may find it difficult for them to accumulate enough 
wealth for graduation from the PSNP in some specific periods. They will then 
underreport their wealth in order to stay longer in the PSNP program. Do you 
agree that some people in this village underreported their wealth in order to stay 
longer in the PSNP program? (Less sensitive; Social protection)* 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
6.1 General Conclusions 
This dissertation contains four empirical studies on related topics in 
development economics. The four studies are all randomized field experiments and 
all of them use original data obtained from rural households in Northern Ethiopia for 
empirical analysis. 
In the first study, we analyze an impact evaluation of a weather index 
insurance program that is offered commercially among rural households in northern 
Ethiopia. The study makes two main contributions to the existing empirical research 
on the impacts of weather index insurance. The first contribution of this study is, it 
investigates the impact of weather index insurance when the insurance is 
commercialized and is offered to rural households without subsidy. Second, our 
study provides an empirical evidence on the impact of weather index insurance when 
the insurance is offered commercially to rural households for a number of 
consecutive years.  
Our results is consistent with the story that rainfall shock experience reduces 
agricultural investment (past rainfall shock experience deteriorates savings and also 
it is a barrier to the adoption of agricultural technologies like chemical fertilizer), 
weather index insurance (along with ex-ante technology adoption behavioral change) 
helps better management of agricultural investment and insurance compensation 
(ex-post) also help to maintain farmers’ investment on risky agricultural inputs such 
as chemical fertilizer.  
In general, our results provide the following sets of conclusions. The first one 
is that carefully designed and implemented weather index insurance can indeed 
 215 
improve agricultural investment, yield and finance. Second, from a development 
point of view, our result suggests that variability of weather coupled with incomplete 
insurance markets may hinder agricultural development in developing countries. As 
such, an introduction of innovative weather index insurance in developing countries 
may play a significant role in boosting investments, savings and economic growth.  
The second essay deals with the effects of weather index insurance on rural 
households' spending on children's education. Specifically, this essay examines 
whether insured households can better pay for their children's education expenses 
due to better risk management. It also reports whether insured households can 
maintain their children's education expenses when they experienced rainfall shocks. 
To examine the impacts, we conduct a randomized control trial (RCT) that has been 
conducted by HARITA research group on a sample of 8 villages and 400 households 
in Northern Ethiopia in 2010.  
The findings report that WII is relevant in determining household school 
expenses because insured households are effectively protected from the rainfall 
shock, which often induces them to reduce educational expenses. In addition, 
education expenditure is higher for rural households with WII than those without the 
insurance. Further, we also find that rainfall shocks have negative effects on 
household education expenses. Rainfall shock (proxied in our analysis by the 
severity of crop failure due to rainfall shock) shows negative effects on household 
education expenses.  
These results are consistent with theoretical notion on the role of WII in 
reducing the impacts of rainfall shocks on education expenses. It was shown that 
weather index insurance affects education expenses in two ways: WII helps 
households earn higher income due its effect on farm investment, yield and 
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agricultural income (Cole et al., 2013; Karlan et al., 2014), in turn, increasing 
expenses including investment on education. Second, as noted in the literature, WII 
is one of the risk coping strategies that help households to smooth consumption 
during adverse shocks. Therefore, insurance policy holders are less likely to reduce 
school expenses compared to non-buyers. Overall, our results are consistent with the 
story that rainfall shock experience reduces education expenses, weather index 
insurance helps better management of educational investment and insurance 
compensation also help to maintain education investment.  
Finally, having shown that the introduction of weather index insurance can 
play a role in reducing the impacts of rainfall shocks on education expenses and 
given the importance of such investment in human capital formation, this implies that 
policies aimed at insuring rural households against rainfall shocks may lead to an 
improvement in households’ educational investment.  
The third essay presents the results of a randomized field experiment 
conducted with a large number of rural farmers randomly selected from Northern 
Ethiopia. This research contributes to the growing literature on the aggregation and 
disaggregation of risk preference by analyzing whether risk preference among poor 
people with low level of education can be framed by interactions among peers. It also 
examines if a prior structural manifestation of individual risk preference has an effect 
on the aggregation of individual risk preferences in small groups.  
We find evidence that supports the following four main conclusions. First, 
our findings on the pure risk preference differential among individuals and groups 
shows that on average the three person groups are more risk averse than individuals. 
This finding is in line with the existing empirical literature on risk preference 
differential between individuals and a small member groups (Shupp & Williams 
 217 
2008; Baker et al., 2008; Masclet et al., 2009; He et al., 2011; Sutter et al., 2012). 
Two basic differences between our findings and the existing literature are worth 
mentioning, however. First, our subjects (who are mainly poor farmers) in general 
are more risk averse than the subjects employed in the other studies (mainly students). 
Second, the results of other studies suggest that groups are more risk averse than 
individuals in low winning percentages, but groups tend to be less risk averse in the 
highest winning percentages. Our result, however, shows that groups are more risk 
averse on both low and high winning percentages.  
Second, the results indicate that risk preference decisions made in a group 
influence the subsequent individual risk preference. Specifically, experiencing risk 
preference exercise in small groups and prior knowledge of risk preference in small 
groups has a significant effect on the subsequent individual risk preference. It means 
that individuals who participated in group decisions on risk and uncertainty will 
bring forward the risk preference of the group back to their individual risk preference. 
The economic implication of this result is quite large. Many economic decisions 
made collectively by small groups under risks and uncertainties have to be further 
managed by or executed by only individuals of the groups and our findings portrays 
that prior communications, knowledge, and decision making by small groups under 
risk and uncertainties can subsequently affect individual decisions.  
Third, we also find that risk preference decisions made individually does not 
significantly influence the subsequent group risk preference. Specifically, on average 
groups decisions are not significantly affected by the fact that participants had prior 
knowledge and decision making on individual risk preference. This result is very 
similar to the findings in Shupp & Williams (2008). Finally, we observe results 
obtained from two-arm one-stage research design are qualitatively similar as results 
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obtained from one-arm two-stage research design. This tells us, the structural 
manifestation of individual risk preference has no significant effects on the 
aggregation of individual risk preference in small groups. Thus, methodologically the 
use of one arm two phases or two arms one phase approaches for risk aggregation 
does not matter.  
In the final essay, we present the results of a randomized field experiment 
conducted with a large number of rural households randomly selected from Northern 
Ethiopia. The essay explores the effects of financial incentive and the framing of 
survey questions on the responses to survey questions of sensitive nature. There are 
two interventions in this study. The first intervention consists of two types of 
financial incentive groups- the high pay (ETB 15) intervention group and the low pay 
(ETB 5) intervention group. For the second type of intervention, we prepare two 
types of survey questions –survey with framed questions and survey with unframed 
questions.  
Then, we compare the response rate among those receiving high financial 
incentive and low financial incentive; and among those who were interviewed using 
framed survey questions and unframed survey questions. We also compare response 
by grouping them into two sensitivity levels (less sensitive ones and more sensitive 
ones). We further grouped the questions in to five socioeconomic domains (health, 
social protection, loan and finance, common pool and gender and intra household) to 
see if responses differ by domain.  
The result shows that high financial incentive improves response to the little 
sensitive survey questions, but the survey with framed questions does not. 
Respondents in the high pay category were more likely to provide more positive 
responses to the little sensitive questions. However, providing survey incentives in 
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the case of high sensitive questions does not significantly affect responses. In respect 
to the socioeconomic domains, both the financial incentive and the framing of 
questions do not matter. Besides, the use of framed survey question does not 
significantly improve response for sensitive questions in all the cases. Overall, our 
findings suggest that the use of financial incentive triggers respondents to provide 
more positive responses to little sensitive questions among a representative sample of 
rural farmers in Northern Ethiopia. However, no relationship between financial 
incentive and responses to high sensitive questions was found.  
 
 
